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ON THE HIERARCHY OF PERPETRATORS DURING THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Suren Manukyan

Outlining organizers and perpetrators of genocides, as well as analyzing their roles in the process of mass killings are crucial for the study of particular cases of the crime.

Genocide is first and foremost a political crime, which is masterminded by humans and is carried out by humans. To understand the machinery of the crime we have to learn the system of hierarchy inside its operating mechanism: from decision-makers to ordinary executioners and their proponents.

This problem has remained somewhat out of the academic scope of the Armenian Genocide studies and has found itself in a specific perceptual trap of the belief that there is no need to study a subject as obvious as this. Surely, there have been researchers, which have reflected on the matter of identifying the felons; however, the system per se, its horizontal and vertical connections, from decision-making through execution has not been subject to academic scrutiny.

The Encyclopedia of Genocide defines perpetrator as individuals, who “initiate, facilitate, or carry out acts of genocide or crimes against humanity”¹. These functions – the initiation, facilitation, and implementation – to some extent describe the operational sequence of any genocide.

Article 4 of the UN Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted on December 9, 1948) defines the scope of complicity to the crime: “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III [of this Convention – S.M.] shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”² At the court hearings against the Young Turks in 1919-1920, the offenders were classified into a similar hierarchal order. Separated hearings were held for party leaders, state officials, members of the Special Organization, as well as regional officials, and party secretaries.³

The May 24th, 1915 declaration made by the three Entente countries reflected on the problem of personal responsibility, and the complicity of Ottoman officials in the mas-

1. Dinah L. Shelton (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, Thomson Gale, 2004), 790.

2. The full text of the UN Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is available at <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/AH386.pdf>

3. See Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam, *Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011); Meline Anumyan, *Tchanachum yev datapartum: Yeritturkeri datavarutyunnery (1919-1921 tt. և 1926 t.)* [Recognition and Condemnation, The Young Turks Trials (1919-1921 and 1926)] (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2013).

sacres of the Armenian population, and stated the need of the members of the Ottoman Empire and the participants of massacres to bear personal responsibility for the events.⁴

The circle of persons involved in perpetration and the hierarchical organization of the Armenian Genocide can be provisionally divided into the following groups: upper-level decision-makers, middle-level regional organizers, agencies, and structures, as well as lower level common population.

a. Decision makers

In the upper circle of perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide were those, who made the crucial decisions. They were responsible for the formulation of the ideology of the genocide, making the decisions on carrying out the genocide and supervising the course of the massacres. Decision-makers sent hundreds of thousands of people to death oftentimes without participating in their killings personally.

The perpetrators of this level were high ranked state officials, party elites, and a few influential individuals, who had a decisive role in masterminding the Armenian Genocide. It is impossible to segregate those roles since a person could appear in more than one position of a party leader, a state official, and an influential individual at the same time.

The state has a crucial role in programming and carrying out genocide. The genocides of the 20th century have been perpetrated by state authorities or its representatives, for only the excessive centralization of state power, as well as control over communications and transportation means make the organization of a crime of such extent possible on a practical level.⁵ State resources, the legitimacy of the use of force, access to infrastructures, such as telegraphs, railroads, concentration camps, make a 'project' as wide-scale as genocide feasible. The state is also the only agent in possession of all those means, which let instigate a feeling of hatred in the minds of the population by dehumanizing the victims, depicting them as an evil or a deadly menace, and, thus involving huge popular masses in the act of killing.

As a rule, such states are governed by political forces, which adopt a genocidal ideology and demonstrate willingness for the mass crime. Those forces included the National Socialist Party in the case of the Holocaust, the Khmer Rouge, one of the currents of the Communist party, in Cambodia. The Armenian Genocide is a crime committed by the Ottoman Empire; however, the decisions for it were made by the Central Committee of the Union and Progress Party, which had de facto incorporated the state's authority in its hands, performing functions of state bodies.⁶ The decisions by the Committee of the Union

4. "In view of those new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime-Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres", (Cf. <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/France.php>).

5. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (eds.), *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 26.

6. See Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*

and Progress, which had been implemented by the government, were later validated by a back date and were given legislative power by the Ottoman parliament.

The decision on genocide was formulated between 1910 and 1911 in the course of the congresses of the Young Turks.⁷ In the situation where the ideology of Ottomanism had demonstrated its inefficiency the urge to replace it with that of Turkism was growing. A number of proponents of the pan-Turkist ideology were elected to the Central Committee of Ittihad in the course of the party congresses held between 1910 and 1911.⁸ In the autumn of 1911, the 4th congress of the party verified the move to forced Turkification. Kazım Nami Duru, who was participating in the congress, recalls in his memoirs: “Ittihat swore to dissolve other peoples in the Turkish environment and so developed a program to achieve the goal.”⁹ Doctor Nazım, one of the pioneers of the plan, consolidated the vision of the ‘final Turkification’ at the 1910-1911 congresses; the program was to be implemented through mass resettlements of Muslims and through extermination of the Armenian population.¹⁰

Starting from 1913 the Central Committee of the Party of Young Turks discontinued reporting to the congress; having centralized the control of the country in its hands, the party relied on the influence and the authority of its members, who held positions in the government. It was the Ittihat Central Committee that elaborated and implemented the plan of exterminating the Armenian population of the Empire. Throughout the period, when the Armenian genocide was planned and implemented, i.e. in 1912-1917, the Central Committee of Ittihat remained unchanged and included General Secretary of the party Midhat Şükrü, Saïd Halim Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Eyüp Sabri, Doctor Nazım, Doctor Behaeddin Şakir, Doctor Rusuhi, Ziya Gökalp, Emrullah, Küçük Talaat, Atif Riza, and Kara Kemal.¹¹

A number of authors (Arsen Avagyan, Dogan Avcıoğlu¹², Şükrü Hanioglu, Robert Melson¹³) give a pivotal role to Doctor Nazım and Behaeddin Şakir in programming and carrying out the Armenian Genocide.

(London, Macmillan. 2007); Vahakn Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 2003).

7. Vahakn Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 179-180.

8. Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 165; Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 49.

9. Kazım Nami Duru, Ziya Gökalp (İstanbul, 1965), S. 41, cited from Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan: mekhanizmi prinyatiya I ispolneniya resheniy* [Armenian Genocide: Mechanisms of Decision-making and Implementation] (Yerevan, Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2013), 43.

10. René Pinon, “La Liquidation de L’Empire Ottoman,” *Revue des Deux Mondes* 53 (September, 1919): 131, 139-140 in Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1999), 98.

11. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan*, 46-48.

12. Dogan Avcioğlu, *Milli Kurtulu Tarihi*, Vol. 3 (İstanbul: İstanbul Publications, 1974).

13. Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide*, 145, 313, (ft 44).

Staying away from the public attention Nazım, nevertheless, had centralized the control of the party in his hands.¹⁴ He had repeatedly expressed himself in favor of the idea of exterminating non-Turkic minorities of the Empire and had his loyal proponents in this cause. Probably, it was Behaeddin Şakir, who, together with Nazım, authored the law of deportations.

The crucial role Şakir played was confirmed by Colonel of the German Army Stange, who, together with Şakir, was organizing guerilla operations against the Russian troops in the first trimester of the World War I. Stange informs that the same detachments were further transformed into those of killers.¹⁵ Vahakn Dadrian, too, underlines the crucial role the two had in the final decision regarding the plan of the genocide (along with Talaat, Head of the National Security Campolad, and Colonel Seifi, who was the Head of the Second Department [responsible for investigations] of the Chief of Defense of the country).¹⁶

Other two main ideologists of the Ittihat in the years of the genocide were Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, who believed that the extermination of the Christians would eliminate the obstacle, which hindered the unification of the Turkic-speaking peoples living from Anatolia to Central Asia into a new super-empire.¹⁷

However, a detailed plan to annihilate an ethnic group could be implemented only where the party had a total control over the state apparatus, and its agencies, such as the law enforcers. In this light, the formation of the Ittihat dictatorship after the 1913 coup d'état was crucial, since the state and the party apparatus got totally amalgamated shortly after.

The government de facto was turned into an instrument in performing the party decisions. The power centralized in the hands of the Three Pashas, which also bore the main responsibility for the perpetration of the genocide. Minister of Defense Ismail Enver, who had accumulated all the military matters in his hands, actively propagated for an alliance with Germany, and, being married to the niece of the Sultan, was believed to have aspirations for the throne. Ahmet Cemal was the first governor of Istanbul, who later became Minister of Navy, Commander of the 4th Army, and the de facto proprietor of Syria. His relationships with Enver had always been complicated.¹⁸ In general, each of the strongmen in the Triumvirate would try to exclude others intervention in spheres under his control, which can explain the sometimes obvious discrepancies in their actions during the Armenian Genocide.

14. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan*, 55-56.

15. Report No. 3481, dated 23 August 1915, Botschaft Konstantinopel 170/23, cited from Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 1(2) (1986): 173.

16. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 7(2) (1993): 176.

17. Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 25-26.

18. Abram Elkus, *The Memoirs of Abram Elkus: Lawyer, Ambassador, Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Gomidas Institute 2004), 61-62.

The third in the triumvirate was Mehmet Talaat, the Minister of Interior, and later also the head of the government, who de facto entertained the greatest power inside the country, having undertaken the role to reconcile and to restrain the conflicting currents and individual influences within a closed circle of the Young Turks Party.¹⁹ As a Minister of Interior the police and the administration in the vilayets were also under his control, which gave him definitive influence and made him a central figure in the scheme that perpetrated the Armenian genocide.²⁰ Ambassador of Germany to the Ottoman Empire Count von Wolff-Metternich called him “the soul of the Armenian persecutions”.²¹ The telegrams, which were coordinating the extermination of Armenians in the vilayets, bore his name. Of course, those orders did not contain overt calls to manslaughter but indirectly indicated on the preparation of the monstrous plan. For instance, a confidential telegram from Talaat dated July 21, 1915, that was sent to the governors and Mutasarrif of Diyarbekir, Kharberd, Urfa, and Der-Zor ordered to bury the corpses on the roadsides, to burn the deserted properties, rather than throw the bodies into gorges, rivers, or lakes.²² In another telegram to the governor of Diarbekir dated July 22, 1915, Talaat called on to immediately terminate the killings of other Christian population, since applying the disciplinary measures against Armenians on other peoples might backfire.²³

The government of the Ottoman Empire had turned into a tool in the hands of the Young Turks Party fulfilling its programs. Prince of Egypt Saïd Halim Pasha,²⁴ who was in the closed circle of the leaders of the Young Turks Party, nevertheless never had a major influence on the decision-making inside it. He was only a docile agent for the triumvirate.

Provisional laws on deportations, which were chosen as a means to implement the Armenian Genocide, were passed on May 27, 1915. It should be mentioned that the deportations were fully underway from early spring and that the adoption of the provisional laws was a backdated attempt to somewhat legitimize the process.²⁵

19. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 110.

20. Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1918), 24.

21. Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 234.

22. Avetis Papazyan (ed.), *Hayeri tseghaspanutyuny yst erittutkeri datavarutyan pastatghteri [Armenian Genocide through the Documents of Young Turk Trials]* (Yerevan: AS of ASSR Press, 1989), 42-43.

23. BOA/DH.ŞFR, no.54-A/73, Coded telegram from interior minister Talaat to the Province of Diyarbekir, dated 22 July, cited from Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 210.

24. Saïd Halim Pasha was the grandson of the famous ruler of Egypt Mohammed Ali (Nikolay Hovhannisyan, *Hayeri 1915 t. tseghaspanutyan lusabanutyuny arabakan patmagrutyan mej* [The 1915 Armenian Genocide Coverage in the Arab Historiography], *Patmabanasirakan handes (Historical-Philological Journal)* 1(1989): 30-31; Said Amin, *Vosstaniye Arabov v XX Veke* [The Arab Rebellions of XX c.] (Moscow: Progress, 1964), 80.

25. According to the Ottoman legislation, the temporary laws allowed to be put them in force before the discussion and approval by the Parliament.

The permission for the extermination of the deported population is evidenced by Talaat's directive on June 14, 1915, to kill those in the caravans of the deported population, who would show resistance and would attempt to escape.²⁶ Few days later in a conversation with a representative of the German Embassy, he would share about the Sublime Porte's intention to finalize the task under the guise of the "war against the enemy from within".²⁷

On June 9 the Ministry of Interior sent a directive to the governor of Erzurum to sell off the property of the deported population²⁸, which clearly indicates the Armenians were not expected to return to the areas of their settlement.

The process of deportation and extermination of the deported Armenians was ensured by the circulars and the directives issued by the Ministry of Interior for the local governments. For instance, the provisional law on deportations adopted by the government on May 27, 1915, cited the decision N270 dated May 13, 1915, issued by the Ministry of Interior on deporting Armenians to Mosul, Der-Zor, and other regions of Syria.²⁹ The pivotal role the Ministry of Interior and Talaat had in the genocide was evidenced by the participants of the 1918 parliamentary hearings, as well as by the high-ranked defendants during the tribunal initiated against the Young Turks in 1919-1920, most of which pointed to the ministry as fully responsible for the deportation and the massacres of the Armenian population.³⁰ To legitimize the atrocities, on May 23, 1915, the Ministry of Interior sent directives on measures, which were to be undertaken against "the Christians, which were supporting the adversary, and the Muslims, which were collaborating with them" were subject to military tribunal.³¹

Even before the World War I the Ministry of Interior had formed structures, which would mostly involve in the coordination of the Armenian deportations.

One of them was the Directorate of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement founded in 1913³². Later it was expanded and reorganized into four departments, which were named in accor-

26. Osmanlı Belgeler, 43, Interior Ministry to Erzurum, 14 June 1915 cited from Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90.

27. AAPA, Abt. 1A, Turkei 183/37, Pera, 17 June 1915, cited from Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 90.

28. Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca (ed.), "Affaires arméniennes, les "télégrammes" de Talât Pacha- Fait historique ou fiction? ", *Société turque de histoire* (France: Triangle, 1983): 117, no. 29, cited from Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 90.

29. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armenyan*, 67.

30. Ibid

31. Ibid., 73.

32. The general migration administrative commission was formed to coordinate the influx of approximately one million over the next half century Chechen, Crimean Tatar, Muslim Georgian, and Turcoman immigrants (Kemal Karpat, "Population Movements in the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century: an Outline," in *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'empire ottoman*; eds. Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont and Paul Dumont (Paris: Editions Peeters, 1983), 385-428 and 405-408, cited from Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 42.

dance with the functions they performed: departments of resettlement, security, transport, and tribes³³. Interestingly, the agency incorporated also the Scientific Council that was headed by Ziya Gökalp and was proposed for the collection of data on ethnic groups living on the territory of the Empire. Its creation was closely tied with a statement Talaat made once: “Anatolia is a closed box for us”, arguing that it was first necessary to ‘get to know the contents of it’ in order to operate on it”³⁴. The Agency for Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants was involved in the coordination of the deportations in the years of the Armenian genocide and was also responsible for the settlement of the Armenian areas with Muslims. The agency was operating under Şukru Kaya. Another pivotal structure under the ministry was the Directorate of General Security.³⁵

Yet another structure was Abandoned Properties Commission, which was in charge of coordinating the confiscation and redistribution of Armenian property.

Despite the main job for an organization of the forced deportations were performed by the Ministry of Interior and its bodies, involving local administrations, as well as security, police, and gendarmerie forces, other ministries, such as the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Education were actively engaged in the process.

In his theory of the law as a cumulative of resources American sociologist Alex Alvarez discusses how in times of genocides law “becomes a servant to those who have gained power and can be mobilized to serve their needs and protect their interests”.³⁶ By controlling laws the state gets power over agents with authority of legitimate violence.³⁷

In times of genocides, a “legal crime” or a set of actions that are protected by – in the perpetrator state but certainly not international society – by law are constituted”.³⁸ One such example is the Nuremberg laws,³⁹ which were illegal decisions formally corresponding to the definitions of law.

33. Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı* (Istanbul: Eren, 1987), S. 120, cited from Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-50* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 36.

34. Ibid., 36-37.

35. Donald Bloxham, “The First World War and the Development of the Armenian Genocide,” in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göcek, Norman M. Naimark (eds.), *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 262.

36. Alex Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 72.

37. Ibid., 74.

38. Ibid., 78.

39. Nuremberg laws were adopted on the initiative of Hitler on September 15th of 1935, at the National Socialist Party and Reichstag sittings in Nuremberg. There were two of them: the Law on the Reich Citizen (Reichsbürgergesetz) and the Law on the Protection of German Blood and German Honor (Gesetz zum Schutzedes Deutschen Blutsundder Deutschen Ehre) and (Gesetz zum Schutzedes Deutschen Blutes und der Deutschen Ehre): See Amy Newman, *The Nuremberg Laws: Institutionalized Anti-Semitism* (San Diego: Lucent Books, 1998); Hecht Ingeborgand, *Invisible Walls and To Remember is to Heal: A German Family under the Nuremberg Laws*, translated from German by J. Brownjohn and J. Broadwin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999).

The parliament of the Ottoman Empire would pass such “laws” backdated, too often aimed to “legitimize” the crimes that were committed.

Early in the beginning of the war, the activities of the Ottoman legislative were de facto suspended. The actual structure of the Ottoman authorities in the emergency situation of the wartime had significantly relieved the executive from the potential restrictions the legislative might impose on it. Talaat hints in his memoirs that the freezing of the parliament’s work on March 1, 1915, was directly connected with the anti-Armenian campaigns.⁴⁰ This may indicate that a certain opposition to those operations was anticipated in the parliament. Furthermore, the suspension of the parliamentary works would let the deputies return to their provinces and inform their constituencies about “the Armenian danger”.⁴¹

The decision was later discussed and approved by the parliamentary committees for military and legal affairs. The Law on Deportations was passed as late as December 1916, following a voting organized in the parliament.⁴²

b. Local officials, party secretaries

The second level of genocide perpetrators encompasses structures, which are directly involved in regulating the genocide following the directives of top authorities, and ensuring the implementation of those instructions. The role of the structures or the state bureaucracy on this level was remarkable. A number of scholars of genocide have given a special role to those structures in describing genocides. Jack Porter, a professor at Harvard University, for instance, states perpetration of genocide requires that there are three major components in place – the ideology, the technology, and the bureaucracy.⁴³ Sociologist Irving Horowitz describes genocide as “structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus”.⁴⁴

The local bureaucracy would greatly precondition the nature and the intensity of genocide. Local elites could intensify or slow down the dynamics of killings.

The coordination of Armenian massacres in the provinces of the country was entrusted to valis, the governors of the provinces, most of whom were actively agitating for and arranging the deportations and killings.⁴⁵ And that was reasonable since most of the governors were loyal to the Union and Progress, oftentimes Talaat’s brothers in arms.

40. Kutay C., *Talat Pasa'nın Gurbet Hatıraları* (The Memoirs of Talat Pasa in Exile), vol. 2 (Istanbul, 1983), 907 cited from Dadrian Vahakn N., *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 223:

41. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 236.

42. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armanyan*, 86.

43. Jack Nusan Porter, “Introduction: What is Genocide: Notes toward a Definition,” in *Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology*, ed. Jack Nusan Porter (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), 12-15.

44. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 17.

45. See for example *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 3549, 4th hearing, 8 Mayıs 1335 (8 May 1919) from Taner Akcam, “The Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress

E.g. Cevdet (the Vali of Van), Ahmed Muammer (the vali of Sebastia/Sivas), Cemal Azmi (the vali of Trabzon), personally led the process of executions and spared no effort to implement the plan to the best of their capacity. Becoming the vali of Diarbekir, Mehmet Reşid, one of the founders of the Young Turks Party, deported and exterminated hundreds of thousands of Armenians, demonstrating an outstanding zest. Arab eye-witness Faiz el-Ghusein mentioned that as of August 1915 some 570 thousand Armenians were exterminated in Diarbekir.⁴⁶ The crimes committed on the territory of the province ruled by Reşid are hard to describe: victims were crucified, horseshoed, hearts stamped by hot horseshoes, their skulls smashed to pieces.⁴⁷ The scale of his cruelty made the Germany Consul to Mosul Holstein demand that Ambassador von Wangenheim interfered and required the Ottoman government to restrain Reşid.⁴⁸ And he was indeed ousted: however, the reason was rather the expropriation of the Armenian property, not the massacres.⁴⁹ In an exchange with the general secretary of the Ittihat Midhat Şükrü (Bleda) that happened in the period following the war Doctor Reşid tried to justify the annihilation of Armenians by the sense of duty he felt both as a Turk and as a doctor, just like “dangerous microbes”.⁵⁰

Besides the valis, the process engaged heads of smaller regions, the mutasafirs (prefects), as well as local police, heads of the gendarmerie, and religious leaders. Members of the Ottoman parliament, e.g. Khoja Ilyas Sami in Bitlis, or Mehmet Nuri bey in Kharberd, and others were actively involved in the killings of Armenians across the country.

Party representatives were eagerly included in the Armenian genocide along the local officials. Ittihad had a well-tuned network of party structures in the vilayets. In 1908, shortly after the revolution, Ittihatists formed clubs in the regions, which were the real centers of power in the provinces directly following party decisions.⁵¹ The clubs were also expected to disseminate anti-Armenian hate speech. Russian consul in Erzurum, Adamov, reported on January 4, 1914: “...Armenians expect assault any time: despite the Muslim resent, which was caused by the Ittihatists under emissary Hilmi bey arriving from the cap-

(Ittihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1(2), 2006: 141.

46. Faiz El-Ghusein, *Martyred Armenia* (London: C. A. Pearson, 1917), 49.

47. On Diyarbakir massacres see Hilmar Kaiser, *The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2014); Üngör Ugur Ümit, Mehmet Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011); Hans-Lukas Kieser, “From ‘Patriotism’ to Mass Murder: Dr. Mehmed Reşid (1873-1919),” in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, Norman M. Naimark (eds.), *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126-150.

48. PAA-AA; BoKon/169; A53a, 4184; p.11.07.1915. Telegraphic report. See Wolfgang Gust (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 245-246.

49. Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity*, 211-212.

50. Interview with Ittihad party Secretary-General Midhat Sukru (Bieda) in Resimli Tarih, 5 July 1953. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Role of Turkish Physicians...,” 175.

51. Fatma Müge Göçek, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 79.

ital, the Ittihatist club, which was chaired by the Germany envoy, had organized a shooting contest in the distant districts of the town. The majority of the local mob and dadashes, equipped with arms, were there... Armenians are sure [of the prepared assault], while the dadashes openly say the massacre is simply postponed”.⁵²

The local elites, including the valis, were all members of Ittihatist clubs and therefore entertained tremendous influence. Vice-consul of Germany to Erzurum von Scheubner-Richter reported on July 28, 1915, that a parallel authority operated in the state (Nebenregierung). He underlined the severity of conditions in which the deportations were carried out by a group Ittihatists. In an instance, when the governor had agreed to stop the deportation of families of health-crippled people, absent men, and lonely women, the local Young Turks club had interfered and had downplayed the decision. An undescrivable cruelty that followed led to the death of the people.⁵³

The clubs were integrated into the party branches in vilayets, which were operating under the party's central committee. In 1913 the central committee delegated party officials to regions. The delegates comprised executive secretaries of the Party of Union and Progress (Kâtibi Mesut), emissaries (Murahhas), superintendents (Umumi Müfettiş), which played an essential role in carrying out the Armenian genocide. They were carefully selected and appointed by the central committee of Ittihat and were mostly former army officers.⁵⁴ These loyal party members could provide efficiency in the organization and guidance on the local level to ensure the smooth and accurate implementation of the plan. As a matter of fact, they were the party agents licensed for total control and a purpose to ensure the proper process of the genocide.⁵⁵

Those party activists were a link between the central committee of Ittihat and the grassroots conveying the orders down from the center. The encrypted directives of the Ministry of Interior were reaching the local authorities and structures, the governors, the regional security offices of the ministry, as well as the gendarmerie, through executive secretaries.⁵⁶

The secretaries would create groups of four to six to support them, head the local party structures, organize meetings, and set the local population against Armenians, issue orders on deportations, massacres, and lootings. In some instances, they would personally lead

52. AVPR (Archive of Foreign Policy of Russia), Embassy in Constantinople, 3726, p. 94 in M. Nersisyan (ed.), *Hayeri tseghaspanutyuny Osmanyany kaysrutyunum [Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire]* (Yerevan: "Hayastan", 1991), 325.

53. A.A., K170, No 4674, folio 63/- Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Determinants of the Armenian Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 1:1(1999): 72.

54. G. Vardar, *Ittihad ve Terakki* [n 23], p. 77, cited from Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Determinants of the Armenian Genocide," 72.

55. *Ibid.*, 71.

56. Taner Akçam, "The Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1:2(2006): 141.

the process of killing.⁵⁷ The executive secretaries were also involved in forming Teşkilat-i Mahsuse detachments and directing mob groups.⁵⁸

Executive secretaries were given tremendous power and could issue directives to valis and mutasarrifs. Nail, the executive secretary of Trabzon, overturned the local vali's decision according to which children and handicapped people could temporarily avoid deportation.⁵⁹ In provinces (Angora, Yozgat, Aleppo, and Kastamonou), where the deportations were carried out with a certain degree of reluctance, the valis were ousted by the Ittihatist officials, punished in some cases, and replaced with more enthusiastic officials.⁶⁰

In the course of the 1919-1920 tribunal organized in the post-war period, the cases of the executive secretaries were heard in separate sessions, which proved the importance of the roles they played.⁶¹

These party structures and executive secretaries had worked with the governor, mutasarrif and gendarmerie offices directly. These local elite groups, which were comprised of about 30 to 40 people, and were usually involved in genocidal operations, included heads of renowned families, Kurdish and Circassian tribe chiefs, as well as local administrations, law enforcement bodies, religious leaders, and party activists. The competition frequently evolving inside those groups was caused by a desire to prove group members' loyalty to the leaders of Ittihat in anticipation of privileges in the future. In Diarbekir, for instance, the race ended up with the victory of Piriçizade, Muftizade, and Derekzade families.⁶²

c. Military and paramilitary structures

Genocides are mostly carried out by means of military and paramilitary structures: in some case, those are already existing ones, while others new structures are specially formed for the perpetration of genocidal acts.

The police and gendarmerie under the Ottoman Ministry of Interior were directly involved in the perpetration of the Armenian genocide by participation in the massacres and the seizing of the confiscated Armenian property. The police would circle the Armenian settlements, break into the houses of the Armenian population pretending to toss for arms, detained Armenian men, forcefully deported the Armenian population. The "death marches" were usually guarded by the gendarmerie. They would urge on the deported, de-

57. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 144.

58. Many telegrams witnesses about this, for instance, from responsible secretary Mesul Rüştü from Samsun. On May 27, 1919, he confirmed that he had organized armed groups needed for this region, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 3554, 5th hearing, 14 May 1919, cited from Taner Akçam, "The Ottoman Documents..." p.148 (ft 90).

59. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *History of the Armenian Genocide...*, 406-407.

60. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 22(1994): 141.

61. The materials on the trials of the CUP responsible secretaries see Avetis Papazyan (ed.), *Hayeri tseghaspanutyuny...*, 129-162

62. Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey...*, 106.

priving them of rest, expropriate their jewelry and clothes, prohibit the people from drinking, when passing by water sources and wells, depriving them of food, torturing them, raping, crippling, and killing them.⁶³ The ministries of interior and war also supervised the telegraph and the railroad networks, the main means of communication of the empire. The telegraph machines played a crucial role in organizing Armenian deportations and mass killings. Those were used to send directives and reports to the local administrations and party representatives. Talaat had once been a postal officer and had a telegraphing machine of his own, which he used to send orders from home. Numerous Armenians, who used to work at postal services, were laid off en masse from early 1915.⁶⁴

The Turkish army, too, had a part in the perpetration of the Armenian Genocide. A particularly big role has been played by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Minister of War Enver, Commander of the 4th Army Cemal, and Commander of the 3rd Army Mahmud Kâmil. Generals Halil Kut, Enver's uncle, and Ali Ihsan Sabis, actively participated in the Armenian genocide, as well.⁶⁵

To remind, under Article 4 on deportations the observance of the provisional law was licensed to the Ministry of Defense.⁶⁶ Army's involvement was greatly conditioned by Enver's factor. The disarming and extermination of the Armenian militaries was motivated by Enver's crushing defeat in the Battle of Sarıkamış. Armenians have been openly declared as enemies of the state soon after. Hundreds of thousands of Armenian soldiers and officers, serving in the Ottoman Army, were exterminated in February-May 1915. Henry Morgenthau wrote: "In the early part of 1915, the Armenian soldiers in the Turkish army were reduced to a new status. Up to that time most of them had been combatants, but now they were all stripped of their arms and transformed into workmen. Instead of serving their country as artillerymen and cavalrymen, these former soldiers now discovered that they had been transformed into road laborers and pack animals... In many instances, Armenian soldiers were disposed of in even more summary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice to shoot them in cold blood."⁶⁷

Army units were actively involved where Armenians would organize self-defense, and there was a need to bear down the resistance.

63. See for example in AVPR, Politarkhiv (Political archive), 3508, p. 16. Cited from G. A. Abrahamyan and T. G. Sevan-Khachatryan (eds.), *Ruskiye istochniki o genocide armyan v Osmanskoy imperii-1915-1916 gody* [Russian Sources on the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire – 1915-1916] (Yerevan: Areresum-ANI, 1995), 22; ЦГИА Арм. ССР, ф. 57, оп. 2, д. 692, л. 17-20, from M. Nersisyan and R. Sahakyan (eds.), *Genocid armyan v Osmanskoy imperii* [Armenian Genocide in Ottoman Empire] (Yerevan: "Hayastan", 1983), 284; James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden by Viscount Bryce* (London: 1916), 262-264; Herbert Gibbons, *Posledniye izbiyeniya v Armenii* [The Last Brutalities in Armenia] (Petrograd, 1916), 15.

64. Johannes Lepsius, *Bericht über die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1916), cited from M. Nersisyan and R. Sahakyan (eds.), *Genotsid arman....*, 389.

65. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide...*

66. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide...*, 235.

67. Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 302.

E.g. the attempts to crack down resistance in Van and Musa Dağ involved army units. Furthermore, the influence the military had on the Turkish elites largely facilitated to presenting the activities as a military need. In January 1919 the Turkish authorities detained a number of high ranked military officers calling the latter organizers of Armenian massacres in the areas under their control. It corresponded to the truth to the certain extent. E.g. when von Scheubner-Richter the vice consul of Germany in Erzurum, complained to Tahsin, the local vali, of the violence against the deported population, Tahsin promised to stop them, while, at the same time, made an attempt to justify himself by explaining it with that the real power in the region was centralized in the hands of the Commander of the 3rd Army Mahmud Kâmil.⁶⁸

Since the genocide of the Armenians was carried out on war-torn territories of the empire and since there was a situation of martial law, the military had concentrated the political power of these regions in its hands. Vahakn Dadrian brings the case of the Kaiseri region where the army would take care of the military conscription, logistics, and transportation, as would perform additional functions – that of unproportionate confiscations on different levels, as well as ‘justices’ made by military tribunals – both of which had tragic consequences for the Armenian population. Furthermore, the army commanders often relied on the units of the Gendarmerie, which accompanied numerous groups of deported Armenians.⁶⁹

The use of non-regular forces to carry out the ‘dirty job’ was a well set Ottoman tradition.⁷⁰ Although the regular forces participated in many instances of carrying out the genocide of Armenians, they were rarely used to exterminate whole communities. It was the irregular forces, which became a real tool in implementing the state policy.⁷¹

A decisive role in the perpetration of the Armenian genocide was played by Teşkilat-i Mahsuse (the Special Organization). This structure was assigned to exterminate the deported Armenian population, as well as to coordinate the activities of all the involved organizations.

There are many interpretations of the emergence of the organization; however, it is clear though that up until the WWI it operated under control of minister Enver, and was influenced by pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideologies.⁷²

68. Hilmar Kaiser, “‘A Scene from the Inferno,’ The Armenians of Erzerum and the Genocide, 1915-1916,” in H. L. Kieser and D. J. Schaller (eds.), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah* (Zürich: Chronos, 2002), 139.

69. Vahakn N. Dadrian., “The Agency of “Triggering Mechanisms” as a Factor in the Organization of the Genocide Against the Armenians of Kayseri District,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1:2(2006): 110.

70. See James J. Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839–1878* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000).

71. James J. Reid, “Militarism, Partisan War, and Destructive Inclinations in Ottoman Military History: 1854-1918,” *Armenian Review* 39, no. 3/155(1986): 6–11; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), 278–280.

72. See for example Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan*, 93-96.

In the course of its existence, the organization had three leaders: Süleyman Askeri, Ali Başkampa, and Husamettin Erturk. Interestingly, all of them were of Northern Caucasus (Circassian) ancestries. Circassians have been widely represented also in other top positions of the Special Organization.⁷³

The real head of the organization, however, was Behaeddin Şakir. As early as in 1914 Behaeddin Şakir traveled to Erzurum with Circassian Hüsein Husni with a purpose of forming armed groups in Armenian provinces. Later he would coordinate the activities of the Special Organization by touring on his automobile to regions as well as by means of encrypted telegrams.⁷⁴ Nazım also played a big role in the organization.

Turcologist Arsen Avagyan underlines that the Teşkilat-i Mahsuse had four major tasks. Those were the organization of the disarmament of the Armenian population, organization of accompanying detachments, which were supposed to carry out the deportation and extermination of the population, organization of detachments for the extermination of the Armenian population in the deserts of Syrian and concentration camps, supervision and coordination of civilian authorities in vilayets in the organization of the Armenian genocide.⁷⁵

Teşkilat-i Mahsuse had one central and four regional units. The unit responsible for the eastern vilayets was intended for the coordinating the pan-Islamist and pan-Turkish propaganda in the rear of Russia; however, the perpetration of the Armenian massacres became its main function. In the eastern vilayets, the supervision of this function of the Special organization was assigned to the vali of Trabzon Cemal Azmi, vali of Erzurum Tahsin, a member of the Ittihat central committee Behaeddin Şakir, as well as Doctor Fuad Sabit bey.⁷⁶

The directives in Teşkilat-i Mahsuse were mostly communicated verbally; the correspondence was destroyed immediately after reading. The organization had strict disciplinary rules and used the cypher codes of the Ministry of Interior for correspondence.

Nevertheless, Teşkilat-i Mahsuse was only a body in an implementation of decisions. However it had some jurisdiction, which allowed for sending instructions to local bodies in organizing deportations and killings; to control their activities, and reporting. The valis, the kaimakams, and the agents of Ittihat were to abide by the requirements of the Special Organization. Many of them were its members, which significantly simplified the implementation of the tasks.

Of course, some tensions regularly arose between Teşkilat-i Mahsuse and other structures: e.g. army units every now and then would refuse to provide supporting forces, because, they said, they served the Commander in Chief alone, or would refuse to comply with orders received through the channels of the Special Organization. In such cases, the

73. Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 58.

74. Supra, p. 187, n. 155 from Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide...*, 199.

75. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan*, 109.

76. Ibid., 107-108.

orders were sent via the Ministry of War. The relationships would regularly become extremely tough. One such instance was the case of Commander of the 3rd Army Mehmed Vehib who had planned to detain Behaeddin Şakir, and it was only with Enver's interference that the decision was derailed.⁷⁷

Executive secretaries closely communicated with Teşkilat-ı Mahsuse. A document dated September 13, 1913, and sent by the Special organization to the central committee of Ittihat proves that the secretaries were responsible for the forming of mobster groups in the regions. The telegram points that the actions were undertaken by the executive secretary of Samsun, Ruştü, who had formed groups in the area he controlled, are exemplary and should as models for other groups.⁷⁸ After they were formed, the groups were then sent to the capital⁷⁹ to be trained as militaries and then be commissioned with assignments to Armenian vilayets.

Interestingly, the correspondence took place through the general secretary of Ittihat Midhat Şükrü.

The numbers of people included in the detachments of the organization regularly changed per each assignment. The groups were mostly formed from Kurdish tribes, immigrants from the Caucasus and the Balkans, as well as criminals, who were released from prisons upon the decree of the minister of interior.⁸⁰ These mob groups were known as “savages and criminals” even among the Young Turk officials.⁸¹

Aram Antonyan points that the units comprised of Balkan muhajirs stood out for their remarkable hatred towards Christians and cruelty, which were guided by the feeling of revenge against Armenians, although the latter had little if any relation to the sufferings Balkan Muslims had undergone before.⁸² Groups were also formed from multi-ethnic communities of Muslims, which had earlier moved to the Ottoman Empire and which were commonly known as Circassians. One such detachment was led by Circassian Ahmed, who killed two Armenian members of Parliament – Grigor Zohrap and Vardges Seringulyan, in the neighborhood of Diarbekir.⁸³ The massacres of the Armenians, who had found refuge

77. Ibid., 119.

78. Takvimi Vekâyi 3554, 5th session, 14 May 1335. Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (New York: Zed Books, 2013), 171.

79. In the telegram dated November 13, 1914 it is demanded “that the people clandestinely recruited by the party secretaries in Izmit, Bursa, Bandırma, Balıkesir and other relevant regions should be summoned and moved [to Istanbul] within a week (Takvimi Vekâyi 3554, 5th session, 14 May 1335, cited from Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic...*, 163).

80. Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic...*, 161.

81. A. Mil, ‘Umumi Harpte Tejkilâti Mahsusa’, in: Vakit, 2 October 1933 up to 18 April 1934, republished as: Arif Cemil (Denker), *I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul: Arba, 1997), 196. Cited from Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 58.

82. Aram Antonyan, *Mets votchiry [The Great Crime]* (Yerevan: Arevik, 1990), 53-54.

83. Ahmed Refik, *yerku komite, yerku votchir [Two Committees, Two Crimes]* (Yerevan, 1997), 46-50.

in the desert of Der-Zor in 1916 were also perpetrated by the çetes comprised of Chechens and Arabs, which were organized by the governor of Der-Zor Salih Zeki.

Turkish historian Suat Parlar mentions that Teşkilat-i Mahsuse had already started organizing groups of volunteers from the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as prisoners serving sentences for grave offenses, even before the decision on deportations was made public. Constantinople received several complaints after the assaults the groups organized against villages.⁸⁴

Falih Rifki Atay, a personal assistant to Cemal pasha, has an interesting recollection of a conversation he had with Nazım as he approached him expressing the willingness to join the “homeland defense units” he had heard were being formed. Hearing the request, Atay recalls, Nazım responded with a faint smile on his face, saying those detachments “are made of criminals and murderers, and there is no place among them for a young man like you”. “I didn’t get anything about the army of murderers,” Falih Rifki Atay writes.⁸⁵

The çetes in Erzurum were formed under Behaeddin Şakir as an “Islamic police” in August 1914. The telegram addressed to the musaserif of Erzincan, kaimakams of Bayburd, Dercan, and Kiğ included the names of those, who were responsible for the establishment of the çetehe, ordering: “...to start secretly and silently and to always report on the results”. The mobsters in the mountains of Rizeh were openly offered to join the Special organization, which they readily did.⁸⁶

Kurdish aşirets were, too, involved in the process. Hilmi, the superintendant of the party in Erzurum, wrote about one of the Kurdish chief aşirets: “The time is about to come to deal with the problem we talked about in Erzincan...I want 50 brave [men] from you...I shall prepare everything for their convenience here...never mind if they are young or middle-aged men, as long as they are strong and determined and willing to sacrifice their lives for their country and nation...Upon first notice from us put them on their way... Only be prepared and keep Behaeddin Şakir Beyefendi informed...”⁸⁷

Kurdish detachments played a colossal role in exterminating Armenians in the eastern vilayets. One precondition for that was the nearly total equipment of the Kurds. Especially as with the annihilation of the Armenians, the Kurds would free a territory they had long been aspiring.⁸⁸ That is the reason the Kurds would mostly attack villages, and kill the pop-

84. Suat Parlar, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Gizli devlet* (İstanbul, 1997), s. 75, cited from Arsen Avagyan, *Cherkesskiy factor v Osmanskoy imperii i Turtsii [The Circassian Factor in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey]* (Yerevan: Gitutyun, 2001), 231.

85. See Taner Akçam, Turetskoye natsipnalnoye “Ya” i armyanskiy vopros, [Turkish National “I” and Armenian Question] is available at <http://armenianhouse.org/akcam/genocide/application.html>.

86. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armanyan*, 106-107.

87. Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic...*, 162.

88. Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 108.

ulation, rather than deporting them. Good looking women and young girls were forcefully sent to harems. The villages were oftentimes set on fire.⁸⁹

d. “Ordinary” murderers

On the lowest level of the extermination, machinery were the “ordinary” murderers, who participated in the killings or the process implementation, advantaging of the atmosphere of impunity entertaining the general popular support.

Carrying out genocide is impossible without the large participation of masses. The number of participants to the killings depends on the technology of murder, the size of the victims’ groups, their dislocation, as well as the level of resistance. The decision on involving big numbers of people in the process of carrying out genocide, too, depends on political purposes. In their actions, the initiators of genocide must have support and get it by letting various groups of society satisfy their needs and wants. By involving big groups of population in the system of killings the forces launching the crime create stronger ties between the criminal society and the regime.⁹⁰

According to Paul Brass, two components shall be in place to ensure the participation of the population in genocidal acts: “planning” and “enthusiasm”. Authorities plan the process of the killings and ensure their coordinated implementation, encouraging at the same time the formation of an atmosphere required for the mass participation of the population. To achieve that the authorities rely on spreading rumors, instigating talks of an imminent danger, reactivate deep, subconscious superstitions, and exploit other means, which help justify the crime and put the responsibility from the true perpetrators to the “objectified, frenzied mass of nameless people”.⁹¹ The situation, when an individual turns into a minor part of a major crowd, is scrupulously described in French sociologist Gustave Le Bon’s “The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind”. Genocide is a group action. Criminals are members of groups, whether big or small or parts of crowds. According to Le Bon, the crowd can be described as “impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and others besides – which are almost always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution...”⁹²

In a crowd personalities are diffused into the collective mind, “...which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation”.⁹³ Le Bon also points that “by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the

89. Arsen Avagyan, *Genocid armyan*, 121.

90. Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, , vol. 2, 792

91. Paul R. Brass, “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means, Methods, and Purposes,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 5:1(2003): 92.

92. Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.; Reprint edition, 2002), 10.

93. *Ibid.*, 4.

ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian – that is, creature acting by instinct.”⁹⁴ In other words, the actions of the members of a group become more simplistic, more emotional, and, eventually, more anti-social.

Oftentimes, the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide are pictured as zealous barbarians, a particular evil in human disguise. This gives some metaphysical nature to the committed crime. The same concern was present in interpreting and presenting the Holocaust,⁹⁵ however, it changed to a certain degree after the publication of “Eichmann in Jerusalem”, a book by philosopher and political thinker Hannah Arendt. Arendt called Nazi criminal Eichmann the embodiment of the “banality of evil” and described him as an ordinary and common personality. Eichmann was not a madman. Moreover, Eichmann was certified by psychiatrists as “normal.” Arendt argued that a terrifying thing about Eichmann was not how unusual or how sinister he was, but the understanding of his extreme ordinariness.”⁹⁶

Therefore, it can be stated that in terms of the Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, or other genocides, the criminals to a great degree were hundreds of thousands of common people, who took millions of lives. Of course, there were those with mental disorders among them; however, the big number of the participants does not allow connecting the carrying out of genocide with individual conditions, educational level, or social origins of the murderers.

Privates, volunteers conscribed to the paramilitary detachments of Teşkilat-i Mahsuse, gendarmerie officers, criminals released from prisons, doctors, peasants, students, Kurds, refugees from the Balkans, i.e. almost every group of the society took part in the process of annihilating Armenians.

The scale of the participation was obvious even to the contemporaries of the events. E.g. British Admiral Richard Webb, who was the Assistant High Commissioner of Constantinople during its occupation, on April 13, 1919, reported to the British Foreign Office: “To punish all persons guilty of Armenian atrocities would necessitate wholesale execution of the Turks, and I therefore suggest retribution both on a national scale by dismembering the late Turkish Empire, as well as individually by the trial of high officials, such as those on my lists, whose fate will serve as an example.”⁹⁷

Turkish officials shared the opinion. E.g. Ali Kemal, later the minister of education of the Ottoman Empire, noted in “Sabah” newspaper on January 28, 1919: “...a crime unprecedented in scale was committed four to five years ago, a crime, which caused the awe of the world. If we want to make an impression on the scale and the terms of the crime, then

94. Ibid., 8.

95. James E. Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 61.

96. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Group, 1994), 76.

97. British Foreign Office Archives 371/4173/53351 (folio 192-93), cited from Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide...*, 306.

we have to speak not of five to ten criminals, but of hundreds of thousands of them.”⁹⁸ Halil Menteşe, who had been the chairman of the Ottoman parliament, as well as its minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of justice in the years of WWI, confessed in his memoirs: “There were very few Turks, who did not have relation to the deportations.”⁹⁹

Therefore, one of the specifics of the Armenian genocide was the nearly total participation of the Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian population in the massacres. The Armenian genocide was perpetrated by the hands of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people, who personally took millions of lives.

Further still, the popular participation cannot be differentiated by gender or age. E.g., Mkrtich Kechyan, a survivor of the genocide, recalls how Turkish and Circassian villagers of all gender and age, circled Armenian women and children and continued the killings.¹⁰⁰

Participation of women and children in crimes is a separate topic within genocide studies. There were many women, members of the SS, working at the Nazi concentration and death camps. The number of women involved in the genocide committed in Cambodia exceeded men in the country, that in its entirety was turned into an actual concentration camp, and tens of thousands of women served as order givers and guards or even participated in the killings. At least three of the main perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda were women – the wife of the assassinated president, and two members of the government, while thousands of other Hutu women joined the process of instigating the actual killings, lootings, and raping of Tutsi women.¹⁰¹ Children were easily getting engaged in the genocidal acts in Cambodia and Rwanda. The ways people joined the process varied. Part of them was encouraged to do so, while others were forced in to committing crimes. Children were learning by watching scenes of murders, and killings were turning into routine ways of proving loyalty to own community.¹⁰² Jean Hatzfield, a French reporter in Rwanda, recalls a young member of the Kibungo mob group, which had killed around 50,000 Tutsis, explaining: “Killing is easier than farming”.¹⁰³

It is equally traceable in the case of the Armenian genocide. E.g. Admiral Mark Bristol, who was the High Commissioner of the United States to Turkey between 1919-1927 described the extermination of the Christian population in Smyrna in a telegram sent to the US State Secretary on September 14, 1922: “...Several of the relief workers as well as Vice Consul Barnes reported to me that there was a noticeable change in the temper of the Turkish troops and civilians towards the Armenians. The impression they received that

98. Günel G., “İttihat Terakki’den Günümüze YekTarz-ı Siyaset: Türkleştirme, BelgeYayınları”, (İstanbul, 2006), s. 127, cited from Meline Anumyan, *Tchanachum yev datapartum*, 52-53.

99. Halil Menteşe *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe’nin Anıları*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), s. 239, cited from Meline Anumyan, *Tchanachum yev datapartum*, 28-29.

100. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide...*, 510.

101. Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, vol. 2, 793.

102. Ibid.

103. Steven K. Baum, *The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 123.

every able-bodied Armenian man was being hunted down and killed wherever found; even small boys of between 12 to 15 years armed with clubs (were) taking part in the hunt.”¹⁰⁴

Children participation was not spontaneous in every instance. E.g. following the military failures of Turkey during the Balkan war, in 1912 Turkish authorities launched a full-scale program for national and paramilitary training of young Turkish population. The by-law of the Association for the Development of Turkish Forces (Türk Gücü Cemiyeti), created in 1913, had program for “preparation of young people”, which was “needed to make the nation that of soldiers again” and to prevent “the deterioration of the Turkish people” (Turk irki inhitata). There were other youth groups, too, which operated under the Ministry of Defense, and were getting prepared to “defend the homeland”.¹⁰⁵ To achieve it the ministry provided rifles, bullets, and outfit. The process was coordinated by Ziya Gökalp, the ideologist behind the minister of defense Enver, and Ittihat. The League for National Defense (Mudafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti), which was created in the course of the Balkan war, was also aimed at providing military education. The founders of the league included party and government leaders, including Talaat, Enver, Saïd Halim, Cemal, and minister of justice Ibrahim.¹⁰⁶

The atmosphere of violence was an important precondition to warrant popular participation. A proper atmosphere guarantees popular support for radical leadership and awakens the binary contradiction between “us” and “them”. The war helps outline the “adversary” and make people perceive it as a danger and menace.

Involvement of masses in the killings in the course of the Armenian genocide took place through a number of concurrent and intersecting processes. The state propaganda would picture Armenians as the fifth column collaborating with the adversary, traitors, responsible for all the defeats and misfortunes of Turkey. This overt propaganda was spread through Young Turks’ clubs and mosques. High level of illiteracy and the traditional anti-Armenian public sentiments and stereotypes proved the efficiency of propaganda. The persistent stereotype of Armenian racial inferiority or *raya*¹⁰⁷, the popular treatment of Armenians as infidels or *gyavurs*, were further nurtured by the rage of the population, incited by the constitutional provision which gave Armenians equal rights with Muslims following the Young Turks revolution of 1908. All these factors created the basis for the rationalization¹⁰⁸ of mass engagement in killings. Ordinary citizens were given an opportunity to feel

104. Christos Papoutsy, *Ships of Mercy, The True Story of the Rescue of the Greeks, Smyrna, September 1922* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter E. Randall, 2008), 38.

105. Among them were also sports and scouting groups (see. Hayk Demoyan, *Haykakan sportn u manmamarzuty Osmanyan kaysrutyunum [Armenian Sport and Gymnastics in the Ottoman Empire]* (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2009), 135-136

106. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide...*, 196-197.

107. C. E. Bosworth, “The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam”, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, ed. B. Braude and B. Lewis, 2 vols, (New York and London, 1982).

108. Rationalization is a psychological protection mechanism that looking for a rational and good ex-

them as part of a big cause, and a historical event (building the Greater Turan, saving the Homeland), as well as a chance to get possession of the property of the victims.

The population had achieved a total consensus in its system of values, which allowed for conscribing squads of future murderers from various groups of society.¹⁰⁹ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen reflected on a similar phenomenon in his controversial book, where he claimed the Nazis' success in organizing the Holocaust without much effort was made possible owing to the preparedness with which the Germans carried it out. According to Goldhagen, the regime did not have to overcome moral doubts or reluctance of those who were supposed to commit the crime of the Holocaust, since an average German was overwhelmed with extreme antisemitism.¹¹⁰ Of course, the picture is exaggerated; however, in a certain degree, it characterizes those, who conscribed to genocide. The attitudes of Turks towards Armenians in the Ottoman Empire had much resemblance to the attitudes in the German society: given an opportunity the majority of the Muslim population would realize its long-time desire, would organize atrocities and would massacre Armenians, especially when there was the "blessing" of the religious leaders, who declared jihad, a holy war against the infidels.

Although the leaders of the Young Turks were not fervent religious Muslims, they took the advantage of the announced jihad to raise the forces inside the empire filled with religious zeal against the Christians.¹¹¹

The ease with which the Turkish population took up the role is well described in a number of instances: Admiral Bristol, known for his pro-Turkish stand, found in proper to send a recommendation to Washington: "It is known that the Turks will rob, pillage, deport and murder Christians whenever the opportunity is favorable from their point of view... It is my opinion that, knowing the character of the Moslem Turks... if you arouse the brutal instincts of the Turks, together with his fanatical tendencies, he will attack the Christian races if he is not restrained by absolute force."¹¹²

planation for behavioral decisions that have other, condemnable reasons. The term was suggested by Z. Freud, and the concept was later developed by Anna Freud, see for example Jason D'Cruz, "Rationalization as Performative Pretense," *Philosophical Psychology* 28, no. 7: 980-1000. Siegfried Zepf, "About rationalization and intellectualization," *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* 20:3 (2011), 148-158.

109. Mihran P. Dabag, "The Decisive Generation: Self-Authorization and Delegations in Deciding a Genocide," in *Genocide: Approaches, Case Studies, and Responses*, ed. Graham C. Kinloch (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 134.

110. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage, 1997), 14, 416-419.

111. Leo Kuper, "Theological Warrants for Genocide: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity," in *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam*, ed. Steven Leonard Jacobs (Plymouth:: Lexington Books, 2009), 25.

112. US National Archives, Record Group (RG) 59.867.00/1361, Bristol's October 23, 1920 report to Washington, pp. 1-2.

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OPPORTUNISM, AUTHORITY AND IDEOLOGY: ON THE MOTIVATIONS OF TURKISH PERPETRATORS AS PORTRAYED IN THE 1919 WAR CRIMES TRIALS¹

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Abstract: The study of the motivations of the people participating in genocide is necessary to fully understand the dynamics of genocide and its genesis, as these are the people who actually implement genocidal policies and provide its material manifestation. This paper looks into the motivations of mid-level perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide through the verdicts of the Ottoman Special Military Tribunal which was established in 1919. It is found that opportunistic motivations dominated for perpetrators' participation, particularly the opportunity for material gain, rape, forced marriage, free labour and career progression. However, the ambiguous nature of authority, coercive structures and ideological tenets also provided a framework within which perpetrators could become motivated to participate.

Introduction

To look at the face of the clock, we can discern the time, and when one asks anyone how this clock works, they will answer that the hands of the clock turn and thus gradually signal the change of time. But to fully understand how the clock works we need to delve into the depths of the mechanics and understand how the various cogs are interlinked, what makes them turn and how they work together to make the time appear on the clock face. This is no different when trying to gain a full understanding of any social phenomenon, including the crime of crimes, genocide. It cannot suffice to describe and contrast the grand sweeps of history and look into the biographies of the leaders of genocide, but instead we also need to look into the dynamics and motivations of the individuals who actually put the genocidal policies into practice, the cogs which make the clock actually turn.

These implementing participants of genocide are not automatons, but instead living, breathing human beings with their own agency, ideas, emotions and interests. Only through a thorough understanding of why these people enlist in a genocidal project and put their

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beings in the violent service of the genocidal leaders can we ever expect to increase our recognition of what constitutes genocide and why it happens. And only with this knowledge will it ever be possible to contemplate preventing such atrocities from happening in the future. This paper provides one small mosaic stone in the bigger picture of why genocide occurs and will give some insight into why individuals participated in the genocide of the Armenian people in 1915.

There is an emerging field of work which studies perpetrators in general and in particular what motivates these people to participate in genocidal violence. In particular much work has been done on the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, as well as conceptual work in social psychology, criminology, anthropology and sociology. However, previous work in the field of the Armenian genocide has been mostly broad historical studies (Akçam 2006; Dadrian 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999; Kévorkian 2011; Zürcher 2010) which have failed to look in depth at the individual level. A wealth of survivor (National Archives of Armenia 2013; see also Anush 2007; Aved 1979; Barooshian 1976; Der-Garabedian 2004; Derderian 2008; Garougian 2005; Hamamdjian 2004; Hartunian 1999 [1968]; Jafferian 1993; Ketchian 1988; Kharpetian 2003; Odian 2009; Papazian 2000; Shamtanchian 2007; Soghoian 1997; Tabibian 1988; Tilkian 1992) and bystander (Alamuddin 1970; Davis 1989; Jacobsen 2001; Morgenthau 2000 [1918]; Niepage 1975 [1917]) testimonial literature fills this desideratum but does not give adequate credence to the dynamics of the perpetrators, the actual implementing individuals. This paper contributes to approaching this research gap and starts looking at the genocide from the perspective of the people who are implementing it.

From a perspective of genocide prevention, it is particularly important to study this topic of perpetration comparatively, in order to understand why people participate not just specifically in one case but across various cases, and thus what could lead people to participate in future genocides also. Thus, this paper will first provide an overview of what motivates people to participate in genocide more generally, before then developing a micro-level foundation for the Armenian Genocide and building a more nuanced understanding of why people participated in it. This analysis will draw on the state of the art on perpetration in the Armenian genocide, as well as analysing data generated from the verdicts of Turkish war crimes tribunals from 1919. Finally, this paper will contrast the findings from Armenia with those of other cases in an attempt understand key similarities and differences and some more generalisable implications.²

The contribution of this paper lies not in its in-depth study of specific motivations of the Armenian Genocide, but to draw on new data and combine this with the previous studies on this case as well as other cases to paint a broader picture than has been painted thus far on perpetrator motivations in the Armenian Genocide. This will not provide the last word

2. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to retell the broad sweeps of the Armenian genocide here, and it is assumed that the reader has a rudimentary knowledge of the case. For an excellent introduction please see Kévorkian (2011).

on perpetrator motivations in the Armenian Genocide, but it is an attempt to synthesise the literature as it stands and bring a systematic perspective to this topic.

The Complexity Of Evil – Why People Participate In Genocidal Violence?

There has been a growing amount of research on perpetrators in recent years, including work on attempting to understand the motivations individuals have for participating in genocide. This section will give a short overview of the literature on why people participate in genocide as a foundation for discussing the motivations of Turkish soldiers and officials on trial subsequently.

Most of the research on perpetrator motivations has been conducted on the cases of the Holocaust (e.g. Browning 2001 [1994]; Gross 2003; Lifton 2000 [1986]; Mann 2000; Welzer 2006) and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (e.g. Fletcher 2007; Fujii 2009; Hogg 2010; McDoom 2008, 2013a, 2013b; Straus 2006; Verwimp 2005), as well as some individual works on the genocide in Bosnia in the early 1990s (e.g. Clark 2009; Lieberman 2006; Mueller 2000; Petersen 2002) and the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia from 1975-79 (Hinton 2004; Hinton 2005; Williams 2015). Furthermore, there is a large social-psychological literature which is informative for this topic (e.g. Bandura 1999; Burger 2009; Milgram 1963; Newman 2002, 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Staub 1989; Sternberg 2005; Vetlesen 2005; Waller 2002; Zimbardo 2008), as well as some criminological literature on genocide perpetrators (Brannigan 2013; Jäger 1982 [1967]). This research has shown first and foremost, that perpetrators' personalities are not individually aberrant, nor do most of them differ strongly ideologically from their peers; much more, perpetrators appear to be overwhelmingly normal (Browder 2003; Browning 2001 [1994]; Fujii 2009; Jensen and Szejnmann 2008; Straus 2006; Welzer 2006). However, beyond this, the many different approaches diverge on what they focus on, both in terms of causal explanations mostly informed by certain disciplinary borders and the cases they study.

Previously I have developed a model which synthesises these research findings from various historical cases and multiple disciplines to a more abstract and inter-contextually comparable model which seeks to explain participation in genocide across many cases of genocide (Williams 2014a; for an updated version see Williams 2014b). A model is to be understood as a systematic representation of social phenomena in which the model aims not to provide "a literally true account of the process or entity in question" (Hughes 1990, 71), but instead an abstraction or idealisation which reduces the complexity of reality to only its causally relevant elements (McMullin 1985, 261-262; see also Jones 2005; Psillos 2011).³

3. The model I have developed is an abstract or idealised representation of genocide participation, which does not take on the form of a typology. A typology would systematically and exhaustively categorise the phenomenon in question along multiple dimensions, while models focus more strongly on capturing the complexity of causal mechanisms.

Motivations are seen here as the impetus for action within a genocidal situation in which a perpetrator finds himself or herself⁴ and these motivations facilitate the process of making a decision between socially structured and individually constructed alternatives (in reference to Hedström and Udehn 2009). Motivations are the driver which guides a person to make a choice between these alternatives. I differentiate between three broad types of motivations: those which focus on the in-group of the perpetrators, on the out-group of the victims or which are intrinsic to the perpetrators themselves and independent of in- and out-group. These three types encompass eleven specific individual motivations.⁵ Furthermore, I identify facilitative factors which are not in and of themselves sufficient for causing an individual to participate in genocide, as a motivation is, but instead make this participation easier. Lastly, there are contextual conditions which influence the entire situation and can make certain motivations or facilitative factors more salient. My model differs from previous approaches to understanding perpetrator motivations as it is the first to systematically integrate findings from multiple cases and several disciplines, thus coming at the topic from a new, interdisciplinary angle. While this comes at the cost of a contextually embedded understanding of perpetration, it also allows for a more nuanced perspective which better incorporates the complexity of reality with the many different motivations underlying human action. The fundamental tenet of the model is that it is possible for similar human and interpersonal dynamics to occur in very different cultural and contextual settings. Whether this is then actually the case, can then be tested by applying the model to new cases (as will be done with the case of the Armenian genocide in this paper).

The first group of motivations I identify are in-group-focused motivations, which concentrate on the social dynamics within the perpetrator group and the social influence exerted between members of it. Social influence can be implicit, explicit or even backed up by (threats of) force and can be exercised vertically by an authority or horizontally between peers. Most prominent in perpetrator testimonies but also in the literature on motivations is explicit or implicit orders by a person in authority and the **obedience to orders** that this then effects (see among many others Alvarez 2001; Brannigan 2013; Du Preez 1994; Gourevitch 1998; Hinton 2004; Mamdani 2001; McDoom 2008; Meyer 2009; Milgram 1963, 1975; Semelin 2005; Straus 2006; Welzer 2002). Similar horizontal social influence is termed **peer pressure** when it is explicit and is a common feature of descriptions of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides (Bašić 2006, 159; Fletcher 2007, 33; Hatzfeld 2004b, 25; McDoom 2008, 265; Straus 2006). When this horizontal influence is implicit instead, the active motivation is the desire for **conformity**, in which individuals participate in order

4. While in the Armenian genocide most perpetrators were men, in other contexts women played a larger role. Although there is some research on the topic of women's diverging roles in genocide (Adler, Loyle, and Globerman 2007; Rights 1995; Hogg 2010, 84; Lower 2013; Sarti 2011; Sperling 2005), there is little evidence for systematic differences in their motivations.

5. Each of these motivations is described at a relatively abstract level and their manifestations in actual genocides will vary. The mechanism causing the person to participate will be the same though, even if it is culturally specific how this occurs.

for them not to lose favour with the group and remain part of it (Asch 1963). Finally, horizontal and vertical influence can be laced with the threat or actual utilization of violence. This **coercion** can be a powerful motivation for individuals to participate in order not to experience physical violence against them. Empirically various instances of genocide have provided significantly different degrees of how credible threats of coercion were, with no known instances of Germans being killed for refusing to participate in the Holocaust (Bhavnani 2006, 657; Fletcher 2007, 32; Hatzfeld 2004a, 130; Mann 2005, 164; Straus 2006; see also Jäger 1982 [1967], 84-93).

The second set of motivations focus on the out-group from the perspective of the perpetrators: the victims. Most prominently for this group and possibly the most pervasive in popular perceptions of genocide, **genocidal ideologies** can motivate individuals to participate in genocide. A genocidal ideology can lead to someone believing that it is the best and morally legitimate course of action or that the victims are deserving of the treatment. Ideologies can take on many different forms and while they may look quite different across various genocides (Goldhagen 1996; Harff 2003; Neilsen 2015; Orth 2002), Jonathon Leader Maynard (2014) provides a nuanced differentiation of six genocidal ideologies which can be found across various cases. The other out-group-focused motivation is **emotions** which at a psychological level raise the saliency of one desire over other competing desires and in this way shift motivations for genocide participation (Petersen 2002, 17-20). Emotions of particular interest in the context of genocide include fear (Fujii 2009, 121; Hinton 2005; Petersen 2002; Semelin 2005, 247; Straus 2006, 122; Sundhaussen 2001, 47), resentment, hatred and rage (Petersen 2002), as well as disgust (Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 2000).

Lastly, there is a broad group of intrinsic motivations which are all particular to the individuals themselves and do not relate to the perpetrator or victim group. To begin with, people can be motivated to participate in genocide for a broad range of **opportunistic** reasons, such as being able to loot and pillage, career promotion (or avoiding demotion), the ability to settle personal scores or get ahead politically, the possibility of raping and many more (Browning 2001 [1994], 75; Fletcher 2007, 33; Fujii 2009, 97; Mamdani 2001, 218; Mann 2005, 32; Mueller 2000, 49, 61; Semelin 2005, 242; Straus 2006, 79; Valentino 2004). Innately motivating for people to participate is **sadism** as it gives people pleasure in inflicting pain on others (Alford 1997, 28; Baumeister 2002, 254; Segev 1992 [1988], 46-47; Valentino 2004, 40). Further, as with many types of crime people can experience a certain amount of **excitement or thrills** when being perpetrators which contrasts with their more mundane everyday life, thus giving them good reason to want to participate (Katz 1988, 53; Hinton 2004; Hinton 2005; Semelin 2005). Next, individual perpetrators can assume **genocidal roles** in which they come to conform to an alternative set of norms and practices associated with this role (Bloxham 2008, 232; Browder 2003; Lifton 2000 [1986]; Roth 2004, 214; Waller 2002, 221; Zimbardo 2008, 214). A pertinent example of this comes from the Cambodian genocide where one cadre speaks of what it was like to join the Khmer Rouge: “When we joined, it was like we were entering into a tiger zone, so we had to be a tiger like them. So, we needed to be a tiger like them, to be cruel like them. No

morality like them. That's why they were like that.” Finally, **status and power** can provide enough motivational allure for individuals to participate in genocide (Hinton 2004; Hinton 2005), particularly through the intensely satisfying experience of gaining power over someone else (Semelin 2005).

Besides these motivations there are also many facilitative factors identified in the model which make participation easier. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these in depth, but a few key facilitative factors will be mentioned in all brevity here. It is easier for people to participate when they can absolve themselves of the responsibility for their actions through the **groups** they are in. They can do this particularly by displacing it to others or diffusing it within a group, or alternatively by immersing themselves in anonymity (Bandura 1999, 196; Fujii 2009, 158; Vetlesen 2005, 147; Waller 2002, 212; Warr 2002, 62; Zimbardo 2008, 315).

Further, if people are not ideologically committed to the crimes they are committing it is likely that cognitive dissonance will occur as their actions do not match their morals. To overcome this, people can try and **morally disengage** from the situation by dehumanising the victim group (thus taking away the moral problem of killing fellow humans) (Bandura 1999, 200; Fein 1990, 37-39); furthermore, distance can help to morally disengage, be it physical (Bandura 1999, 199; Chirot and McCauley 2006, 52; Grossmann 2004), moral (Grossmann 2004, 75; Waller 2002, 196; Welzer 2002, 243), social (Browning 2001 [1994], 153; Hatzfeld 2004, 28, 51), psychological (Waller 2002, 196) or cultural distance (Grossmann 2004, 70).

Third, another way to overcome cognitive dissonance is to seek **moral justification** for the deed and thus change one's attitude towards one's actions. There are many strategies for moral justification and portraying why the killing is necessary and good (Eisner 2009, 53; Leader Maynard 2014; Waller 2002).

Finally, the factor **time** can have a facilitative impact on people's willingness to participate. Over time, people can become habituated into violence and thus grow desensitised (Browning 2001 [1994], 69, 128; Hatzfeld 2004, 54; McCauley 2002, 79; Sereny 1977 [1974], 200). Also individuals can progress along a 'continuum of destruction' (Staub 1989) by which an individual changes little by little over successive steps with each task preparing him mentally for the next slightly harder one. Similarly, the idea of 'escalating commitments' when a person will continue along a pathway towards participation in a series of small steps, because at each point in time, stopping would mean admitting that the previous step (which was not much less worse) was actually also wrong (Waller 2002, 205).

Besides these time-dependent facilitative factors, a final note on temporality as understood in this model is in order: over time people's motivations for participation can change. While a perpetrator may begin his or her participation in response to social dynamics within the perpetrator group, ideological justification can later become more important or the opportunities the participation has allowed for. The model does not claim that one factor will explain each individual's participation, but that various factors can coalesce and

that over time these may vary. Future empirical research should endeavour to trace these intra-personal developments in some cases.

In evaluating this model, a downside could be construed in its abstract nature by which it neglects cultural specificities and the individual dynamics inherent in various cases. However, this is also the strength of such a model as it is its abstraction which allows it to be inter-contextually and inter-culturally applicable, reducing the complexity of reality to the causal mechanisms which effect participation without their context. This in turn means that it can then be 're-inserted' into context and help to understand other cases of genocide participation by reducing the level of abstraction and showing how the causal mechanisms *actually* work here. Hence, this is the point where researchers who are expert on various cases of genocidal violence can bring to the model the cultural specificities of their cases and engage it with these more abstract causal dynamics. For example, some participants are motivated to participate due to obedience to authority; while social psychologically the causal mechanism for how they react to authority will be similar the nature of authority can vary strongly from case to case and authority during the Khmer Rouge meant something very different to authority in Nazi Germany or authority in the late Ottoman Empire. Thus, this means that the model should also be able to assist in understanding participants to the Armenian Genocide. The model will now act as the template by which these perpetrators can be analysed. It will be of particular interest, which cultural specificities the motivations take on when they manifest in this case, but also whether some motivations occur with a higher frequency than in other cases. This model is not important in and of itself, but it allows the empirical data on perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide to be embedded systematically in the broader discussions of genocidal perpetrators. This is important in order to establish the comparability of the Armenian Genocide's dynamics, but also with an ultimate view to genocide prevention.

The Challenging Data Situation On Perpetrators In The Armenian Genocide

Having introduced in short what motivations can drive people to participate in genocide, the focus will turn now to the case of the Armenian Genocide to see whether the model can explain perpetrators' participation in this case also. This is not a formal test of the model but instead seeks to understand the case of the Armenian Genocide using the model as a framework. Should motivations emerge in the empirical analysis, this would disprove the model, while the model would be lent a higher credibility if the motivations found in the Armenian genocide resonate with the individual elements of the model. In researching perpetrator motivations various approaches which have been pursued in the past will be discussed, demonstrating that there is a dearth of original sources for investigating perpetrators in the Armenian genocide.

While others have successfully studied perpetrators and their motivations in the Armenian Genocide, this has most often remained a niche of their analysis (although their valuable insights will help inform this more general analysis below). The most significant

research dedicated *specifically* to perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide has been conducted by Hasmik Grigoryan who looks at perpetrators through the eyes of survivor and bystander testimonies (Grigoryan 2015a, 2015b). In particular she looks at the behaviour of children participants in the violence, women perpetrators and the role of sexual violence as a behavioural expression of perpetration. While the findings in this research are certainly interesting in and of themselves, they are more focused on the individual actions of the perpetrators than their motivations; this is quite reasonable as it is not only difficult for third parties to gauge the thoughts and motivations of others, but moreover the perspective of survivors is likely to diverge quite strongly from that of the perpetrators. Baumeister terms this a ‘magnitude gap’ between victims’ and perpetrators’ perceptions. Most of these differences in perspective “boil down to the fact that nasty events, both great and small, typically seem worse to the victim than to the perpetrator [...]. A researcher therefore cannot understand the perpetrator’s perspective without at least briefly adopting a view of the episode that makes it far less bad than it seems to the victim” (Baumeister 2002, 243).⁶ More specifically, survivors like to entertain narratives which “construe the perpetrators’ intentions in a suitably grand and evil manner to match the suffering of the victims” (Baumeister 2002, 246). Referring to Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) metaphor of a gardener who dispassionately weeds, Roy Baumeister (2002, 246) states that survivors would prefer to be hated passionately as this shows more respect than complete indifference. In this vein, “victim accounts tend to see stark moral issues with clear lines, whereas perpetrator accounts see many more grey areas in the relevant moral judgments. [... Further,] perpetrators usually have reasons and explanations for their actions, whereas many victims describe the perpetrator’s actions as utterly gratuitous” (Baumeister and Campbell 1999, 211). Certainly, much can be learned about forms of perpetration from the survivor perspective in the Armenian Genocide, as is demonstrated in Grigoryan’s (2015a, 2015b) work, but to understand motivations from a perpetrator perspective, a different approach becomes necessary.

To understand the perpetrator perspective, it would be most promising to directly interview the perpetrators themselves as was done in many of the studies on Rwanda and Cambodia, as well as some of the Holocaust research (e.g. Fujii 2009; Hinton 2004; Hinton 2005; McDoom 2008; Straus 2006; Williams 2015). Given the passage of time since the Armenian Genocide, interviews are obviously not a viable approach. Other methods for studying perpetrators certainly exist, such as using the transcripts of clandestine audio recordings of German prisoners of war (Neitzel and Welzer 2011; Welzer 2006; Welzer, Neitzel, and Gudehus 2011) or studying their diaries or letters to read how they portrayed themselves and their actions at the actual time. These approaches are advantageous as there is less danger of the people wanting to socially conform as they are not writing or speaking

6. Although the terminology used in the literature on the Armenian genocide is that of ‘survivors’, these are equivalent to what is termed in most of the genocide studies literature as ‘victims’. The victims meant are obviously also those who were killed, but any types of post-genocide research referring to victims’ perspectives will also entail those who survived.

for a posterior audience. Unfortunately, such documents do not exist or are inaccessible for the case of the Armenian Genocide, as a vast majority of Ottoman soldiers were illiterate, as were the villagers and militiamen who participated in massacres (Zürcher 2010, 167). Furthermore, even if a small amount of such documents did exist, these would be under lock and key of Turkish military archives and thus inaccessible to the general public.⁷

Instead this paper will draw on data from judicial proceedings of the 1919 trials, an avenue of research also followed in many Holocaust-related projects (most prominently in Browning 2001 [1994]; Goldhagen 1996). More specifically, this paper will look into the verdicts of the Ottoman Special Military Tribunal, which was a post-World War I courts-martial set up in 1919 by the Ottoman State under extreme pressure by the Allied forces who had just defeated the Ottoman Empire, Germany and others. It was an act of the accommodation by the newly installed government particularly towards the British victors. This paper focuses on several cases which go beyond the highest echelons of power, particularly on the cases regarding local officials in Yozgad, Trabzon, Erzincan, Bayburt, as well as some Responsible Secretaries and Delegates of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). I focus in particular on the verdicts passed by the tribunal, and draw on two different translations from Turkish into English by Dadrian and Akçam (2011) and Yeghiayan (1990);⁸

7. Private correspondences.

8. The verdicts studied here are from the following cases which include mid-level perpetrators:

1. In the trial regarding Yozgad (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 290-293; Yeghiayan 1990, 155-158) the accused were Kemal Bey, Boğazlıyan Sub-District Commissioner (Kaymakam) and Acting District Governor of Yozgad; and Major Tevfik Bey, Gendarmerie Commander for the provincial district of Yozgad.

2. In the trial regarding Trabzon (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 294-299; Yeghiayan 1990, 159-165) the accused were Mehmed Ali Bey, Director of Taxation of Trabzon; Nuri Bey, Chief of Police of Trabzon; Mustafa Effendi, Director of the (Secret) Service of Trabzon; Talat Bey, Sub-District Commissioner (Kaymakam) and Assistant to the Chief Inspector of the Trabzon Gendarmerie; Niyazi Effendi, Manager of a hotel in Trabzon; Ali Sayib Bey, Chief Sanitary Inspector, Trabzon; all of the aforementioned were present at their trial. Tried in absentia were Cemal Azmi Bey, Provincial Governor (vali) of Trabzon; and Nayil Bey, Party Responsible Secretary of Trabzon.

3. In the trial regarding Erzincan (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 312-313) the accused were Memduh Bey, Former District Governor of Erzincan; Hafız Abdullah Avni Efendi, son of Hacı Hüseyin; Halit, Former Deputy of Erzincan; Hacı Vahid-zade Efendi from Erzincan; Karmo Yusuf, Tribal leader from Dersim; Arslan, Gendarme sergeant from Erzincan; tribal leader Kagü, Director of the Daniz Bey village connected to the Township of Pülümür.

4. In the trial regarding Bayburt (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 304-310) the accused were Yanyali Nusret Bey, former district governor of Urfa; and Mehmet Necati Efendi, discharged from the rank of lieutenant.

5. In the trial regarding Responsible Secretaries and Delegates of the CUP (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 314-323; Yeghiayan 1990, 147-154), Avni Bey, Party Responsible Secretary of Manisa; Selaheddin Bey, Beyoğlu Responsible Secretary; Dr Besim Zuhti Bey, Eskişehir Responsible Secretary; Mithad Bey, Brusa Responsible Secretary; Cevted Bey, Lieutenant to the Responsible Secretary of Mirkun; Cemal Bey, Aleppo Responsible Secretary; Abdül Geni Bey, Inspector of Edirne; Abdül Kadir Effendi, Aid to the Konia Responsible Secretary; Hasan Fehmi Effendi, Aid to the Kastamonu Responsible Secretary; Agyah Bey, former President of the Sanitary Commission of Karahisar; Hayreddin Bey, former Karahisar official; all the accused were also present at the trial.

the use of two translations allows me to triangulate the translations and minimise the risk of mistakes or biases in the translations misleading the analysis.⁹

Before launching into the analysis of these trial documents, a short discussion of the limitations of this type of source is necessary. The people on trial are certainly not the low-level perpetrators in the focus of much perpetrator research, but the list of accused also goes beyond the leaders to include some of the mid-level functionaries to whom the scope of the model could also apply. Also, any form of post-genocide data collection is confronted with the problem that “perpetrator testimony after the fact is vulnerable to attempts to minimize personal responsibility, or else to construct socially acceptable narratives. Memory loss should also not be under-estimated” (McDoom 2008, 239). This is exacerbated when the testimonies being examined are taken in the course of judicial proceedings as the individuals have strong incentives to minimize their own role and misconstrue their motivations. Furthermore, the source used here are verdicts of the tribunal meaning that they are not the perpetrators’ own words but instead the condensed synopsis as seen by the judges. While this does allow for a certain adjudication of the credibility of the perpetrator testimony, it means that the motivations portrayed will have been filtered; and in this case even by a relatively partisan tribunal as was elaborated on above. Nonetheless, these documents are among the only primary sources available through which this level of interaction with perpetrators and their motivations is visible. Thus, these sources are anything but ideal, but -with these limitations in mind- nonetheless they constitute an interesting launching point from which to explore the motivations of perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, to try and understand, at least to a certain degree, what drove people to participate in this heinous violence. Lastly, the judicial documents only let one infer the actual motivations of the perpetrators to a certain degree; although much can be said about the actions of perpetrators and some motivations are made explicit, in parts the motivations are only implicit. To bridge this gap, they will –as far as possible– be matched to other studies in the literature in which these actions are founded within the motivations of the perpetrators. As explained in the introduction, the aim of this paper is not to study any one motivation in-depth, but to bring together the insights from these judicial documents with the further research on individual motivations conducted by others and place this within the research framework of perpetrator motivations in other genocidal contexts.

Perpetrator Motivations In The Armenian Genocide

In this section, the Tribunal verdicts are analysed in more depth to uncover what motivated some of the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide who were on trial and their affiliates who did not need to face justice but were referred to in the trials. This analysis will be complemented by the insights from several other scholars who have in the course of their re-

9. Both translations obviously offer the same content, albeit with different linguistic interpretations. If an idea is cited which can be found in both translations only the verdict will be referred to, whereas if a verbatim quote is given, the direct source will be mentioned.

search discussed perpetrator motivations to some degree. Key motivations referred to here are various forms of opportunistic motivations, obedience to authority, sadism, ideology, although all to varying degrees, as well as several interesting facilitative factors.

Material gain

Of the motivations discussed in my model above, by far the most prominent in the data under analysis for the Armenian genocide is that of opportunism with various forms of opportunistic participation being described in the verdicts. Üngör and Polatel argue that the seizure of Armenian property by the Young Turk regime was not motivated by economic, but by ethno-nationalist reasons at the systemic level, with the economic destruction of the Armenians aiming at supporting the broader annihilationist campaign and securing a Turkish economy (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 166). In particular, “The expropriation of Ottoman Armenians was a functionally necessary phase linking persecution to destruction” (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 103). However, they argue that for the individual perpetrators themselves, economic motivations did play a more central role, particularly for the ordinary people participating in the murders who were motivated by plunder as a ‘pull factor’ (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 104). They also refer to Latham’s (2000) work who demonstrates that these economic motivations existed at all levels of the state apparatus and also for non-state participants (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 10).

First and foremost, looting is described in the verdicts as widespread with the seizure of abandoned property and possessions prevalent, as well as the stealing of the deported Armenians’ money and carried possessions (CUP Responsible Secretaries; Erzincan; Trabzon; Yozgad; for a broader discussion of the mechanisms of looting during the Armenian genocide see Kurt 2015). This occurred both in their homes prior to departure as well as when the deported Armenians were already being transported away. As the looting continued of the possessions they had taken along, increasingly anything they had with them was stolen, including even their clothes (Trabzon). Furthermore, even those who were spared immediate killing or were allowed to remain behind (mostly women who were then raped and killed or later married off, see below) were stripped of all their belongings. In their description of Aziz Feyzi, Üngör and Polatel (2011, 163) conclude that “it is likely that in his eyes he was only pursuing the financial interest of his family.” Furthermore, even not killing, but participating in the broader actions of genocide (e.g guarding a caravan during deportation) could also provide options for enrichment as guards accepted bribes to postpone deportation or to see one’s family one final time (Balakian 2010, 124), bribes to be allowed to use the toilet or to be allowed to rent carriages for transportation (at an already grossly inflated rate) (Balakian 2010, 132)

There were, however, also more subtle ways of gaining materially from participation in the deportations and genocide by either purchasing properties or possessions at desperation prices or by purportedly rescuing Armenians but doing this in order to charge a large sum of money. In one example a CUP Inspector for the province of Edirene, Abdülgani Bey, “had the cassimere and textile shop of the Kazazyan brothers, which was worth one hun-

dred thousand lira, given to his own son Hayrullah in exchange for one thousand lira, and he had the abandoned property [of the Armenian deportees] given to other followers at very low prices” (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 319). This same Abdülgani Bey also took over the shares of two Armenian brothers in exchange for seeking an exemption for them through a special request to the governor-general (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 319).

In another example, Mrs Sophie Tahmarzian, widow and daughter of Onik Mahokian, trader and shipping agent, reports of Mehmed Ali Bey, Director of Taxation in Trabzon, that “in order to further facilitate stealing of my trousseau and my husband’s property he adopted me as his daughter. All my property and my deported husband’s thus became his” (Yeghiayan 1991, 434). Here the perpetrator was even able to present himself in a positive light as a rescuer, while at the same time taking the entire property of Tahmarzian and her family. It was also common among Turkish soldiers, paramilitaries and police, accompanying the deportations to collect money daily from the deportees in order to protect them from groups of bandits or potential looters from whom the deportees expected their imminent murder, as has been testified to broadly in the survivor literature (see for example Dadrian 1945).

Access to ‘saved’ Armenians as free labour

By participating in the genocide, perpetrators were also able to gain access to various types of free labour. Primarily such labour was garnered from women and girls who were not sent along with the rest of the deportees, but separated out. In the Trabzon verdict, for instance, the plight of several Armenian women and girls is told. They were first collected in a hospital supposedly for their protection, however, in due course, the women were then passed on to perpetrators’ households where they were used as slave labour or were married by the men (Trabzon). Not all ‘saved’ Armenian women who were given to members of the perpetrator group were forcibly married. Instead some were given into Muslim households as maids or slave labour. Here, again, perpetrators could benefit from participating by receiving unprecedented access to free labour for their households (Trabzon). Further, during the genocide some perpetrators took male deportees also as free labour to build clubhouses for members of the CUP or to work in the properties which had been stolen from the Armenian deportees (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 315). Lastly, orphaned children were also sometimes converted to Islam and then accepted into Muslim families (Balakian 2010, 87).

Forced marriages and rape

Of those who were forcibly married to their new husbands, it is also reported that many of them were first obliged to convert to Islam (Yeghiayan 1991, 434), and were often also raped in order to prepare “them for absorption into Muslim households” (Bjørnlund 2009, 30). Rape of Armenian women was also common throughout the genocidal process and this was integral to the systemic attacks against the Armenian population (Bayburt; Trabzon; Bjørnlund 2009). These practices of rape gave male perpetrators an incentive to participate as they had unmitigated access to sexual activity and can “be seen as a result of

a thoroughly brutalized environment that left room for local initiatives when it came to the methods of killing and humiliation, initiatives that satisfied individual needs, not only for self-gratification but also for variation” (Bjørnlund 2009, 29). At the individual level and beyond mere sexual desire, the raping allowed some men to gratify their sadistic or dominating needs and provide mutual recognition of masculinity (Bjørnlund 2009, 29). Theriault brings these perspectives together slightly differently:

“The pleasure of rape is not sexual, but rather is experienced as sexual because the perpetrator gets sexual pleasure from violent domination. Sexual enslavement of Armenian women and girls, including through coerced or forced marriages, allowed perpetrators a related avenue of dominion that could be extended out in time” (Theriault 2007, 30).¹⁰

Freedom from prison

A strong opportunistic motivation which can present itself to potential perpetrators is when they are currently in prison and are offered their freedom in exchange for their participation. There is significant evidence that this was a common recruitment strategy in the context of the Armenian Genocide. These former criminals were then trained for one week at the Ministry of War and then sent from the capital to the Caucasus as cadres of the ‘Special Organization’ (*Teskilat-i Mahsusa*) in order to implement the annihilation of the Armenian people (Altınay 1919, 23; quoted in Dadrian 1991, 121; see also Balakian 2010, 78).

Demonstration of loyalty for career progression

“During the period of the rule of the Committee for Union and Progress, [...] all civil servants from the very lowest of rank to the directors of offices were appointed based upon no other qualification other than loyalty” (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 307). In the build up to and during the Armenian genocide, local officials were systematically replaced by individuals more loyal to the CUP and its exterminatory plans (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 307; see also Balakian 2010, 78, 109). Thus individuals who towed the line and positioned themselves strategically in favour of the deportations and the genocide could advance their career by receiving promotions. However, it is also plausible that those who had careerist ambition during this time were *already* dedicated to the cause for other reasons, thus not making this a motivation. Nonetheless, either way, participation was a possibility to signal loyalty to the new system and to establish one’s authority over an area.

Coercion

Besides these opportunistic motivations though, there were also a host of further motivations. The power of coercion is indicated to varying degrees in different genocides, as

10. These perspectives which ascribe little erotic sexual pleasure to the act of rape have more problem explaining why, in most accounts of genocidal rape against Armenian women and girls, it is the prettiest ones who are sought out. If it were solely about domination, the looks of the girls would matter less than, for instance, their social status. Notwithstanding this addendum, the possibility to participate in rape certainly provided a motivation for some perpetrators.

described above. In the case of the Armenian genocide, the threat of coercion varied substantially depending on an individual's position. As Mann's (2005, 164) thorough review of secondary sources demonstrates, normal soldiers were shot if they refused to participate or even dared to help the Armenians, while officers in the army were unlikely to be killed for rejecting participation. This security predicament is also demonstrated by the low-level perpetrating individuals themselves, as testified by Atkinson (2000, 88; quoted in Bjørn-lund 2009, 21) when discussing a Turkish policeman who participated in killing because he ostensibly believed he would otherwise be killed himself, a common excuse or stated motivation.

Obedience to Authority

Regarding the role of authority, many of the perpetrators were embedded in official state structures so that any orders they received came along traditional lines of authority used for all manner of legislation and its implementation, giving the genocidal policies fundamental legitimacy. However, the CUP party structure became ever more dominant throughout the Ottoman Empire, with party structures partially existing in parallel to its state counterparts. In this context, there are descriptions of individuals "without any official authority as supervisors over the officials and guards" (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 291) taking charge. These people nevertheless managed to successfully assert their authority in these situations, gaining obedience from individual perpetrators to act in accordance with the genocidal policies. It is through the authority of the increasingly dominant CUP that these people even without official rank were able to enforce obedience to their orders (Trabzon; Yozgad). These processes were amplified as decrees were not precisely formulated to begin with, giving ample room for interpretation (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 104), thus strengthening the importance of authoritative interpretation and the resulting pressure to implement this.

Consequently, state officials became less willing or placed to intercede. For example, in the Trabzon trial the court noted that even members of state institutions such as the local police chief, Nuri Effendi, took a back seat and "made absolutely no attempt, either officially or unofficially, to prevent [such acts], even though he witnessed them with his very own eyes" (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 296).

At the same time, these parallel authority structures made it possible for individuals to abdicate responsibility for their acts to the state structures. For instance, Besim Zuhti Bey, CUP Responsible Secretary of Brusa, says that "it was not within my authority to do anything, and so I cannot say anything whatsoever about it" (Yeghiayan 1990, 141). By referring to the 'Temporary Law of Deportation', individuals were also further able to displace the authority which would hold them accountable for their actions, rather than seeing them as just automatons implementing orders. Abdül Geni Bey, CUP Responsible Secretary of Edirne states in a cross-examination during his trial that "the deportations taking place were legally sanctioned. How could we have opposed laws established by the Government? [...] How could we have interfered? There was the law; there was the gendarmerie.

[...] Could we have said to him, ‘You are authorized’ or ‘You are not authorized’ to do this work on the basis of the Law?” (Yeghiayan 1990, 127-128).

Ideology

Michael Mann (2005, 167) finds that “few Kurds and few rankers in any unit can have been ideological killers.” While he posits that most perpetrators will have had little positive sentiment towards the comparatively privileged Armenians, he argues that for most people ideology did not play a key motivating part. There are certainly some actors who did have ideological motivation, for instance Kemal Bey in the Yozgad trial who displayed “feelings of revenge and of a personal vendetta [against the Armenians]” (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 292). This form of revenge is not opportunistic in the sense that it is personal but instead ideological as it is against the whole Armenian people.

While motivating only some individuals, ideology more importantly created a framework of legitimacy within which it became acceptable for people to participate in the deportations, lootings and killings. Mann also concedes to the role of ideology that “these motives of retaliation and revenge helped still normal taboos against murdering helpless human beings” (Mann 2005, 167). This began with the dispossession of the Armenians which was clad in legality, and thus suggested a degree of legitimacy (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 58) and then continued with the legitimacy was given to the expulsion of the Armenians as it was framed as a deportation or relocation. Furthermore, nationalist narratives in which the danger posed by rebellious Armenian groups fed into people’s perceptions of the necessity of their actions (see Göçek 2015, 225).

Also, the subjugated role of the non-Muslim Armenians within the Ottoman millet system and their unequal status which was legitimised within the doctrines of Islamic ideology (Dadrian 1995, 4-5) underlined this facilitative framework. Within this framework the discrimination and subsequent destruction was able to be framed as legitimate the Armenians could be portrayed as “antagonists” of the Muslims (Dadrian 1995, 125). Furthermore, at the local level, it was local religious authorities whose authority “played a pivotal role in motivating and legitimizing the massacres” (Dadrian 1995, 150; see also Balakian 2010, 146), giving religious absolution for these crimes and also underlining the state lines of authority discussed in the previous section. Through declaring the slaughter of the Armenians a religious war (‘jihad’), it became legitimate to kill people as a normal act of war, as testified by a police captain (Balakian 2010, 146), even stylising it to a “sacred religious obligation” (Balakian 2010, 145). Hence, ideology functioned here in facilitating people’s participation by removing moral inhibitions which individuals would have had and even creating a positive, religiously-legitimated reason to participate.

Sadism

While there are no direct reports of sadism in the trial verdicts, there are multiple references to how the newly instated people who came to perpetrate the genocide were “cruel inhumane individuals” (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 307) and to the “atrocious and cruel”

(Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 294) manner of the killings. Furthermore, although survivor testimony is more susceptible to interpreting perpetrator motivations as vindictive and based on hatred – as explained in more detail above – the actual actions of the perpetrators can be gauged with a higher degree of veracity. The degree of gratuitous violence involved in the deportations and killings speaks to the presence of at least some sadistically motivated perpetrators within the group. If the perpetrators had only been motivated by opportunistic, coercive or obedient motivations, there would have been no necessity for gratuitous violence, no need to torture both physically and psychologically many of the victims before killing them.

Facilitative factors – group dynamics

As detailed above in the discussion of authority, some state and CUP officials were able to remain in their positions without effectively and actively propelling the genocide forwards. However, this inaction in and of itself also had an effect on other perpetrators in their perception of the legitimacy of the crimes, because the inaction signals to others that the person is not registering moral inhibitions or their dissent towards the policy, thus inadvertently and implicitly legitimating it. This is epitomised in the trials of the Responsible Secretaries, when the president of the tribunal is quoted as having said to Dr. Mithad Bey: “It is maintained that in your region and in others, many vile acts took place. And since you did not undertake any measures, your indifference encouraged the initiators and gave them license to expand the scope of their cruel activities” (Yeghiayan 1990, 145).

Facilitative factors – moral disengagement through distance

In the Armenian genocide, the key facilitative factor which enabled moral disengagement was distance. While the deportations for the most part started through actions of local officials who were geographically as well as socially and possibly even emotionally closer to the victims, the actual killings nearly always occurred either outside the towns in arid areas and “out-of-the-way and concealed places” (Dadrian and Akçam 2011, 294), or at sea where people were thrown overboard (Trabzon). Furthermore, the killing groups were most often not made up of individuals who were from the same place as the victims as they had already been deported onwards (Altınay 1919, 23; quoted in Dadrian 1991, 121). Thus any possible emotional or social ties which could have inhibited people from killing were removed.

This distancing process began earlier even in the dispossession of the Armenians which was clad in legal veneer, which also allowed the involved bureaucrats to take on a specific role of loyal civil servant. This legalisation of the dispossession created a framework for the implementing individuals which “structured their daily work and provided an impersonal, administrative-bureaucratic mask to hide behind. [... Furthermore, it] relieved the conscience of the perpetrators by placing the ultimate responsibility with the central authorities” (Üngör and Polatel 2011, 58).

Facilitative factors – dehumanisation

A further facilitative factor attested to broadly is the systematic dehumanisation of the Armenian population in the years before the genocide through state actors and media, which was augmented as a consequence of the early massacres of the Armenians and the deportations which reduced the humanity of their appearance and thus legitimised the bad treatment in the eyes of the perpetrators (Bjørnlund 2009, 22; see also Balakian 2010, 295). However, Theriault (2007, 30) convincingly argues against this omnipresent assumption of dehumanisation by demonstrating that many perpetrators actually attempted to maximise the suffering for the Armenian victims, which provided satisfaction precisely because of their status as humans. It is necessary for the human capacity for emotion and trauma of the Armenians to be “assumed by perpetrators in order for many forms of cruelty, such as raping of women and girls in front of husbands, siblings, or their children, to be considered meaningful” (Theriault 2007, 31). While Theriault does agree with the successive reduction of human features as cruelty mounted, he sees this gradual dehumanisation as a process in which enactment of cruelty which had the capacity to dehumanise was the foundation for the pleasure experienced by the perpetrators; he graphically phrases this as a process “through which genocide perpetrators consume the humanity of their targets by converting it into their own pleasure” (Theriault 2007, 31).

Other facilitative factors are also present in the Armenian genocide, such as the brutalisation of soldiers through standard training (see Riggs 1997, 127-128; quoted in Bjørnlund 2009, 21) which made it easier for them to participate in such horrific acts. Also, the use of sanitising language such as referring to massacres as ‘cleansing’ (Balakian 2010, 139) made it easier to frame the killing in a positive light. Other facilitative factors have already been alluded to above in the discussion of the motivations. First and foremost there are the moral legitimisation of the deportations and the genocide through tapping into narratives of revenge and resentment already palatable to many of the rural population. This was not the motivation for their participation but instead it provided the framework for legitimacy within which their actions could become perceived as good and just.

Discussion

How does the data analysed from the Armenian Genocide compare to the motivations and facilitative factors which have been unearthed for perpetrators of other genocides, as described in my previously developed model? Most importantly, it should be noted that there were an exceptional number of opportunistic motivations found for why people participated in the Armenian Genocide. These were all based on the idea that participating in the deportations and killing enabled people to reap the benefits of being a member of the perpetrator group. These benefits range from the receiving the opportunity to loot Armenian money, possessions and property for personal material gain, the possibility to rape or receive a forced bride, access to Armenians as free labour, or career progression (or the avoidance of demotion) for loyalty. Lastly, a key incentive was the opportunity for criminals to gain freedom from prison in exchange for their participation. This long list of

opportunistic reasons certainly dominated the trial verdicts, as well as secondary source interpretations of why people participated.

Nonetheless, further motivations can be identified also. Referring to the in-group-focused motivations obedience to authority and coercion played a role, and the ambivalent nature of authority is particularly interesting in this context. However, there was little evidence of horizontal social influence in the form of peer pressure or conformity, as was important especially in the Rwandan genocide (Fujii 2009).

Next, out-group-focused motivations were primarily located in the realm of ideology, which played a role as a motivation for some, and provided a legitimacy framework for most, particularly drawing on the subjugating categorisations of the millet system, the ideas of an Islamic jihad and Turkish nationalism.

Regarding intrinsic motivations, the primary motivation of opportunism has already been mentioned, but this was also complemented by evidence of sadism. No specific data indicated the motivational power of genocidal roles, status or the thrill and excitement of participation. Further, regarding facilitative factors, particularly ideology as a legitimating factor, distance as morally disengaging and group dynamics were shown to have made individuals' participation easier.

Altogether, participation in the Armenian Genocide appears to have significant similarities to other cases, albeit with its own idiosyncrasies. While the motivations certainly have slightly different manifestations in this case to in other cases, they also appear to be quite comparable with other cases. The prevalence of opportunistic motivations which interact with a framework of legitimacy created by religious and state authorities shows how easy it can be to motivate ordinary people to become perpetrators of genocide, and this is an important lesson to heed in thinking about avoiding genocidal violence in the future. As and when new and better primary sources emerge it would be important to continue this systematic investigation of perpetrator motivations in the Armenian genocide in an attempt to find out whether certain motivations occur more frequently than others, whether more often in combination with certain others, as well as how these perpetrators themselves perceived their motivations at the time and since. This paper here has not been able to provide a final answer on these issues but has attempted to bring together the work done so far on perpetrator motivations and look at it through the perspective of a model to judge the comparability of perpetrators in the Armenian genocide to other cases. While this comparability is certainly given, much work still remains to be done, both in understanding the perpetrators and their motivations, as well as deriving lessons to be learned for the future from these.

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THE RETURNING HERO AND THE EXILED VILLAIN: THE IMAGE OF THE ARMENIAN IN OTTOMAN SOCIETY, 1908-1916¹

David Low

Abstract: This essay explores the evolution of photographic constructions of Armenian identity and the place of Armenians within Ottoman society through a comparison of images made in the aftermath of the revolution of 1908 with those produced during the 1915-16 period. In the earlier period, recurring motifs of return and reconciliation can be discerned, with there being pictured a new, inclusive Ottoman society. While Armenians were depicted as a vital element within post-revolutionary society, the photographic medium simultaneously identified those that were thought not to belong and was complicit in their social exclusion. During the Armenian Genocide, photography was employed in a similar visual strategy, with Armenians finding themselves in a changed position, being targeted by the lens and marked as lying outside of a reconceptualised Ottoman society.

The manner in which the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, also referred to as the Unionists, or the Young Turks) mounted their revolution of July 1908 is noteworthy, for it was by telegram that they warned Sultan Abdülhamid II that failure to restore the suspended constitution would be met with an armed response. The event presents a challenge to the conventional conceptualisation of technology as an instrument of the state by demonstrating how it could be turned against centralised authority by actors on the peripheries. Power, as Roderic H Davison observes, ‘could emanate from either end of the telegraph line’, and such a claim might equally be made with regards to the photography of the era.² Accepting this principle of multivalence, this essay examines the contrasting sides of photography and the divergent uses to which the medium was put. It specifically addresses the manner in which Ottoman Armenians were presented photographically and charts the evolution of images from the time of the revolution to the Armenian Genocide of 1915-16.

1. This work is partially the product of research undertaken at the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, as a Raphael Lemkin Scholar in 2012. I would like to thank all colleagues and staff at AGMI, especially Gevorg Vardanyan and Arevik Avetisyan. The essay further develops sections from my PhD thesis ‘Framing the Armenian Genocide: Photography and the Revisualisation of the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1923’ (The Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London, 2015), for which I wish to thank Shulamith Behr, Gabriel Koureas, James Ryan and the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council. My thanks also to Benedetta Guerzoni and those that commented on this essay in draft form. Translations are my own, except for those from Ottoman Turkish which are by Yaşar Tolga Cora.

2. Roderic H Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 156.

Having been associated with state surveillance and censorship during the repressive Hamidian era, photography became synonymous in the post-revolutionary period with new freedoms. The lifting of censorship brought about a marked rise in photographic practice amongst ‘ordinary’ Ottoman subjects and a great proliferation of images by way of illustrated magazines and picture postcards. The first part of this essay examines some of these photographic offerings, in particular those that appeared in one of the key publications of the era *Resimli Kitab* (Illustrated Book), as part of a consideration of the new individual and collective narratives propagated by the lens. Prominent motifs of return, reconciliation and fraternity can be discerned, with Armenians positioned as an integral part of a new, inclusive Ottoman society.

However, the new vision of empire did not embrace all. The very first days of the new constitutional regime saw the publication of images depicting ‘enemies’ of the state, a clear indication that photography could speak of exclusion as well as inclusion, and be used to denigrate as much as celebrate. The practice reached its apex during the First World War and the Armenian Genocide, when photography once again served the interests of the state. The second part of this essay considers photographic albums produced by the Ottoman authorities during this time, addressing these as some of the central photographic products of an era in which censorship and state control had once again been imposed. The albums, concerned with justifying state actions against the Armenians, can be read as enacting a reversal of the previous discourse of fraternity and inclusivity, thereby constructing an image of Armenians as a seditious element of which Ottoman society needed to be purged.

Photography

During its earliest days, photography’s principal originators outlined their vision of an image-making practice with a unique relationship to the physical world. Frenchman Louis Daguerre stated that the new instrument gave nature ‘the power to reproduce herself’, while William Henry Fox Talbot, Daguerre’s British counterpart, suggested something similar, not least by naming his first book of photographs *The Pencil of Nature* (1844-46).³ Photography, based upon the registering and fixing of the reflected rays of the sun, was perceived in natural terms, its products regarded as ‘imprints’ of the physical world. Thought to elide the human element to produce direct and unmediated images of pre-existing physical reality, the medium gained its ‘evidentiary’ quality and its currency as a ‘truthful’ witness. Perhaps most memorable of all in this regard is Roland Barthes’s later invocation of the ‘That-has-been’. ‘I can never deny that *the thing has been there*’, he asserted of the photographic referent, ‘the *necessarily* real thing which has been placed before the lens’. Therein was seen to lie photography’s unique authority, with ‘the power of authentication’ exceeding ‘the power of representation’.⁴

3. Mary Warner Marien, *Photography: A Cultural History* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2002), 23, 30-32.

4. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 76-7, 89.

Taking this as his point of embarkation, John Tagg argues that photography 'is not the inflection of a prior ... reality, as Barthes would have us believe, but the production of a new and specific reality.' Barthes's position is far more complex than simply the 'That-has-been', for photographs in his work are always wrapped up in wider associations, but he provides a useful opponent for Tagg's denunciation of the 'realist' position. Shifting the discussion from the 'magical' to the material, Tagg lays out the photograph in stark terms as 'a material product of a material apparatus set to work in specific contexts, by specific forces, for more or less defined purposes.'⁵ The 'truth' of photography, from this perspective, is constructed; photographs are representations deployed with certain agendas and made meaningful within particular discursive frameworks. Spurred by the work of Michael Foucault, Tagg identifies institutionalised observation productive of social categorisation and control as the key defining context of photography.

This is an area also examined by Allan Sekula, but his theorisation is notable for positioning photographs as controlling instruments of power within a wider range of photographic activity. Sekula outlines a double system of representation in which photographs function 'both *honorifically* and *repressively*'. In other words, the photograph might speak either for or against its subject. Sekula places bourgeois portraiture and the criminal archive in relation to one another, identifying them as two opposing ends of photographic practice and discourse in which 'every proper portrait has its lurking, objectifying inverse in the files of the police'.⁶ These different photographic modes are described in terms of a certain symbiotic relationship, for together they outline the shape of society. This reading of photography as a medium productive of not only castes but society at large invites the possibility of charting the journey of Armenians from one side of the social and photographic spectrum to the other.

Visualising Revolution

The revolution of July 1908 brought about the restoration of the constitution, the transference of power away from the sultan, and the relaxation of limits on freedoms of association, assembly and the press, with one consequence being a press boom and an immediate increase in the presence of photography in Ottoman life.⁷ Significantly, photographers were for the first time allowed at the weekly *selamlık*, the procession of the sultan and his entourage to Friday prayers at the Yıldız Hamidiye Mosque, as British witness Charles Roden Buxton recounts:

The first week after the Constitution (that is the way they describe what is almost a new era in chronology) the photographers were admitted to the court of the mosque, and one of

5. John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), 3.

6. Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," *October* 39 (Winter 1986): 3-63 (original emphasis).

7. Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 25-50; Erol Baykal, *The Ottoman Press, 1908-1923* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013), 29-44.

them secured the finest snapshot of His Majesty that has ever been taken. It is all a terrible profanation ... But I do not think the Sultan can complain. A snapshot is better than a bomb.⁸

The ‘new era’ was thus inaugurated photographically, with the camera prising open the previously hidden world of Ottoman power. Henceforward, photography would have a role to play in the proceedings of the new empire, participating in a public realm characterised by openness and visibility. Indeed, it became something of a motif of the time, with the new figure of the public photographer evident in the foreground of one of the many illustrated postcards marking the restoration of the constitution (figure 1). The scene depicted is typical of the era, featuring celebrants coming together as a cohesive mass in order to usher in a new epoch. The card’s message of ‘Long Live the Constitution; Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ suggests not only political change but also, in being presented in Armenian, Greek, Ottoman Turkish, French and Ladino, social progress. Image and text thus combine to demonstrate succinctly the ostensible central principles of revolutionary thought that aspired to an inclusive, collaborative ‘nation’ comprised of the different Ottoman ethnic communities and based upon the enlightened beliefs that had underpinned the French Revolution.⁹ Meanwhile, on the peripheries of the scene the role of the photographer is ambiguous; simultaneously a part of the crowd and apart from the crowd, he occupies a liminal position between observation and participation, between visibility and invisibility.



Figure 1
Photographer Unknown, “Proclamation de la constitution le 24. Juillet 1908.,” *Hayk Demoyan, Haykakan sporty ev marmnaktutyuny osmanyany kaysrutyunum* [Armenian Sport and Physical Gymnastics in the Ottoman Empire] (Yerevan: AGMI, 2015), 10.

8. Charles Roden Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), 152.

9. Erik J Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2010), 57-58.

After the censorship of the Hamidian era, the public presence of the photographer in the constitutional era was seen as a remarkable indication of new freedoms, as suggested by Charles Roden Buxton's description of the *selamlık*. That account is also interesting in its linking of photography with the prospect of a new political and social settlement, with his comment about photographs replacing bombs appearing to allude to the occasion in 1905 when the *selamlık* was the scene of a Dashnak attempt on Abdülhamid's life. In a sign of the great sea change, three years after that event revolutionaries were invited to participate in the new constitutional politics, with the Dashnak activist and *Droshak* journalist Ak-nuni describing his return to Constantinople to his colleagues in Geneva:

You cannot imagine how happy I am to be able to write you from this city without the slightest censorship or control. After thirty-two years of silence, the city is chanting "Freedom"; the crowds are drunk with joy.¹⁰

The letter succinctly communicates a distinct historical moment that saw the unleashing of pent-up emotions as people revelled *en masse* in newly restored freedoms. Indeed, the crowd became the motif *par excellence* of the day, with the flood of new illustrated periodicals offering abundant images of street celebrations and 'public manifestations'. *Resimli Kitab* contains fine examples of this phenomenon, with its first issue alone containing 15 such scenes, including an image of the first post-revolutionary *selamlık* ceremony, as if to share in Buxton's view of it as a foundational event.¹¹ A further scene depicts celebrations outside the Holy Trinity Armenian Church in Pera (figure 2), a setting that would seem to suggest an emphasis upon the re-emergence of the Ottoman Armenian community after a period of oppression.¹² However, the church itself is not visible, and the scene is instead dominated by a crowd gathered beneath Ottoman flags on the Grande Rue de Pera. In short, the image is concerned with communal identity and public solidarity, and by locating the Armenians within a wider collective it suggests not simply the re-emergence of this marginalised group but its reintegration into the social body.

Resimli Kitab balanced these broad images of mass events with portrait photographs that specifically located the revolution and its values in the bodies of a number of individual actors. Notable amongst these was Enver Bey, the Young Turk 'hero of liberty' who had spearheaded the movement to restore the constitution and who recognised in the camera a means of sculpting a public persona.¹³ The raising of Enver to the status of 'national' figure was greatly aided by his willingness to pose for the lens and the dissemination of the resulting images by way of illustrated magazines and picture postcards, affordable, compact and mobile formats that allowed photographic images to be increasingly woven into the daily fabric of Ottoman life.¹⁴ The new 'heroes' were not re-

10. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 53.

11. *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 40.

12. *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 60.

13. *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 17; 2 (October 1908): 158; 10 (July 1909): 974.

14. Edhem Eldem, "The Dissemination and Impact of Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1870–1914"



Figure 2
Photographer Unknown, 'Demonstrations outside the Armenian Church in Péra', *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 60

stricted to the ranks of the CUP, however, for there existed a strong strain of rhetoric dedicated to saluting those that had previously opposed the government. Armenian revolutionaries emerged from hiding to be ceremoniously welcomed by Armenians and Turks alike and, as Raymond Kévorkian describes the turn of events, these 'militants, villains only yesterday, were suddenly being celebrated as heroes'.¹⁵ Similar scenes were played out across the empire with fighters from various ethno-religious groups, and readers of *Resimli Kitab* were presented with portraits of Greek, Albanian and Macedonian fighters, the latter praised for having 'made common cause with the Turks in order to call for the constitution'.¹⁶

Enver's utilisation of the camera for the theatrical staging of political and social identity was nothing new, as shown by the images that revolutionary organisations had produced over decades of anti-Ottoman agitation.¹⁷ The creation of such scenes continued after July 1908, and yet clearly the new era had brought about a seismic shift in the connotations attached to the image of the *fedayi*, with that figure morphing from a shadowy, seditious enemy to a public, patriotic ally, while the broad and varying aims of disparate revolutionary

in *Camera Ottoman: Photography and Modernity in the Ottoman Empire 1840-1914*, ed. Zeynep Çelik & Edhem Eldem (Istanbul: Koç University Publications, 2015), 106-153.

15. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 53.

16. *Resimli Kitab*, 2 (October 1908): 124-125.

17. See, for example, Martina Baleva, "Revolution in the Darkroom: Nineteenth-Century Portrait Photography as a Visual Discourse of Authenticity in Historiography," *Hungarian Historical Review* 3:2 (2014): 363-390.

groups were happily subsumed within the narrative of a unified struggle for constitutional politics. Perhaps nowhere is this better seen than in *Resimli Kitab*'s coverage of the ongoing revolution in neighbouring Persia, a country seen as having similarly suffered by the hands of both domestic despotism and foreign imperialism.¹⁸ One of the visual focal points of a 1910 report is Yeprem Khan, the Persian-Armenian Dashnak who had previously operated in Ottoman lands and been part of the famous Googoonian expedition.¹⁹ Now dubbing him a 'warrior of freedom', *Resimli Kitab* hailed Yeprem Khan's 'extraordinary sacrifices in the making of the Persian Revolution' in texts accompanying numerous heroic images of him and his revolutionary colleagues.²⁰ It is, above all, his own solo portrait adopting the established *mise-en-scène* of the *fedayi* photograph that provides compelling evidence of the extent to which images and philosophies of the sort once restricted to the underground revolutionary presses had found a place within popular, mainstream illustrated magazines.

Such image rehabilitation occurred not simply among *fedayin* but within a wider circle of dissidents and outcasts. Myriad returning exiles were honoured by *Resimli Kitab*, with Patriarch Madteos II Izmirlian providing Armenians with perhaps their most powerful symbol of return and reconciliation.²¹ The first edition reproduced his portrait to mark his arrival back from Jerusalem, a city to which he had been banished by Abdülhamid in 1896 for protesting against the massacres of that time.²² Izmirlian returned bearing a wreath given to him by the Jerusalem branch of the CUP, and the second edition of *Resimli Kitab* carried an image of a ceremonial procession to the cemetery at Şişli for it to be laid in memory of the Armenian victims of the massacres (figure 3).²³ It is a scene in which the Patriarch himself is barely distinguishable amidst a throng of people made up, as the caption describing joint endeavour suggests, of both Armenians and Turks. Through a symbolic renunciation of the Hamidian past and its imposed social divisions, emphasis is again laid on collective identity and reintegration into the Ottoman fold. The image stands as a prime example of what Michelle U Campos terms the 'theatrical production of revolutionary brotherhood', for it consciously enacts, through a visual rhetoric of kinship and solidarity, a vision of a society in which citizens would stand as equals.²⁴ It can be identified as part of the dominant discourse of the day, with the themes of return, reconciliation, fraternity and the 'Unity of the Elements', based upon a

18. Palmira Brummett, "Image and Imperialism," 91-96.

19. AGS, "General Yeprem Khan," *Armenia* 5:12 (July 1912): 359-361.

20. *Resimli Kitab*, 21 (June 1910): 760-785.

21. Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 32-35.

22. *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 32.

23. *Resimli Kitab*, 2 (October 1908): 176.

24. Michelle U Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 74-81.



Figure 3

Photographer Unknown, 'The wreath sent by the Armenian and Turkish Committee of Jerusalem to the Armenian Cemetery of Şişli', *Resimli Kitab*, 2 (October 1908): 176

shared Ottoman citizenship of the different communities, being at the fore.²⁵ In this way, the revolution was staged not only on the streets but also within the pages of the press.

However, the source of such rhetoric and the precise nature of these events is unclear. Bedross Der Matossian hints at their inherent contradictions, for while 'some of the revolutionary festivals were spontaneous, they all entailed a certain level of organization and planning'.²⁶ Of the cemetery visits Raymond Kévorkian poses the blunt question: 'How are we to interpret the display of mutual respect ... in a capital in which a little more than ten years earlier thousands of Armenians had been publicly disembowelled?'²⁷ It is difficult to state with any certainty whether these events were staged productions or organic expressions of newfound freedoms, and as such they occupy a vague, indistinct zone between the actions and rhetoric of the political parties and those of the general public. These ambiguities were similarly carried by the print culture of the day. The illustrated press presented itself, according to Palmira Brummett, as a 'forum for the voices of the "people", as if voices, somehow snatched from the air ... had suddenly metamorphosed directly onto the printed page'. However, it was not free from influence, being regularly utilised by political parties in order 'to mobilize support, influence public opinion, and even spread rumours'.²⁸

25. Erik J Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 57-60.

26. Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*, 37.

27. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 54.

28. Palmira Brummett, "Image and Imperialism," 53.

The source of photographs was sometimes unknown, for many carried no credit lines or indications of authorship. However, the mention of a photographer's name below an image or the reproduction of their signature within the frame was becoming increasingly common. With this growing suggestion of human agency at work in photography, the photographer emerged into public life. *Resimli Kitab* gave prime billing to its main photographic contributors, the new studios of Apollon, run by Aşil Samancı, and Kenan Bey, crediting them alongside the editor and thus affording their roles similar stature.²⁹ On at least one occasion, Kenan Bey found his portrait featured in *Resimli Kitab*'s pantheon of honoured faces, while amateur image-makers also found a home within the magazine upon the advent of its photography competition.³⁰ There can be little doubt that image-making was enjoying a period of unprecedented freedom and, as photographic practice flourished, the photographer began to take on a role in Ottoman Society that was at once more prominent and more visible.

Not all photographers prospered, however, and within the pages of *Resimli Kitab* can also be found a portrait of Ali Sami, a former military photographer close to the sultan's court, reproduced beneath the words 'former ministers and spies of *l'ancien régime*'.³¹ The portrait formed part of a collection of *personae non gratae*, those deemed too closely associated with Hamidian power to have a place in the new society of the constitutional era. This rogues' gallery served to delineate a Hamidian space for public edification, projecting the idea that responsibility for the internal conflicts and international failures that had brought about imperial decline was confined to a small circle, and that the empire, apparently unburdened by inherent structural failings, was at liberty to begin anew. Enacted was a process of social ostracism that mirrored political and physical exile, with this in Ali Sami's case taking the form of his being stripped of his rank and removed from the capital by way of an administrative posting to Alexandretta.³² Images of the empire's *personae non gratae* were but another way in which the new era was signalled, appearing in the first issue of *Resimli Kitab* along with portraits of those returned from exile. Acting as counterpoints to one another, those admitted into the imperial body are weighed against those expelled in a reciprocal motion, with the process speaking of the social and political reconfiguration of the empire. Created is what Allan Sekula writes of as the 'shadow archive', a photographic hierarchy of the social terrain in which portraits contribute to the conceptualisation of the social body by identifying and demarcating its 'heroes' and 'villains'.³³

Ali Sami had proudly posed with his imperial medals, thus projecting a relationship to state power. The portrait was clearly produced for honorific purposes, and indeed would

29. Ibid., 36.

30. *Resimli Kitab*, 14 (December 1909): 119; 2 (October 1908): 288-292.

31. *Resimli Kitab*, 1 (September 1908): 62.

32. Bahattin Öztuncay, *The Photographers of Constantinople: Pioneers, Studios and Artists from 19th Century Istanbul*, Volume 1 (Istanbul: Aygaz, 2003), 342.

33. Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," 10.

be used by the photographer to advertise his studio.³⁴ However, in its reprinting the subject is inadvertently associated with a cruel form of power and accused of playing an unethical role on behalf of that power, thus standing damned by his own professed connections with *l'ancien régime*. This act of appropriation provides a lesson in the passage of photographic meaning, showing how the semantic fluidity of the medium allowed for the imposition of divergent connotations. As photographic historian Silvana Palma has observed, a caption 'influences perception to such an extent that it can reverse its interpretation' so that 'the same image can be taken equally well to portray an ally or a traitor'.³⁵ The example of Ali Sami also succinctly demonstrates Sekula's double system of representation within photography, with 'every proper portrait has its lurking, objectifying inverse in the files of the police'. His portrait made the transition from one side of the medium to the other, showing how images could be upturned, and with them reputation and social standing. Photography provided its subjects with a means of defining themselves and their places in society, but it also contained the potential for these to be given definition by others.

Seen here is the hand that photography had in crafting public personas and shaping the social landscape. Its role could be one of not only expressing solidarity but also asserting its limits, and this engagement in disciplinary modes was brought into sharper focus after the failed counter-revolution of April 1909. *Resimli Kitab*'s first issue after that event features images of chained prisoners and public executions, with such vilification interspersed amongst laudatory photographs of those who had taken action to defeat the counter-revolution. The magazine continues the use of dramatic image contrasts to describe the social and political terrain by presenting a photograph of a shackled and guarded 'reactionary' opposite one of new sultan Mehmed V, a juxtaposition that worked to characterise the latter as much as the former.³⁶ Although at first used by some to celebrate the reimplementation of the constitution (as evidenced by the picture postcard already discussed), the image of Abdülhamid had proved too firmly wedded to the negative connotations it had accrued over the years.³⁷ Rehabilitation of the sultan's image was only possible with Abdülhamid's removal and the accession of his brother, with Mehmed providing the Young Turks with a blank space upon which to project ideas of new beginnings and 'national' cohesion.³⁸

1909 also saw shifts in the image of the Armenian in Ottoman society when massacres took place in Cilicia. The swirling of rumour played a part in the violence, and it is interesting to consider one particular accusation levelled at the bishop of Adana, Mushegh Seropian, namely that he had been photographed in the guise of an ancient Armenian king.

34. For a reproduction of the photograph in this context, see Bahattin Öztuncay, *The Photographers of Constantinople*, 341.

35. Silvana Palma, "The Seen, the Unseen, the Invented: Misrepresentations of African "Otherness" in the Making of a Colony. Eritrea, 1885-1896," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 45:177 (2005): 39-69.

36. *Resimli Kitab*, 8 (May 1909): 762-795.

37. Palmira Brummett, "Image and Imperialism," 121-123.

38. Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 73-94.

The photograph, in fact, depicted the bishop wearing ceremonial dress on the occasion of a feast day, but it was read by some as revealing the Cilician Armenian community's desire to establish an independent kingdom.³⁹ The incident is further evidence of how readily semantic migrations could occur with photographs, and the likelihood of such rereadings became heightened in charged environments in which changes to the social order threatened established power and privileges.

Fears concerning the loss of power only increased as the new Ottoman leaders failed to stem imperial decline, most notably with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 reducing the empire's European holdings to a small toehold on that continent. The ensuing coup d'état completed the Unionist's seizure of the state and brought about a return to Hamidian forms of governance.⁴⁰ The reimplementation of censorship greatly contributed to the end of the press boom and the retreat of print culture, with *Resimli Kitab* producing its final edition in 1914.⁴¹ The shallowness of their commitment to the constitution and the principle of the 'Unity of the Elements' exposed, it was clear, as Erik Zürcher explains, that the CUP 'identified themselves with the interests of the state ... and of the Muslim majority. Their perceived enemy was as much an 'enemy within' as an 'enemy without'.'⁴² Only a few short years after the restoration of the constitution, Armenians were being presented as a people whose identities could not be reconciled with the new vision of the state. As Edhem Eldem states at the close of his essay that takes photography up to 1914, photography followed in the wake of the empire's darkening politics 'and soon abandoned its recently achieved freedom to become the instrument of violent ideologies and aggressive nation building.'⁴³

Visualising Genocide

As it had been with the revolution, the genocide was in part founded upon the visual construction of identity. From the time of the disastrous Ottoman defeat at Sarikamiş in January 1915, the Unionists promoted an image of Armenians as traitors and fifth columnists.⁴⁴ This campaign took on a visual element after the Entente declaration of May that year that those responsible for the recent massacres of Armenians would be held to account, and Germany's own warnings to its Ottoman partner that a better 'presentational' job was needed in order to legitimise its acts to a world audience.⁴⁵ Production of a number of books, albums and

39. Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 78.

40. Erik J. Zürcher, "The Young Turks - Children of the Borderlands?" *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 9:1-2 (Summer 2003): 275-286.

41. Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I* (London & New York: IB Tauris, 2007), 11-14.

42. Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 69; See also Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*, 170-176.

43. Edhem Eldem, "The Dissemination and Impact of Photography," 153.

44. Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75-76.

45. Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1978-1918)* (New

pamphlets was overseen by *Polis Mecmuası* (Police Magazine), part of a slim press industry that was by this time not only censored but utilised for state propaganda.⁴⁶ The first publication to result was *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires des Comités Arméniens avant et après la Proclamation de la Constitution Ottoman* (1916/1917), a book, printed first in Ottoman Turkish and then in French, that contained substantial texts supported by a number of photographs.⁴⁷ This was followed by a photographic album in two volumes with texts in Ottoman Turkish, English, French and German (1916).⁴⁸ The range of languages in use in itself provides an indication of the intended audiences for the work.

The publications utilise both images made by Armenian groups and images created by the Ottoman authorities, deploying them in tandem in support of an official government version of events depicting Armenians as ‘instruments of foreign governments’.⁴⁹ This narrative describes the good faith of the Young Turks during the constitutional era, for at ‘all Armenian ceremonies, at the reception for the return from Jerusalem of Patriarch Izmirlian, as well as at the requiem at the cemetery of [Şişli] in memory of Armenians who died for the Constitution, one always saw at the forefront the most well-known figures from the CUP’.⁵⁰ However, ‘while all Ottomans were fraternising and indulging in the joy that had very naturally arisen from the new era of freedom, Armenians piled up engines of destruction in all corners of the country’.⁵¹ In this way, Armenians are presented as betraying the revolutionary ideal of Ottoman brotherhood and reconciliation. Not only is the discourse of 1908 invoked, but those very scenes and images through which it was staged, including the previously discussed visit of Patriarch Madteos II Izmirlian to Şişli. We thus see outlined the project of these albums, being the complete reversal of the former narrative of unity.

As has been observed by Benedetta Guerzoni, the characterisation of the Armenians as ‘forever dedicated to conspiracy’ had its roots in the state propaganda of the 1890s.⁵² Therefore, the narrative of the 1916 albums should not be seen simply as an inversion of the discourse of 1908 but a reversion back to the dominant narratives of the Hamidian era. The discourse of the genocide years harked back to, and most likely consciously stirred memories of, the late nineteenth-century broad brush characterisation of the Armenians as a treacherous community. As in the past, revolutionaries were presented as drawing all

Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 123-127.

46. Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity*, 79-82.

47. *Aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la constitution ottoman*[Constantinople: 1917](Ankara: Direction Général des Archives de l'Etat du Premier Ministre, 2001), hereafter *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires*.

48. *Ermenî Âmâl ve Harekât-ı İhtilâlîyyesî Tesâir ve Vesâîk*, two volumes [1916] (Ankara: Ankara Matbaacılar Ciltçiler ve Sanatkarlar Odası Eğitim ve Kültür Yayınları, n.d.), hereafter *Ermenî Âmâl*

49. *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires*, 8-12.

50. *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires*, 50.

51. *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires*, 67.

52. Benedetta Guerzoni, “Il “nemico armeno” nell'impero ottomano: le immagini,” *Storicamente*, 1:6 (2005), www.storicamente.org/guerzoni (accessed 7 September 2016).

Armenians into their conspiratorial web. They are described, for example, as promoting revolution, independence and nationalism in schools, instilling ‘hatred against the Turks and all things Turkish, poisoning the minds of children’.⁵³ The restoration of the Armenian revolutionary to the former role as bogey man of the empire is further evidenced by the reprinting of *fedayi* portraits, including those of Andranik, Murad of Sebastia and Keri. While this again shows continuity with the Hamidian era, it is difficult not to dwell on the stark contrast with the stories of recent years when one reads references to Keri’s activities alongside Yeprem Khan. This ‘incriminating’ connection to a man once celebrated as a hero of the constitutional era demonstrates how the image of the *fedayi* had evolved once more.⁵⁴

With their overarching narrative of sedition and betrayal, texts provide the lens through which Armenian images are viewed. This operation, designed to shape readings and subvert messages, is at work most clearly in the direct application of new captions to existing photographs, notably in the case of images from the 1915 siege of Van. That these images had their origins in the US press is plain to see, for the albums reproduce not only the images but wider sections of the newspapers that originally housed them. The result of this intriguing editorial decision is that captions both old and new are legible, and the supreme role of text in guiding interpretation is made evident. ‘Armenians defending themselves from the Turks’ reads one still visible newspaper caption; ‘Armenians fighting in the trenches against the Turks for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the city of Van by the Russians’ is the caption with which the first is overlaid (figure 4).⁵⁵ The second text inverts the scenario laid out by the first, in the process turning defence into attack and victim into aggressor. Through such transplants, Armenians are subjected to a variety of the treatment seen meted out in 1908 to Ali Sami. Images designed as positive portrayals of their subjects are recast as pictures of villainy, and the strata of conflicting captions makes the viewer privy to this process of the rewriting of photographic meaning.

In addition to these semantic redeployments, the Ottoman authorities produced new accusatory photographic tableaux depicting prisoners and weapons. Such images also circulated as prints that were passed from hand to hand and shown in private circles, as attested to in his memoirs by Rafael de Nogales, a Venezuelan officer serving in the Ottoman army. Recalling a meeting with Mehmed-Asim Bey, commander in the gendarmerie of Diyarbakir, de Nogales describes how ‘this gentleman overwhelmed me with attentions; and offered me two photographs, showing him and his secretaries aligned behind a stack of arms’. Presented as loose prints, these photographs were free from the texts that guide interpretation in the printed albums, and yet they had their own determining narrative with

53. *Aspirations et Agissements Révolutionnaires*, 52.

54. *Ermeni Âmâl*, Vol.2, 64.

55. The original source for the photograph and text appears to have been the periodical *Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly* (the precise edition is not known). The photograph was also printed with the caption ‘Armenians Fighting for their Lives’ in *The Literary Digest* (9 October 1915). For the Ottoman version see *Ermeni Âmâl*, Vol.1, 53.




Figure 4
Photographer Unknown, 'Armenians fighting in the trenches against the Turks for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the city of Van by the Russians', *Ermenî Âmâl ve Harekât-ı İhtilâliyyesi Tesâir ve Vesâik*, 1916, Vol.1, 53

the commander painting the Armenians as the agents of a Russian-sponsored plan of revolution. Of this Nogales writes that 'it is impossible to know whether things were thus in hard fact, or merely in the Dantesque vision of the Sublime Porte, which, habituated to its own regime of blood and darkness, believed that the rest of the world acted in the same way.' He was certain, however, that the photographs were of questionable veracity, for he saw the 'discovery' of weapons in Armenian homes and churches as a charade, while an examination of the photographs told him that most of the weapons were not designed for combat. His conclusion is that 'this ostentatious collection of elements of war was nothing more nor less than the work of Mehmed-Asim Bey himself, in his attempt to mislead and impress the public'.⁵⁶ We

56. Rafael de Nogales, *Four Years Beneath the Crescent* (New York & London: Charles Scribner's Sons,

find similar statements in the memoir accounts of Aram Dildilian, who was tasked with photographing what he terms 'fake' displays of weapons in Marsovan, and Mary Louise Graffam, an American missionary in Sivas.⁵⁷

The 'evidence' provided by these photographs not only took the form of weapons but also the human body (figure 5). Armenians were paraded as prisoners of the state in photographs that conform to an overarching compositional format premised upon the disciplinary modes identified by John Tagg, 'a repetitive pattern, the body isolated; narrow space; the subjection to an unreturnable gaze'.⁵⁸ Furthermore, many prisoners display numerical markers on their chests, thus giving the suggestion of the photographs operating within a disciplinary apparatus, as per the model of Alphonse Bertillon's classificatory system in which photographs of criminals were accompanied by detailed physical descriptions and measurements.⁵⁹ However, whatever state bureaucratic function the Ottoman photographs may have served, as seen in the albums they largely lack any corresponding information detailing the identities of their subjects. In such minimalist form, photographs play no role, as they did within the Bertillon system, in pinning down identity. Such imaging is instead interested only in highly reductive forms of characterisation and categorisation, resulting in generalised pronouncements regarding an entire community. As such its subjects stand not as themselves but as anonymous symbols of Armenian 'treachery' and 'lawlessness'.

Armenians were not the only people on show for the camera. The account provided by de Nogales of his meeting with Mehmed-Asim Bey suggests that the propaganda mission upon which the commander had embarked was in no small way orientated around himself as the subject. The creation of negative images of Armenians was certainly the primary aim of these pictures, but they also served as opportunities for positive depictions of Ottoman functionaries. Importantly, these figures are not just symbols of Ottoman power in the way that prisoners are symbols of Armenian guilt, for they also stand before the camera as individuals wanting to promote themselves. The role they play is similar to that of the policeman and doctor in British criminal photography as described by Jennifer Green-Lewis, those who '[b]y writing themselves into the photograph ... announce the significance of their authority, just as they indicate their sense that such authority must be recorded in order to be rendered real'.⁶⁰ Such people were thus involved, as Enver had been, in personal image construction based upon the projection of power, perhaps similarly imagining

1926), 140.

57. Armen T. Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 199; Susan Billington Harper, "Mary Louise Graffam: Witness to Genocide" in Jay Winter (ed.) *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 214-239.

58. John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation*, 85.

59. Jonathan Finn, *Capturing the Criminal Image: From Mug Show to Surveillance Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 23-28.

60. Jennifer Green-Lewis, *Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture of Realism* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 225.




Figure 5

Photographer Unknown, 'Some bombs seized at Ada-Bazar together with tools to manufacture them. A few influential leaders of the Committee and some of its members whose duty it is to make bombs and distribute them', Ermeni Âmâl ve Harekât-ı İhtilâlîyyesî Tesâir ve Vesâik, 1916, Vol.1, 32

themselves in the role of 'national' heroes. What was theatrically performed in the wartime albums, however, was unmistakably the wielding of power over others.

By providing testimony in favour of agents of the state and against Armenians, these photographs succinctly demonstrate Allan Sekula's double system of representation, and do so not within the space of the archive or in the pages of a journal, but within the frames of single images. In this way, photographs of officials and their captives combine the criminal mug shot and the society portrait, thus acting both repressively *and* honorifically. This dual role is particularly evident in a photograph from Maraş that depicts two clusters of people in a scene divided along the horizontal axis (figure 6). On the upper level stand Ottoman soldiers and officials, while below them we find a group of Armenian prisoners. The two groups are separated physically and socially, with the camera performing different operations with regards to each: those above are praised by the lens, while those below are condemned. Comparing this to the 1908 photographs of crowds, particularly that of the procession of Armenians and Turks at Şişli, we see the abandonment of solidarity and the involvement of photography not in the breaking down of social divisions but rather in their construction. The Maraş photograph's clear signalling of its message of the violent tilting of the social scales possibly provides the reason why this photograph did not appear in the Ottoman albums, appearing instead to have circulated only in the form of prints. The accentuated theatricality with which its scene of rise and fall is performed suggests the photograph more as a souvenir and trophy than a piece of 'evidence'.⁶¹

61. For this aspect of photography, see Leigh Raiford, "The Consumption of Lynching Images" in *Only*

*The Returning Hero and The Exiled Villain:
The Image of The Armenian in Ottoman Society, 1908-1916*

It is necessary to consider what took place not only in front of the lens but behind it also. Grigoris Balakian, the priest and historian of the years of destruction, reports the widespread use of Armenian photographers for the making of these images.⁶² The Ottoman state thus relied upon the skills of members of the very community it was targeting, and the survival of some photographers because of their roles in the construction of ‘evidence’ against Armenians calls to mind Primo Levi’s ‘Grey Zone’, the ambiguous, morally complex position in which some victims found themselves during the Holocaust.⁶³ These photographers included the Dildilians of Marsovan, whose survival also rested upon a forced conversion to Islam, and the Encababians of Sivas.⁶⁴ The work of these photographers was not advertised, and it might be said that if the post-revolutionary period witnessed the emergence of the photographer into the public realm, then the genocide era witnessed the disappearance. The absence of photographers’ names is in keeping with a strategy that positioned these images as neutral, organic documents that carried that aforementioned quality of having been ‘somehow snatched from air’. Similar tactics were at work when, according to Fuat



Figure 6
Photographer Unknown, Upper level - Ottoman officials and soldiers, including Ali Haydar Pasha, Mutesarif (Governor) of Maraş, Lower level- Armenian prisoners from Zeitun in Maraş. Hayk Demoyan (ed.), 100 *lusankarchakan patmutyun Hayots tseghaspanutyun masin* [100 Photo Stories on Armenian Genocide] Yerevan: AGMI, 2015, 48.

Skin Deep: Changing Visions of the American Self, ed. Coco Fusco & Brian Wallis (New York: International Center of Photography / Harry N Abrams, 2003), 267-273

62. Grigoris Balakian, *Armenian Golgotha*, trans. Peter Balakian & Aris Sevag (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 108.

63. Primo Levi, *The Complete Works of Primo Levi* (UK: Penguin Classics, 2015), 2430-2456.

64. Armen T. Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland*, 187-253; Kay Encababian Surabian, Unpublished transcript of interview conducted by Ruth Thomasian 22 November 1988 (Project SAVE Armenian Photograph Archives, Watertown, Massachusetts).

Dündar, publication details were omitted from the albums to obscure their CUP origins, in the belief that ‘Western public opinion would be more impressed if they were presented as impartial publications.’⁶⁵

Dündar reports that 1700 copies of the propaganda booklets were sent to foreign diplomatic offices and Ottoman embassies abroad for distribution in 1917.⁶⁶ Yet it is also clear that the material had already been in circulation for around a year, with the British historian Arnold Toynbee describing seeing an album shortly after publication in spring 1916. While compiling documents for *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, he wrote of coming into contact with ‘what they call an album containing photographs of arms purporting to have been found in possession of the Armenians’. Of this material he was dismissive, although without questioning some of the claims, stating ‘I imagine that the Armenians were indeed in possession of a considerable number of arms, having been permitted to possess them ever since 1908’.⁶⁷ The Ottoman bid to convince foreign powers of the legitimacy of its actions seems to have met with little success, and yet it must be noted that its propaganda also appears to have carried a domestic agenda. The writer Yervant Odian records an encounter in Konya in 1918 while on his return to Constantinople after surviving deportation. He found that the albums, ‘specially published to inflame the Turkish mob and the Turkish police against the Armenians’, were being circulated among the population by local Unionists. This, he writes, ‘was nothing but laying the groundwork for a massacre. And indeed, a short time after the arrival and distribution of those books, Turkish hatred towards the Armenians was even greater’.⁶⁸ The process described by Odian strongly resembles what Jay Winter terms the ‘cultural preparation of hatred, atrocity, and genocide’, the demonization of the enemy that, in a context of total war, allowed ‘war crimes on a revolutionary scale and character’ to take place.⁶⁹ Seen thus, the Ottoman visual propaganda operation was not simply concerned with constructing justifications for foreign powers but performed the vital role of readying the domestic cultural space that was necessary for the enactment of a violent reshaping of society. As instruments of this cultural preparation, the albums played a role akin to that of the illustrated press as previously discussed, being used ‘to mobilize support, influence public opinion, and even spread rumours’.

Returning once again to Allan Sekula’s assertion that the photographic definition of the criminal body contributes to the creation of a hierarchical social body, we might see how in the Ottoman Empire it was the body of the Armenian that was used for purposes of social construction. An aspect of social definition and social separation is evident in all prisoner

65. Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*, 125.

66. Ibid.

67. FO 96/205, Arnold Toynbee to William Walter Rockwell, 8 June 1916 (Foreign Office papers, National Archives, London)

68. Yervant Odian, *Accursed Years: My Exile and Return from Der Zor, 1914-1919* (London: Garod Books, 2009), 286.

69. Jay Winter, “Under Cover of War: Genocide in the Perspective of Total War” in *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 37-51.

photographs, but is most clearly seen in the image of the two groups in Maraş with its harshly delineated composition. As *Resimli Kitab* had previously done with its assembled galleries of the 'former ministers and spies of *l'ancien régime*', the albums brought together the images of those that were to carry the blame for the empire's misfortunes. However, in highly generalised depictions and narratives those being identified and disciplined were not individuals but an entire community. Branded as the 'enemy within', Armenians were presented as a dangerous social element from which the empire needed to be freed in order to survive and prosper.

The discursive reformulation of Ottoman identity taking place at this time was played out through photographs that identified those that belonged and those that did not. That the officials in these photographs represented the power of the state is clear, but they were also presented as *belonging* to the Ottoman state in a way that the Armenians on view did not. In the state narrative, the Armenian populace had chosen to reject the promise of the 1908 revolution and the new Ottoman contract, siding with outside forces who sought the destruction of the empire. In accordance, they were presented visually as being no longer Ottoman, no longer part of society and no longer subject to the protection of the state. Armenians in this scenario, this 'Dantesque vision' to borrow Rafael de Nogales's term, were an alien, hostile element that needed to be removed from Ottoman soil, the very soil that was in the process of being reconceptualised along Turkish 'national' lines.

The photographs made of Armenian prisoners in 1915-16 were a visual signal of the end of the multi-ethnic Ottoman society and collective existence that had been celebrated, in just as visual a manner, in 1908. Separated by seven years, these two groups of images constitute radically different imperial visions and take part in the different discourses that shaped the empire over those short years. However, the strategies at work in each case are remarkably similar, for they demarcate an 'us' and a 'them', identify those that belong and those that do not. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 had brought about a new discourse of Ottoman identity, one orientated around fraternity and solidarity. Photography took part in the reordering of the Hamidian world, theatrically announcing a new world of returning heroes and Ottoman brotherhood. However, the treatment of elements of *l'ancien régime* demonstrated that the 'new' empire had its divisions and that the camera would be deployed as an instrument to define different social groups and cast out those that were deemed to have no place. Armenians were painted as an essential element of Ottoman society in 1908, and yet later found themselves on the receiving end of this visual project, one that sought to depict them as a rotten section of the empire that needed removal. The image of an empire under threat from an 'enemy within' was promoted through the production and circulation of photographs in the same way that the image of a resurgent and united society once was. In the process of redefining the Armenian community, photographs also contributed to the redefinition of the empire in narrow national and religious terms. The returning hero and the exiled villain: these were the roles assigned to the Armenians in the period following the revolution, the picture of inclusion morphing into one of annihilation.

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GENOCIDE DENIAL UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPAIN, GERMANY AND FRANCE

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Abstract: This article examines Genocide denial under the constitutional law, mainly the conflict between constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and dignity/equality. The comparison reflects the attitudes of three European States - Germany, Spain and France. The Article discusses the history and background of anti-Holocaust laws in the concerned countries and possible criminalization of the Armenian Genocide denial. It further concentrated on the Constitutional Court decisions, which are marked with differences connected with factors such as history, morals, values of the particular society and, of course, politics.

Introduction

The phenomenon of genocide denial is an issue of hot debate. Opinions on how to deal with the denial are sharply divided. Those favoring robust speech protection assess denial as a political issue, while others offer legal regulations. Apart from being an issue of public, academic and political debate, genocide denial possesses also a crucial constitutional difficulty, as its regulation operates in the nexus of competing constitutional concepts - freedom of speech and dignity, equality. The second important aspect of the issue is the type of regulation- criminalization or civil law solution. The mentioned considerations are grounded on the specific historical and conceptual settings, as well as on the system of values of the particular society.

This paper is a comparative analysis of the constitutional law approaches to the criminalization of Genocide denial within the framework of values and symbolic function of the anti-negation laws in a specific cultural context. The three states – Germany, Spain and France-are chosen for having adopted different approaches to the issue, from the robust protection of human dignity by Germany to valuing French freedom of expression and a moderate approach elaborated by the Spain Constitutional Court.

Freedom of Speech v. Dignity

One of the basic arguments for the freedom of speech is its fundamental role in seeking the truth,¹ which was further elaborated in the theory of the “marketplace of ideas”² to enhance public discourse. The importance of free speech is also assessed as a high democratic value and a basis for the development of an individual autonomy³ in the democratic order⁴. Meanwhile, in nearly all legal systems, the freedom of expression is recognized as a non-absolute right in the context of other fundamental rights and may be limited by the states under certain conditions.⁵ The limitations aim at balancing the freedom of speech and the rights of others. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, which encompasses also the right of non-discrimination.⁶ Human dignity⁷ is tightly connected with individual autonomy and is called an inherent right,⁸ the “highest human right”, as well as “the source of rights”⁹ and that only “the performance of free person can create human dignity”.¹⁰ In other words, other rights, including freedom of speech become means and conditions for the formation of human dignity.

The prevalence of one constitutional norm over the other in a particular society depends “on the values sought to be promoted, harm perceived, and the importance attributed to this harm”¹¹. When the freedom of speech conflicts with other values of the society (dignity and equality), a “wide array for regulations come to play”.¹² The underlying argument is that societies are founded on different historical, cultural, philosophical premises, which brings to different perceptions and values. The overall attitude of European nations to human

1. Mill John Stuart, “On Liberty,” cited in Claudia E. Haupt, “Regulating Hate Speech—Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches,” *Boston University International Law Journal* 23:299 (2005): 314.

2. Bruce Ackerman, “The Marketplace of Ideas,” www.digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/154 (accessed 10 May, 2012).

3. Keith Werhan, *Freedom of Speech: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 36.

4. Alexander Meiklejohn, *Free Speech and Its Relations to Self-Government* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948), 93-94.

5. Limitation clauses in international and national jurisdictions.

6. UN preamble.

7. Dignity (latin— *dignitas* – worth, noble appearance, worth, *dignatio* – respect for someone).

8. *Human Rights. Collection of regional international documents* (Vilnius, 1993), 232.

9. Alfonsas Vaišvila, “Human Dignity and the right to Human Dignity in terms of legal personalism, from conception of static dignity to conception of dynamic one,” *Jurisprudencija* 3:117(2009): 111-127, www.mruni.eu (accessed 10 May, 2012).

10. Ibid.

11. Michel Rosenfeld, “Hate Speech in the Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis,” *Cardozo Law Review* 24: 4 (2003): 1528.

12. Kathleen Mahoney, “The Canadian Constitutional approach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 55, 1 (1992):77.

rights bears the notion of the WWII.¹³ Europe generally has never accepted the freedom of speech in the same manner as the U.S. with its unique preference and protections of free speech.¹⁴ While dignity, in the context of constitutional rights and values plays more primary role in Europe¹⁵ than in the U.S.¹⁶

Genocide denial regulations partly depend on the mentioned factors. Two ways are offered to assess the regulations of genocide-denial laws:¹⁷ to look into “historical accounts of ethnic, racial and religious violence, genocide, and discriminatory practices” that have occurred within that particular state and consider “the jurisprudential history of the society concerning equality, group libel, peace and security, and human dignity”. Both the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that in light of “historical experience” it is acceptable to prohibit certain acts.¹⁸ This implies that a law criminalizing Holocaust denial may be appropriate for Germany as a perpetrator of a crime, while the same law will not be accepted in other state not connected with Holocaust. It derives that crimes should have a substantive impact on a society or a significant group within the society to serve as a basis for the content-based regulation of freedom of speech. The second factor to consider is the attitude of that particular state towards freedom of speech, human dignity and equality. Thus, under this analysis a law criminalizing Holocaust denial may be appropriate in most states of Europe because of its wide impact on those particular states and a high value of human dignity in the region, but the Armenian Genocide, while passing the dignity requirement, will probably fail under the first.

German Constitutional Law Approach to Criminalization of Genocide Denial

Dignity has a dominant role in the German Constitution, and is called “a supreme value dominating the whole system of the fundamental rights”¹⁹, a central value “obliging states to realize and protect it”²⁰. This attitude is linked to the historical developments, culture and perceptions of the German society. Human dignity is enshrined in Article 1 of the German

13. Ruti Teitel, “Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives,” *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 29:49(2008): 65.

14. John Knechtle, “Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European Union,” *Florida State University Law Review* 36:41(2008): 45, 47.

15. *Ibid.*, 58.

16. Silvia Suteu, “Law against Negation: Anti-Holocaust Denial Legislations in Europe,” www.fromceu.hu (accessed 2 May, 2012).

17. John Knechtle, “Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European Union,” 52-53.

18. B.H., M.W., H.P. et G.K. v. Austria, no. 1277/87, Commission decision of October 12, 1989. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 4144/98, 2003, para. 124.

19. Claudia E. Haupt, “Regulating Hate Speech,” 326.

20. Silvia Suteu, “Law against Negation...” 41.

Basic Law²¹. It stipulates that human dignity is inviolable and the state has a duty to respect and protect it. It's also important to mention Article 2(1), which provides the right for free development of one's personality "insofar as does not violate the rights of others or the constitutional order and the moral law".

It is important to mention that an insult to the memory of deceased person is protected in German jurisdiction, which recognizes that the specific circumstances of an individual's death as part of his/her dignity, which is protected after the death²². Under the German jurisprudence the denial of a murder of an individual by a state based on his/her origin/race harms the dignity of that individual.

The right of free speech is in Article 5, which initially makes broad protection for speech, ensuring both a right to disseminate expression and receive information. Paragraph 2 of the same Article further indicates the conditions for limitation as found "in the provisions of general laws, for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor".

The rights enshrined in Article 5 are limited by different provisions of the criminal code, administrative law, and the civil code of Germany, which empowered the state to exercise wide content-based regulations on speech.

There is no separate law banning Holocaust denial in Germany. Meanwhile, several provisions in the German Penal Code form an anti-denial apparatus. Section 130 deals with "agitation of people", which punishes incitement to racial hatred and attacks on human dignity. Art. 130 (2) deals directly with denial of Nazi crimes. It stipulates that the incitement of hatred against segments of the population and calls for violent or arbitrary measures assaults their human dignity and shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years. Paragraph 3 of the same Article punishes with imprisonment for five years or a fine those who "publicly or in a meeting *approves of denies or belittles* an act committed under the rule of National Socialism or the Code of Crimes against International Law". The newly added paragraph 4 made it an act punishable by 3 years of imprisonment and fine publicly or in a meeting to assault human dignity of the victims *by approving of, denying or rendering harmless* the violent and arbitrary National Socialist rule. Article 189 criminalizes the detraction of the memory of deed.

A major consideration in evaluating anti-denial laws should be paid on the German's self-perception as a perpetrator of Holocaust; and in this respect criminalizing denial serves a moral purpose. The successor state of the "Third Reich" has assumed legal and moral responsibility for the Nazi policy of Jews extermination.²³ These historical and moral elements explain the fact that Germany was the first country to enact such laws, and during its EU presidency strongly agitated for the criminalization of Holocaust denial throughout

21. German Constitution.

22. "Introduction," in Ludovic Hennebel and Tomas Hochmann (eds.), *Genocide Denials and the Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xliii-xliv.

23. Claus Leggewie, "Seven circles of European memory," www.eurozine.com/pdf/2010-12-20-leggewie-en.pdf (accessed 25 April 2012).

the EU.²⁴ The history of fascism and Third Reich played a significant role also in shaping German's attitude toward democracy and the state's anti-denial legislation.²⁵ The state is called a "militant democracy"²⁶, as the Constitution of Germany is based on the principle of a "democracy capable of defending itself"²⁷ and fighting against anti-democratic forces. The enactment of many German statutes after World War II also aimed at eliminating Nazism and its ideology, namely that of disseminating racial hatred.²⁸ In this realm hate speech²⁹ is assessed as a tool of propaganda which can destroy the foundations of cherished democracy and speech regulations are established to prevent the revival of Nazi past.³⁰

Only taking the aforementioned background in the mind one can assess the Germans Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter the Court) decision on the constitutionality of *Holocaust denial laws* (*Auschwitzluge*). Court explained its position by distinguishing between opinions and facts. The Court emphasized that opinions are subjective and are protected under Basic Law whether they are "well founded or emotional or rational, dangerous or harmless, valuable or worthless"³¹. Thus, the mere expression of opinion is considered as constitutionally protected. By contrast, freedom of speech does not protect the dissemination of factual statements that are false or are based on the fact that has been proven to be false.³² In other words, incorrect or untruthful factual statements do not fall within the ambits of Article 5. The Court further stressed that the denial of Holocaust is a clearly false fact, as the accounts of eyewitnesses, historians, and judicial proceedings dismiss any doubt about Holocaust and German responsibility.

The Court's next argument was that freedom of speech does not take precedence when it violates the right to the protection of personality by "formal insult or vilification"³³. The

24. Ian Traynor, "Germany bids to outlaw denial of Holocaust across continent," www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/16/germany.thefarright (accessed 20 May, 2012).

25. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, "The Hatefulness of Protected speech: A Comparison of American and European Approaches," *William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 7(1999): 319.

26. Silvia Suteu, "Law against Negation," 45.

27. Laurent Pech, "The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe: Towards a (Qualified) EU-wide Criminal Prohibition," www.centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/09/091001.html (accessed 25 April 2012).

28. John Knechtle, "Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity," 49.

29. Hate speech is a communication that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence. It is an incitement to hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and the like. Hate speech can be any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities or to women.

30. Mariana Mello, "Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary International Law," *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 28:365 (2006): 374.

31. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 241 (F.R.G.), www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html (accessed 11 May 2012).

32. Claudia Haupt, "Regulating Hate Speech," 329.

33. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 1994.

Court also stressed the importance of not only an individual dignity but also of a particular group implying the dignity rights of the Jews currently living in Germany. The Jews were regarded as a vulnerable group. Holocaust denial significantly harms the reputation and dignity of Jews, since the Holocaust is an integral part of Jews identity and personal dignity³⁴ (a strong dignity-based argument). The Court stressed that Nazi persecutions have become part of modern generation of Jews living in Germany. So, Denial of Holocaust equals to denial of Jews identity³⁵. It will create an atmosphere of insecurity for the Jews and a possibility of repetition of those notorious events. The rights to equality and non-discrimination were also evaluated by the Court.

So, the Court concluded that Sec 130 is compatible with the Constitution and other rights, namely dignity, equality, non-discrimination and protection of personality. Besides, the Court stated that it is simply enforcing the limits established by the German Constitution itself.³⁶ While the criminalization of glorification of Nazi crimes is not neutral toward opinions as the Constitution requires, it is nevertheless justified by Germany's dark past.³⁷

Thus, the essence of this decision was the role of Holocaust denial in the German society, the guilt of the German state and the responsibility of the state that such crimes will never happen again.

The Court's decision was criticized in that the latter did not consider other non-punishable interpretations and other less restrictive means to achieve the goal,³⁸ and has chosen to protect dignity at the expense of free speech in nearly absolute terms.³⁹ This is, however, quite in consonance with the spirit of German Basic Law that "all rights must be weighed against human dignity, which takes precedence over all other values"⁴⁰.

As mentioned, Germany's direct participation in Holocaust results in a special moral responsibility on the German society. This responsibility mandates to assure and guarantee the collective dignity and security of Jews living in Germany. Above all, the Constitutional Court of Germany as a part of society and state apparatus feels the same *moral* responsibility, which explains the compatibility of the Holocaust denial criminalization with the German Constitution.

34. Ibid.

35. Dieter Grimm, "The Holocaust Denial Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany," in Ivan Hare, James Weinstein (eds.), *Extreme Speech and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 560.

36. Claudia Haupt, "Regulating Hate Speech," 330.

37. BVerfG (2009), Wunsiedel, 1 BvR 2150/08, Par. 64-68.

38. Winfried Brugger, "Ban on or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and American Law," *Tulane European and Civil Law Forum* 17 (2002): 53.

39. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, "A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany," *Tulane European and Civil Law Forum* 78 (2004): 1581.

40. Claudia Haupt, "Regulating Hate Speech," 314.

Taking these dignity-based and guilt-based arguments can the Armenian Genocide denial survive the German Constitutional Court analysis? Within the spectrum of guilt-based argument one can argue that Germany was an ally of Ottoman Turkey during World War I and the Armenian Genocide in 1915 was perpetrated and executed by the approval of the Germany. This was admitted also on the governmental level: the German Bundestag adopted a resolution on the Armenian Genocide which not only condemned the actions of the Young Turks' Government that resulted in almost a complete extermination of the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, but also recognized the historical responsibility of Germany and called on the Federal Government to continue further public discussions about the responsibility of the German Reich in the Armenian Genocide. However, whether this would be enough to shape a public attitude and establish collective guilt so that to raise it to the level of moral issue? It took more than 100 years for the German lawmakers to admit the fact of the Armenian Genocide and the responsibility of Germany.

Although the criminalization of denial in Germany relates only to the Holocaust, in this paragraph we will apply the Court's reasoning to the Armenian Genocide denial case to see whether it will pass the test. Definitely, the Armenian Genocide denial passes the first argument of the German Constitutional Court on opinions and facts, as the Armenian Genocide is a clearly established historical fact. Moreover, the German Bundestag very recently officially admitted that the 1915 events qualify as genocide.

The Court's next argument on the protection of personality and the importance of dignity of a particular group can also well suit into an Armenian case. Armenian Genocide denial significantly harms the reputation and dignity of Armenians, since Mets Yeghern is an integral part of Armenians' identity. As in case of Holocaust denial, Armenian Genocide denial also violates the rights to equality and non-discrimination. However, in Holocaust denial case the Court referred to the rights of Jews living in Germany, and the responsibility of the German state to assure their security and guarantee against the Holocaust repetition. The number of Jews living in Germany outnumbered the Armenians living in Germany several times. There are still Holocaust survivors and their heirs living in Germany - a perpetrator state, who admitted and hugely regretted about the past genocide, and the German state feels an obligation to safeguard them from any kind of discrimination and reminder about the past atrocities. This analysis is hardly applicable to the Armenians living in Germany. Plus, the existence of a huge Turkish Diaspora in Germany can play a negative role in this case. Finally, the weight of guilt in the Jews case is far great than in the Armenian Genocide case, where the weight of German guilt is still to be discovered, discussed and admitted.

Spain Constitutional Law Approach to Criminalization of Genocide Denial

Article 20 of the Spain Constitution recognizes the freedom of speech, thoughts and truthful information. In its fourth paragraph, Article 20 imposes limits on this right based on "the respect for the rights... and, especially, in the right to honor, privacy, personal iden-

tity, and protection of youth and childhood”. Article 10 of the Constitution declares dignity as the inviolable inherent right, which together with “the free development of the personality, respect for the law and the rights of others, constitutes the foundation of political order and social peace”.

The Spain Constitutional Court (hereinafter the Court) has declared that the right to freedom of speech is a precondition for exercising other rights. At the same time Constitution does not recognize the right to insult, and freedom of speech protection “excludes absolutely humiliating expressions”.⁴¹ According to the Court freedom of speech is a right to make judgments and opinions, without factual claims or objective data, and when freedom of speech provides untrue information, the Court will assess it as information and “the constitutional protection will be extended only to truthful information”.⁴² However, in assessing the Holocaust denial law the Court seemed to contradict this approach.

In 1971, Article 607 on the crime of genocide was introduced to the Spanish Criminal Code, which was amended in 2007.⁴³ In its original, Section 607.2 of the Spanish Criminal Code prescribed that “dissemination of ideas and doctrines that deny or justify the crimes [acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group] or aim at reinstating regimes or institutions that contribute those crimes is punishable with imprisonment from one to two years”.

In its analysis the Spain Constitutional Court states that this rule aims not to “the simple spreading of ideas or opinions, but to the protection of society from behaviors that “would generate a climate of violence and hostility that, in an indirect way, could materialize in specific acts of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination”.⁴⁴ Although the article was aimed at the protection of Jews, the wording of the article is wide, including also other genocides.

In understanding Spain anti-negation legislation it’s also important to consider that the Spain Constitution came into force after 36 years of Franco dictatorship and the fears of Spanish people are reflected in the Constitution.⁴⁵ That’s why it is also called “militant democracy”, which implies the defensive character of the Spain Constitution and the re-

41. Alfredo Coll and Sergio Doncel, “Freedom of Speech in American and Spanish Law: A Comparative Perspective,” www.works.bepress.com/alfredo_coll/1 (accessed 28 July 2016).

42. Ibid, 7.

43. The Section was amended in November 2007 after another decision of the Constitutional Court that criminalization of denial of past events violates the right to freedom of speech. Now Section 607.2 reads “...those who are found guilty of spreading ideas **justifying** the destruction of the protected groups or of **attempting to reinstate** regimes or institutions which carried out such policies and/or bore relevant ideologies are to be punished with a prison sentence of one to two years”.

44. Spain Constitutional Court Judgment No. 235/2007, of November 7. www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/JCC2352007en.aspx (accessed 30 May 2012), also Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antoni Rubí Puig,, “Genocide Denial and Freedom of Speech: Comments on the Spanish Constitutional Court’s Judgment 235/2007, November 7th”, in *Dret. Revista Para el Análisis del Derecho* 4 (2008):16.

45. For more information see Enrique Guillen Lopez, “Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court,” *Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review* 41: 529 (2008): 529-562.

striction of some fundamental rights - freedom of speech - in order not to be used for anti-constitutional purposes. Another important fact related to section 607.2 is that Jewish culture and community had been historically and systematically persecuted in Spain and anti-Semitism was quite widespread in Spanish society.⁴⁶

With this background in 1991 the Court in assessing the constitutionality of Section 607.2 ruled that initially denial speech fell under the freedom of speech protection, however, it does not protect racist declarations, which are contrary to the right of honor and human dignity⁴⁷. So, the Court was of the opinion that the right to dignity should prevail over the right of freedom of speech.

However, in 2007 the Constitutional Court of Spain struck off the denial aspect of the article, thus criminalizing only the justification of genocides.

The issue of Article 607.2 constitutionality was again raised on September 14, 2000 connected with the case of the bookstore owner who had sold and distributed books and documents denying the Holocaust. In evaluating Article 607.2 the Court first stressed the importance of the freedom of speech not only as a basic individual freedom (even if is disturbing and unpleasant), but also its role in Spain's democratic system, which implies that fundamental rights may not be limited because are counter to the spirit of Constitution.⁴⁸In democracy state authorities cannot interfere in the exchange of ideas (very similar to "marketplace of ideas" theory), unless they infringe upon other constitutionally protected rights.⁴⁹The Court highlighted the urgent need to set clear boundaries between behaviors that do not merit protection and dissemination of ideas and ideologies.

The Court differentiated between denial and justification, between simple denial and positive value judgments. The simple denial of genocide as a historical fact without adding any subjective value judgment is ruled to be protected by the Constitution. The Court found that Section 607(2) of the Criminal Code punishes simply the dissemination of ideas without any damage to the constitutionally protected rights, so constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech (Articles 20(1), and freedom of thought (Art. 16)) should prevail. Although the Court accepted that the denial of Holocaust is very "reprehensible and distorted", however statements, doubts and opinions about the historical fact are protected by the freedom of speech. By contrast, positive value judgments may be criminally punished, because "dissemination of offensive utterances is unnecessary for the expression of ideas and opinions and fall outside the right's scope of protection"⁵⁰. So, the Court held that there is a difference between denying and justifying, because the "latter conduct does create a clear and present danger".

46. Jose Rodriguez Jiménez, "Antisemitism and the Extreme Right in Spain (1962-1997)," www.sicsa.huji.ac.il (accessed 24 April 2012).

47. Case of Violeta Friedman, No 101/90, Judgment of November 11, 1991.

48. Spain Constitutional Court Judgment No. 235/2007, of November 7, para 5.

49. Ibid. para 6.

50. Ibid.

As to the punishable acts the Court explained that freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to express and disseminate particular statements with the intention of “disdaining or discriminating individuals or groups”. Second, freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to “praising tyrants, glorifying their publicity or justifying their actions if they entail humiliation to their victims in the context of denying the Nazi genocide”. Third, freedom of speech does not cover the so-called «hate speech», which involves direct incitement to violence against citizens or against particular racial or ideological groups. Thus, genocide denial will be criminalized only if *disdain or discriminate, justify the crime or humiliate the victims and incite violence* against particular group. In other cases Holocaust denial is protected by the freedom of expression. So, the ruling of the Spain Court differs from the German Court with regard to opinions and factual statements. Under the right of freedom of speech the Spain Court decided to protect factual statements, while the German Court preferred to guarantee opinions. From the moral point of view opinions are free but lies have no constitutional value. Moreover, facts are scientifically testable, while opinions labeled radical yesterday can be considered acceptable today.

So, despite the historical fact of Spain’s involvement in the persecutions of Jews and anti-Semitism, it seems that the society is changing. The moral part of guilt becomes more and more remote and by the influence of globalization and modern challenges new human right values appear to outweigh in the Spanish society. The people start to value the freedom of speech and its role in the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, legislator declared its intention to continue efforts to bring a new draft with a view to overcome the Court’s decision.⁵¹

In Spain’s perspective, the denial of the Armenian Genocide is not quite straightforward: most importantly, the state hasn’t yet officially recognized the Armenian Genocide, which was done by more than dozen city councils. It is clear that the mere denial of the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide fall outside the scope of Article 607.2 Spain Penal Code. However, whether the justification of the Armenian Genocide could still be protected under the Spain Constitution?

The issue seems quite debatable. Although there was no underlying argumentation about Holocaust history in the reasoning of the Court, however in assessing the mere existence of Article 607.2, the history of Jews persecutions in Spain should be kept in mind. There is no history of Armenian persecutions in Spain. Moreover, Spain was a neutral state during WWI, during which the Armenian Genocide was carried out. Armenian community in Spain was formed after the dissolution of the USSR, in contrast to other states where the Armenian emigration started just after the 1915 Genocide.

Thus the Court’s argument that denial “would generate a climate of violence and hostility” and “could be materialized in specific acts of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination” is less applicable to the Armenians. However, as already mentioned because Spain hasn’t

51. Cited in Michael Whine, “Expanding Holocaust denial and Legislation against it,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* 20:1-2(2008).

recognized the Armenian Genocide, this mere fact can deter the Court from even considering the Armenian Genocide denial case.

French Constitutional Law Approach to Criminalization of Genocide Denial

The Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen guarantees freedom of speech as the most precious rights of man, stating that people are free to speak, write, and print “*on condition that they answer for any abuse of this freedom*”.⁵² Furthermore, the Declaration states the only bound on the exercise of natural rights is the necessity to assure the enjoyment of these same rights to other members of the society.⁵³ Meanwhile the Parliament of France can enact rules on the right of freedom of speech, as well as institute indictments on abuse of the right that violate public order and the rights of others provided “that damage must be necessary, appropriate and proportionate to the objective pursued”.⁵⁴ Consequently, under French law, people have rights which can be restricted by the legislature if considered necessary for public security. To understand such an approach one should consider the philosophical and historical grounds of free speech in France, which was directed at the preservation of democracy⁵⁵ as a non-self-perpetuating system.⁵⁶ This notion comes from the 1793 French revolutionary slogan “*Pas de liberté pour les ennemis de la liberté*”⁵⁷.

One of such restrictions on the freedom of speech is Holocaust denial law (Loi Gaysot), which was paradoxically included as Article 24 in the 1881 Freedom of the Press law. The Article stipulates that “Anyone who disputes the existence of the crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute of the International Military Tribunal which have been committed by the members of a criminal organization or by a person found guilty of such crimes by a French or international court shall be liable to one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine”. The aim of the law is to “protect public order, morals and rights of others, referring to the respect due to past and the necessary preservation of social peace in the future”.⁵⁸ A clear recognition that the Holocaust denial is anti-Semitism the *Gayssot* law is intended to protect the Jewish community “against hostility, antagonism and ill will”.⁵⁹ It should also be clarified that the rationale of the law in France differs from that of Germany. The

52. Declaration of the Rights of Man – 1789, www.avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (accessed 21 May 2012).

53. Article 4 and 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

54. Article 34 of the French Constitution.

55. Sévane Garibian, “Taking Denial Seriously: Genocide Denial and Freedom of Speech in French Law,” *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9:479 (2008): 483.

56. Vivian Curran, “Balancing Freedom of Expression and Human Rights in France,” www.jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vivian-curran-genocide-denial.php (accessed 30 May 2012).

57. “No liberty to the enemies of liberty,” Sévane Garibian, “Taking Denial Seriously,” 482.

58. Silvia Suteu, “Law against Negation,” 73.

59. Josephs Jonathan, “Holocaust Denial Legislation,” *Working Papers du Centre Perelman de philosophie du droit* 3 (2008): 50.

latter focused on the untruthful nature of the Auschwitz lie, while the French authorities in outlawing Holocaust denial have mostly relied on the argument that it pursues racist and antidemocratic aims.⁶⁰ It's worth highlighting the role of history in shaping the attitude of France towards Holocaust. The involvement of Vichy France with Nazi German anti-Jewish policy, French anti-Semitic attitude,⁶¹ Jews aggressive persecutions in France⁶² played their prominent role on the conciseness of the French society.⁶³ In 1995 President Chirac recognized the responsibility on behalf of the French state for the nation's participation in atrocities against its Jewish citizens during WWII.⁶⁴ As a result, there is a solid degree of culpability in the French society. Holocaust denial laws are legacies of sensitive and painful events in French history through which "the French nation is supposed to come to terms with its sobering past".⁶⁵ Even the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California accepted the right of France to enact anti-negation laws against "the distribution of Nazi propaganda in response to its terrible experiences during WWII".⁶⁶

The law was not submitted to review to the Constitutional Council (hereinafter the Council) prior to its ratification. The Court of Cassation decided not to refer the law to the constitutional review because "it evidently does not conflict with the freedom of expression".⁶⁷ The *Gayssot* law was assumed compatible with the Constitution, because what is punished is not the holding of opinions, but the diffusion of that opinion, which is an "act susceptible to produce undesirable effects..."⁶⁸ So far 29 cases have been tried under *Gayssot* law⁶⁹ and ordinary courts have ruled on the compatibility of the law with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR),⁷⁰ namely is *prescribed by law*, is *necessary in a democratic society* for

60. Sévane Garibian, "Taking Denial Seriously," 485.

61. Lyombe Eko, "New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological Foundations of French & American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expression on the Internet," *Loyola. Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 28:69 (2006):106.

62. Richard H. Weisberg, *Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publisher, 1996), 2.

63. Peter Carrier, *Holocaust Monuments and the National Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 51.

64. Lyombe Eko, "New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes," 83-84.

65. Roger Cohen, "France Confronts its Jews, and Itself," *New York Times*, 19 October 1997, 1.

66. *UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc.*, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [Superior Court] Paris, May 22, 2000, The Clerk of the Chief Justice Christine Bensoam, (Fr.), available at www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm.

67. www.senat.fr/basile/visio.do?id=d45186620120123_8&idtable=d136282-72330_3|d45186620120123_8&c=Genocide+bill&rch=ds&de=20110527&au=20120527&dp=1+an&radio=dp&aff=36282&tri=p&off=0&afd=ppr&afd=ppl&afd=pjl&afd=cvn#eltSign7 (accessed 31 May 2012).

68. Michel Troper, "La loi Gayssot et la constitution," *Annale. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 54(6) (1999):1253.

69. Silvia Suteu, "Law against Negation," 96.

70. 1. Everyone has the right to **freedom of expression**. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless

the prevention of *disorder* and the *protection of the rights of others*. The law is considered to protect the rights of the Nazis' victims by ensuring and safeguarding the respect to their memory and safeguards the peaceful coexistence in the France.⁷¹ To further justify this conclusion, courts sometimes additionally referred to ECtHR limitation clause.⁷² The legitimacy of the Law was also upheld by the international case-law.⁷³

On January 2012 the French Parliament adopted the Genocide Bill - criminalizing "contestation or trivialization of genocide named in the French Criminal Code and recognized by the French law".⁷⁴ Although the law criminalizes the denial of any genocide legally recognized by France, it unofficially implied the Armenian genocide, as the French law recognized only 2 genocides – the Holocaust, the denial of which is criminalized separately, and the Armenian Genocide.⁷⁵ The experts assessed the adoption of the Bill within the framework of 2008 EU Council Framework Decision and with the nation's own complicated past.⁷⁶ However, these were not enough for the Bill to survive. Unlike the Gaysot law, the Genocide Bill was submitted to the Constitutional Council (hereinafter the Council) for evaluation.

of frontiers.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such **restrictions** or penalties as are **prescribed by law** and are **necessary in a democratic society**, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

71. *Yahoo! II*, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2004).

72. None of the provisions of the ECtHR may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the ECHR.

73. ECtHR 7 July 2003, Case No. 65831/01, *Garaudy v. France*; ICCPR 8 November 1996, Case No 550/1993, *Robert Faurisson v. France*.

74. The purpose of this bill is to punish by one year of imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros, or both, only those who have publicly denied, challenged or trivialized crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the Agreement of London of August 8th, 1945, or recognized by France.

Accordingly, the Act on Freedom of the Press is amended to ensure that offenses of a racist nature are now a common law offense under the Freedom of the Press Act. Moreover, it allows any association duly declared for at least five years at the date of the facts, which proposes, in its statutes, to defend the moral interests and honor of victims of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity And war crimes to exercise the rights of the civil party with respect to the apology, denial or trivialization of crimes of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. www.senat.fr/lng/en/index.html

75. In 2001 France passed a law recognizing the Armenians Genocide. In 2006 the French National Assembly approved an amendment to the 2001 statute, imposing criminal sanctions for the denial of the Armenian Genocide. However, it was dropped before being submitted to the Senate. The next attempt to criminalize the Armenian Genocide denial was made on 2012.

76. *Balancing Freedom of Expression and Human Rights in France*, www.jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vivian-curran-genocide-denial.php (accessed 12 June 2012).

Before dwelling upon the Council reasoning and decision, let's first understand the place of the Armenian Genocide in the frame of the French memory laws' arguments⁷⁷. So, the Gaysot law as a memory law deals specifically with the Holocaust denial in France and is tightly connected with the history of Holocaust in France, its political, cultural and social implications, the killing of French Jews and the rise of denialism in France.⁷⁸ What about the Armenian Genocide? Does it fit into the common understanding of French history and culture? Armenian Genocide denial laws should have some connection with the French history, culture, etc. Although one can argue that France as a great power did not interfere to stop the massacres and deportations, thus aiding and abetting the Armenian Genocide, this argument will hardly survive the critique. This same rationale could be applied to other great powers as well. Plus, other instances of assistance and help from the French part can be pointed out. Another argument, listed also in the Report to the National Assembly on the Proposed Armenian Memory Law⁷⁹, could be the place of France "as a birthplace of human rights", thus having a role to protect universal human rights values. However, as the author of the idea correctly put it, in this case the France will adopt a broader approach to the issue and will criminalize all genocides⁸⁰ (by the way, this was one of the arguments of the Council).

When evaluating the constitutionality of Genocide Bill, the Council first assessed the vital role of the freedom of speech, and further elaborated on the right of the Parliament to enact on freedom of speech and at the same time to institute indictments on abuse of its exercise.⁸¹ The main argument of the Council was based on Article 6 of the Declaration of Human and Citizens rights 1789, which stipulates that the law as the expression of general will of all citizens must be the same for all "whether it protects or punishes". The Genocide Bill was intended to punish only Genocides recognized by the French Parliament, which, according to the Council, cannot be considered as normative within the meaning of Article 6. And thus, the legislature unconstitutionally interfered with the right of freedom of expression.⁸² It derives from the reasoning of the Council that if the Bill equally criminalizes all Genocides it will survive judicial scrutiny. In this case what about Holocaust, does its "exceptional status" still work? In that case what about the equality and normative value of the laws declared by the Council?

77. Together with the **Gaysot law**, there is another memory law connected with the French history - **Taubira law** - which recognizes slave trade and slavery as a crime against humanity.

78. John Wolf, *Harnessing the Holocaust: the Politics of Memory in France* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 264.

79. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/genocide.asp> (accessed 30 June 2017).

80. David Fraser, "Law's Holocaust Denial: State Memory, Legality," in Ludovic Hennebel and Tomas Hochmann (eds), *Genocide Denials and the Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 41.

81. www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/decision/decision-no-2012-647-dc-of-28-february-2012.114637.html

82. Ibid.

As to the reality, the dissemination of the Bill on all Genocides poses a clear danger for France, because accusations of France's involvement in Rwandan genocide and massacres in Algeria.⁸³ According to some analysts, there is also a political and economic context in this overall situation: in addition of being an active ally of NATO, Turkey and France (also EU -Turkey relations⁸⁴) have trade ties valued at \$13.5 billion.⁸⁵

In 2016 the French legislature again tried to criminalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide. It was passed as an amendment to the French "Loi relative à l'égalité à la citoyenneté" (Law on Equality and Citizenship). However, the French Constitutional Council again ruled the amendment unconstitutional as it conflicts with the freedom of expression and is neither necessary nor proportionate⁸⁶.

Conclusion

Genocide denial laws are "symbolic laws";⁸⁷ they incorporate different constitutional values such as freedom of speech, dignity, equality. They are also contingent on the historical, cultural, political, social and psychological matters of a particular society, thus being called also memory laws. However, these approaches do not fully explain the choice of the particular state how to deal with an issue of Genocide denial. From the historical perspective the three discussed states were somehow similar: the concept of militant democracy was relevant in all cases. The same refers to their collective memory related to Holocaust as a social imperative to remember the past atrocities against Jews. The special responsibility seems to be felt by the three states, with different degree of culpability. The decision of French Constitutional Council reflects not only the absence of that culpability towards the Armenian Genocide, but also the political reasons underlying the decision, which can well be applied to Germany and Spain.

Social change and geopolitical evolution brought to the reevaluation of the right-protection system in Spain, where past notions are replaced by a more balanced ones to the values related to individual rights.

However, one crucial question still remains with such approach: shouldn't the law be the same for all?

83. www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2011/12/19/2003521130 (accessed 29 June 2015).

84. www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-14/end-france-s-block-on-turkey-s-eu-bid-president-hollande.html (accessed 28 June 2015).

85. www.edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/europe/france-armenia-genocide/index.html (accessed 24 May 2012).

86. Décision N° 2016-745 DC du Conseil constitutionnel du 26 janvier 2017.

87. Silvia Suteu, "Law against Negation," 54.

BOOK REVIEWS

STEFAN IHRIG, JUSTIFYING GENOCIDE:
GERMANY AND THE ARMENIANS FROM BISMARCK TO
HITLER, CAMBRIDGE, MA: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016,
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The question of involvement and complicity of Germany in the Armenian Genocide is one of the directions of research of the history of the Armenian Genocide. This question was put into agenda from the beginning of the Armenian deportation and massacres in 1915, at first by Entente powers with the aim to emphasize Germany's role in this process. Afterwards many foreign and Armenian scholars explored this question in dozens of books and articles.¹ Of recent years' research we would like to highlight the groundbreaking study of Vahakn Dadrian "German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity"² and a fundamental source book of Wolfgang Gust's "The Armenian Genocide. Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916".³

To these studies comes to contribute Dr. Stephen Ihrig's book "Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler," published in January 2016. Here the author, the Polonsky Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, presents a broad picture and a continuous narrative of reception of the Armenian question and the Armenian Genocide topics by German policymakers, press and public from appearance of the Armenian question in the agenda of international diplomacy in 1878 up to beginning of WWII.

Ihrig adopts quite lively and unconventional style and structure for his book. This is obvious from the beginning of his study which actually has two preambles. The first is a short Prologue entitled "Franz Werfel Meets Adolf Hitler," there in full accordance with the Latin principle "in medias res" the author presents one of the "protagonists" of his

1. The Select Bibliography on German Involvement in the Armenian Genocide, composed by Zorian Institute in 22 November 2011 lists the names of 45 studies in English, French and German, which deal with this topic (see online at: <http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/bibliographies/Select%20Bibliography%20on%20German%20Involvement.pdf>);

2. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity* (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1996).

3. Wolfgang Gust, *Der Völkermord an Den Armeniern 1915/16: Dokumente Aus Dem Politischen Archiv Des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amts* (Spinge, Germany: Ju Klampen, 2005).

book – the famous Austrian writer of Jewish origin – and ponders about the possibility of the meeting between him and Adolf Hitler in late 1932 in Breslau. The second is broader and more formal (in structure but not in content) Introduction, entitled “Questions of Genocide,” here the author presents the main topic, aims and objectives of the study.

After introducing Werfel’s famous book “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh,” as a warning of Hitler, Ihrig puts before reader the following questions: “Why would a German (-language) author use the Armenian Genocide to warn Germany of Hitler and Nazis? How could he think this was an effective narrative and use of his time?” The answer according to author is imminent: the Armenian Genocide was well remembered in Germany when Werfel published his “Forty days” in late 1933. (p. 4) Thus Ihrig states the core argument of his book: the Armenian Genocide was and is of towering importance for German history, even though its role there has been largely ignored. (p. 6) Ihrig again and again emphasize what his book is about: “it is the history of Germany’s understanding of the Armenian Genocide (in a broad context, beginning with the role of the Armenians in German history since Bismarck) (p. 11), “this book is about trying to understand how a society – German society – could possibly engage in a multilayer debate about genocide... full of details, horrors, and personal testimonies – only for that very society (or at least part of it) to commit another, even more unimaginable genocide merely a few years later.” (p. 8)

Author claims that his book is the first extensive study of the role the Armenian Genocide played for Germany and German history. (p. 11) The book covers the time from the 1870s to the Holocaust, and thus touches on many very different political and societal backgrounds, actors, relationships, and facts. To accompany the reader throughout the story the author at the end of introduction presents four “protagonists,” four men who, in different ways, and for different reasons, became “passionate warriors” against genocide: Johannes Lepsius, Max Erwin Scheubner-Richter, Armin T. Wegner, and Franz Werfel. “Who they are will become clear in what follows, – notices Ihrig. - One thing, though, unites them: their quest to raise the alarm in Germany about genocide.” (p. 15)

The book consists of four major parts with fifteen chapters. Part One, which have four chapters, is entitled “Armenian Blood Money” and serves as a background and introduction to German policies toward and discussions about the Ottoman Armenians prior to 1915. The first chapter - “Beginnings under Bismarck” – analyses the policy of German chancellor Bismarck in connection of the emergence and during first years of the Armenian question. Here Ihrig discusses the first famous German quote on the Oriental (=Armenian) question, Bismarck’s words that the Oriental question is not worth the “healthy bones” of even “one Pomeranian musketeer.” The author shows that on the contrary, Bismarck and his Germany were very much interested in the Ottoman Empire but not from the point of view of caring about the peoples inside of this state. From the beginning the Armenian question was used by the German chancellor as a means to promote the German-Ottoman rapprochement at the price of the Armenians. (p. 28) As author summarize “The aspiration of the Armenians were on the one hand a cumbersome nuisance to Bismarck and later to Wilhelm II as well, but, on the other hand, they also offered opportunities. ...The Arme-

nian question was constantly used by Germany as a pawn in its game to endear itself to the Ottomans: it was a pawn in Germany's quest for a place in the colonial sun as well as for its new place in the game of the Great Powers in Europe. Germany's silence on the Armenians was something like blood money that Bismarck, Wilhelm, the Foreign Office, and other political leaders were willing and even thought in necessary to pay. This constant and decades-long cynical use of the life and liberty of a people – and a Christian people – accustomed the German political elite and public to anti-Armenian views and discourses, to a “pragmatic” approach to the Armenian question, and, most crucially in the long run, to a “pragmatic” approach to *human* rights, life, and liberty more generally.” (pp. 29-30)

The Chapter 2 - “Germany and the Armenian Horrors of the 1890s” - is central both by its length (28 pages) as well as meaning for the Part I of the book. Here the author discusses the reactions to the massacres of Armenians in 1894-1896 by official Germany and then by the German press. Already in the introduction to this chapter Ihrig states that the Armenian massacres did little to change political Germany's position on the Armenians, quite the opposite: they gave Germany another chance to cement its role as Abdul Hamid's ally by “selling out the Armenians.” (p. 33)

Ihrig abundantly cites Kaiser Wilhelm's reaction to the massacres – comments made on the margins of German diplomatic reports from Constantinople: “Their [Armenians – R.T.] blood upon England's head,” (about Sasoun massacre, p. 37) “Artillery fire into Yildiz [sultan's palace] is the only thing that will have any effect now,” (about Zeytun conflict, p. 38) “This surpasses everything before, this is indeed a true St. Bartholomew's massacre! It is necessary to speak in a different tone with the Porte! Because these are Christians! And after all it is also against the other white Christians,” (on the massacres of Armenians in Trebizond, *ibid*) “And new as a Christian and a European, one has to watch quietly and even hand out good words to the sultan! Shame! On all of us!” (p. 39) As Ihrig notes, yet despite all the Kaiser's private outrage, for Germany it was not an option to intervene on behalf of the Armenians.

In this chapter Ihrig also introduces Johannes Lepsius, one of the “protagonists” of his book, the person, who popularized knowledge of 1890s massacres in Germany with his articles in press and especially by his volume “Armenia and Europe” (1896). (p. 47)

The author distinguishes the following features of the German reception of the 1890s massacres: 1) the 1896 debates saw the first mention of the direct German equivalent of the term “genocide” (*Völkermord*); 2) the conservative and pro-government press generally advocated and justified Turkish actions against Armenians by describing Armenians as “usurers” and “revolutionaries”; 3) Armenian massacres were considered as directed not against Christians but against particular race and thus used as argument against extending help and charity to the Armenians. (pp. 55-57)

Ihrig summarizes the chapter in the following sentences: “What is illustrative of the first large Armenian debate in Germany is the way the anti-Armenian faction – the majority of the press, the political leadership, and the Foreign Office – tried to stifle all criticism of Turkey. Not only did it attempt to justify what had happened – through racial qualifications,

appeals to German state interest, and warnings of a European war – but it launched an all-out war against any pro-Armenian sentiments. ...The Kaiser and the leaders of German politics knew what they were doing, whom they were backing, and what moral price they were in fact paying – despite all the whitewashing by the domestic press.” (p. 58)

Chapter 3, entitled “The Triumph of German Anti-Armenianism” focuses on discussions of the Armenian question in Germany from the end of Hamidian massacres up to Young Turkish revolution of 1908. Author rightly notes that due to Germany’s acquiescence to Abdul Hamid’s bloody policies, Germany became privileged economic partner of Turkey. Accordingly, the anti-Armenian stance of German ruling elite and imperialist press became clearer: this new racial discourse massively fostered the dehumanization of Armenians, thereby justifying and excusing all kinds of violence against them. Thus, the German anti-Armenianism became both a duplicate and an extension of modern German anti-Semitism. (p. 60)

Here Ihrig gives detailed analysis of anti-Armenian passages in Protestant pastor Friedrich Naumann’s book “Asia.” Published in 1898 it became one of the most-read books of his time, having seven editions by 1913. Ihrig shows that Naumann was justifying the killings of Armenians from the point of view of preservation of the Ottoman Empire and was defending inaction of Germany in the Armenian question as in accordance with German interests in connection with struggle with England for world domination. (pp. 63-69)

To substantiate and justify its anti-Armenian position Naumann in his book quotes and agrees with racist remarks on Armenian nation made by some German potter in sultan’s court, living in Constantinople: “The Armenian is the worst type in the world. He sells his wife, his still underaged daughter, he steals from his brother. The whole of Constantinople is being morally poisoned by the Armenians. ...It is Armenian who is practicing all the usury. ...An orderly means of protecting oneself against Armenians does not exist. The Turk is acting in self-defense.” Ihrig notes, that this “potter’s quote” became a key quote of German anti-Armenianism. (p. 64) Thus in 1890s debates the perception of the Armenians as the “true Jews of the Orient” emerged. In German public discourse the Armenians were understood to possess the same racial qualities as the Jews in the anti-Semitic worldview, but in more pronounced fashion, and even were often portrayed as something of “über-Jews.” (p. 74)

Ihrig notes, that the image of Armenians as “über-Jews” was a result of decades of anti-Armenian discourse in Germany sustained by a whole plethora of characterizations, images, and proverbs copied from modern anti-Semitism. The German anti-Armenian literature texts made no mention of the fact that the Armenians – unlike the Jews – were Christian. Total disregard for the Armenians’ religion became a central aspect of German anti-Armenianism over the coming decades. Ihrig shows and illustrates with examples how the Jewish-Armenian parallel, if not equivalence, was continuously reaffirmed in the German press up to World War I, and also how anti-Armenianism found its way into fiction – in work of Karl May, the one of the most successful German novelists of the time. (pp. 75-79)

Ihrig concludes the chapter by stating, that the German reactions to the 1890s Armenian massacres do not only constitute the historical background to the debates that would follow in the wake of the Armenian Genocide, they also were replicated in almost every respect in the genocide debate of 1920s. (p. 81)

The chapter 4 is entitled “From Revolution to Abyss” and deals with Germany’s response to the Armenian question developments from Young Turkish Revolution of 1908 till the beginning of World War One. Here author shows as repeatedly the Kaiser, the German Foreign Office and political leadership maintained their anti-Armenian stance. Thus, Ihrig sites the angry reaction of the Kaiser on the proposal of the German chancellor to send a ship to Cilicia during the Adana massacres in April 1909: “Why warships? The Armenian do not concern us at all.” (p. 83)

Ihrig also touches upon the German reaction to the Armenian reform plan of 1914. He notices that even the otherwise rather anti-Armenian German ambassador Wangenheim –who was to deny the reality of genocide for month in 1915 – acknowledged the need for Armenian reforms in 1913. (p. 88) Ihrig describes this attitude and Germany’s support of the need of reforms for the Armenians as “Germany’s temporary willingness to change its decades-old anti-Armenian policy,” with the main motivation to secure the stability of the Ottoman Empire. (p. 89)

We think that here the author exaggerates the factor of interventions in favor of Armenian reforms by Wangenheim. Actually, the German diplomacy did its best to limit the scope of the initial reform package offered by Russian embassy as much as possible. Anyway Ihrig rightly concludes that Germany was a rather unwilling participant in the Armenian reform plan developments and did not really do its best to speed up its implementation. (Ibid)

Part two, entitled “Under German Noses,” deals with the German reactions and knowledge of the Armenian genocide in progress. It consists of four chapters. The first chapter of the second part (chapter 5, entitled “Notions of Total War”) explores some of the backgrounds of the Armenian genocide. After touching upon the processes of radicalization that had taken place prior to the Armenian Genocide and which determined the Armenian genocide – “the end of empire,” “ethnic claustrophobia,” “military culture,” “atrocities propaganda,” “propaganda culture,” etc, - Ihrig notes that these can be served as explanations but not excuses for genocide. (p. 103)

The author puts the central question of the next three chapters of the second part as following: what could Germany have known about the Armenian genocide during genocide in progress? In chapter 6 entitled “Dispatches from Erzurum” Ihrig states and shows that official Germany knew in fact “everything”, yet it did not intervene. As there were many German diplomatic witnesses to genocide in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and their reports could not all be discussed in the book, Ihrig focuses on German vice-consul at Erzurum Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter’s reports as an exemplary case. Ihrig highlights the reasons for choosing him as the follows: 1) he not only reported extensively and was present at the center of the earlier deportations, but he continually petitioned to the embassy in

Constantinople to intervene on behalf of the Armenians, and he even personally attempted to save individual Armenians; 2) from the beginning, his reports are thoroughly detailed, and among his colleagues he was the most vocal opponent of the measures against the Armenian population; 3) in combination with the answers he received from his superiors, this diplomatic correspondence sheds light on what the German embassy and the Foreign Office knew, and what they did (and did not do) with this information. (p. 109)

Ihrig shows the early developments of the Armenian genocide in March-July 1915 by abundantly quoting from the Scheubner-Richter's reports. (pp. 108-128) Particular attention is drawn on his letters to chancellor on 10 August 1915 and on December 1916 (at that time he already returned to Germany), where at that time former German consul presents the big picture of the Armenian question and "grand resume" on the Armenian genocide. We consider it worth to cite from the last letter as well:

The fear I spoke of in my report from Erzurum, namely that the evacuation of the Armenians would be tantamount to their annihilation resp. that this was the purpose behind it, has unfortunately turned out to be true. Those evacuees of this tribe who are still living in Mesopotamia are in a desolate condition. It would not be saying too much if I tell you that the Turkish Armenians, with the exception of several hundred thousand living in Constantinople and other larger cities, have been practically wiped out....

I feel obliged to direct Your Excellency's attention to the following: a number of discussions with leading Turkish personalities left me with the following impressions:

A large part of the Young Turkish Committee is of the opinion that the Ottoman Empire should only be built upon a purely Mohammedan, pan-Turkish foundation. Those inhabitants who are neither Mohammedan nor Turkish should be made to become so by force or, if that is not possible, annihilated.

For these gentlemen, the present time seems to be the most suitable to put this plan into effect.

The first item on their program was the execution of the Armenians.

A supposed revolution prepared of the Dashnak Party was put forward as a pretext for those powers, who are allied with Turkey. Furthermore, local unrest and self-protection measures on the part of the Armenians were exaggerated and taken as an excuse to justify the evacuation of the Armenians from endangered border districts. At the instigation of the committee, the Armenians were murdered along the way by Kurd and Turkish gangs, in places also by gendarmes.

[Secondly, at] about the same time, the Nestorians in eastern Kurdistan, after brave resistance, were turned out of their domiciles by the Vali from Mosul, Haidar Bey, and annihilated in part. Their fields and homes were ravaged. ...

[Thirdly,] Halil Bey's campaign in northern Persia resulted in the massacre of his Armenian and Syrian battalions and the expulsion of the Armenian, Syrian and Persian population from northern Persia. It left behind a great bitterness towards the Turks. ...

"If we, the Turks, bleed to death in this battle for the existence of the Ottoman Empire, then there shall be no other nations in this empire either." This remark by a Young Turkish

politician characterises best the point of view held by the circles of the Young Turkish Committee. And the logical consequence of the weakening of pure Turkishness (the Anatolians), appearing more and more mainly because of a lack of organisation and foresight, is the violent annihilation of the other nations living in Turkey. (pp. 122-127)

Thus showing that by the end of 1915 the German embassy and its consulates time and again had internally acknowledged the extent and intent of the genocide as genocide, Ihrig switches his attention to how the German authorities reacted to what was happening with Armenians. First, Ihrig states that Germans knew that what had happened had been “wrong”, and that its own role, not just of the Ottomans, would be under scrutiny and attack in the future. Thus, from 1915 onward, Germany prepared this double strategy: on one hand, blaming the Armenians to justify whatever had happened to them; and on the other hand, defending itself by claiming it had helped the Armenians. This very much was Germany’s official line for the rest of the war and the postwar years. (pp. 128, 132)

Here Ihrig also touches upon the question of German’s guilt in the Armenian genocide. Opposing what he describes as “allegations by Armenian researchers, most prominently Vahagn Dadrian” who picture Germany as co-perpetrator, the author states that the claim that the Armenian Genocide was a result of joint German-Ottoman decision making cannot yet be proven. However, he continues, this does not mean that Germany was not guilty in another way: guilty in failing to stop the Young Turks. Germany knew what was going on and chose to accept the death of Armenians as part of the cost of doing business at war. (p. 134)

Chapter 7 bears the name “Interlude of the Gods” – the same name as one of the key chapters of Franz Werfel’s novel “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh,” where the author depicted the meeting of Johannes Lepsius with Enver Pasha, during which German Protestant figure tried to convince his powerful interlocutor to stop the extermination of the Armenians. Here Ihrig deals with activity of Lepsius and other German figures aimed at increasing of awareness of German public about the ongoing process of extermination of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire.

Following his trip to Constantinople in summer 1915 where he failed to persuade the Young Turkish leaders to stop anti-Armenian measures Lepsius returned to Germany and published the book “Report on the State of the Armenian People in Turkey” in 1916. About 20,000 copies of the report were printed and distributed among German officials, parliamentarians, public figures, journalists, missionary circles, clergy, etc. Ihrig gives the short description of Lepsius report as well as touches upon Armin T. Wegner pro-Armenian lobbying activity after his return from military service in the Ottoman Mesopotamia where he witnessed the Armenian genocide. (pp. 143-145)

In years of 1916 and 1917 two other German testimonies about the Armenian genocide were published abroad: these are “The horrors of Aleppo” by Martin Niepage, the teacher at a German school in Aleppo, and “Two War Years in Constantinople” by Harry Stürmer, the former correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* in Constantinople. Ihrig provides summary of these reports here. (pp. 145-149)

The rest of the chapter 7 deals with the Armenian genocide debates in Reichstag, the German parliament during World War One. Particularly, Ihrig puts a spotlight on the question in writing to the German chancellor by Karl Liebknecht on 18 December 1915, where the famous Socialist leader inquired about whether the German government is aware of the fact that the Armenian population “were expelled from their places of residence and were butchered in the hundred thousand.” (p. 150) On January 11 this question was read aloud in the plenum of parliament and got an evasive answer of the government official. When Liebknecht tried to raise this question again, he was suppressed and halted by his fellow parliamentarians. (pp. 150-151)

The chapter 8 (“What Germany Could Have Known”) is mainly devoted to the coverage of the Armenian topic in the wartime German press. Extensive citing of major articles and debates in such newspapers as *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Vorwärts*, *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung*, *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Magdeburger Zeitung*, *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, etc allows Ihrig to come to the conclusion, that the Armenian issue was discussed and all the allegations of massacres and of the “annihilation of the Armenian nation” were treated in the very same fashion in which 1890s massacres were discussed, denying the full extent of violence and justifying violent measures against Armenians, including the killing of civilians. (p.185)

According to the author “virulent anti-Armenian bias,” present in the German press was not a result of total ignorance of the actual events in Anatolia. To argument this point Ihrig among others cites Karl Otten, a German wartime censor, who affirmed 1919 that not only diplomats but also the press had been well aware of the suffering in Armenia: “I remind you of Armenia whose suffering was known to our press and our diplomats as much as they were to me, who held news about them in my hands and was supposed to confiscate it.” (p. 189)

Part III of the book is entitled “Debating Genocide” and is dealing with the discussion of the Armenian question and the Armenian Genocide in Weimar Germany between 1919 and 1933. As the previous two parts it consists of four chapters of which in the Chapter 9 (“War Crimes, War Guilt, and Whitewashing”) the author shows how the Armenian topic was discussed in the first two years after the World War One. Ihrig notices that “what characterizes these years is the interplay between information and whitewashing, accepting the charges of genocide and denying of justifying what had happened.” (p. 193)

The defeat of Germany resulted also in lifting of censorship in German press, which allowed German pro-Armenian activists, most prominently Johannes Lepsius and Armin T. Wegner, to reveal in depth and condemn the Armenian atrocities. Ihrig emphasize that these texts and reports were first in postwar weeks to use fully fledged “genocide language:” terms such as “systematic annihilation,” “extermination,” “annihilation of the Armenian people,” “awful extinction,” “monstrous annihilation of Armenians” were frequently used to describe to what happened to Armenians. (pp. 194-195)

In this connection Ihrig extensively cites from the Wegner’s open letter to the American president Wilson on behalf to the Armenians, published 23 February 1919 in the *Berliner*

Tageblatt. Yet he also notices that this letter, though “thoroughly passionate,” fell on deaf ears – both abroad and in Germany. This convinced Wegner to come up with a series of slideshow public lectures on the “Armenian horrors” during which he also showed pictures taken by him at Armenian concentration camps in Syrian deserts. Many of Wegner’s pictures have since become iconic images of the Armenian Genocide. (pp. 196-204)

With the aim to whitewash and bury German involvement in and responsibility for the Armenian genocide the German government asked Lepsius to prepare a collection of German diplomatic documents where the reports of German diplomats, who complained against actions of the Ottoman government and tried to relieve the condition of Armenians, would be gathered. The result was *Germany and Armenia* which was published in the same year of 1919. The author surveys the reaction of the German and international press to the Lepsius volume. (pp. 209-219) As a whole, Ihrig evaluates this book positively, emphasizing that it sparked public interest in and a debate on the Armenian Genocide itself, although also succeeded in convincing German press and public that Germany was not guilty of conspiracy and coexecution of genocide. (pp. 209, 217)

But the acceptance of the charge of genocide leveled against the Young Turks by many German papers in 1919 did not last long. Ihrig names the year of 1920 a “backlash year,” when an overwhelmingly large part of the German press began again to deny intent and minimize the extent of the atrocities. Here again Ihrig illustrates this point by abundantly citing from the press of the corresponding year. (pp. 219-225)

The intensity of Armenian debates in Germany has significantly increased after the shooting of Talât Pasha, the key organizer of the Armenian genocide, by Soghomon Tehlirian in Berlin on 15 March 1921. In Chapter 10, entitled “Assassination in Berlin, 1921,” author observed the reaction of German public and press to this incident. (pp. 226-233) Ihrig shows that the moods of sympathy toward Talât were prevailing; he was depicted as a “friend of Germany,” a “genuine and honorable statesman.” Correspondingly his role in the extermination of Armenians was downplayed and once again the full scope of the Armenian genocide denial arguments was presented.

The Chapter 11, entitled “Trial in Berlin,” is the lengthiest in the third section of Ihrig’s book. (pp. 234-269) Ihrig calls the topic of this chapter – Tehlirian (Talât Pasha) trial, which lasted only one and a half days (2 and 3 June 1921) – the “one of the most spectacular trials of the twentieth century” for two reasons: 1) from the very first hour the trial turned against Talât Pasha and, by extension, against the Ottoman Empire, 2) though Tehlirian repeatedly admitted that he had indeed killed Talât, he was acquitted and set free. (p. 235)

Ihrig continues by giving minute details from the proceedings of trial, which are read all in one breath: dialogs between judge and defendant, attempts of prosecutor to stop turning of trial into political one, interrogation of witnesses, among them Johannes Lepsius, the key defense witness, who presented the broad picture of the Armenian genocide, and concluding speeches of state prosecutor and defense attorneys.

The verdict of the jury to the question of whether Tehlirian was guilty of intentionally killing Talât Pasha was “No.” Ihrig stresses important point here: that contrary to specula-

tions in subsequent press and academic discourse, the jury did not necessarily find Tehlirian innocent because of “temporary insanity” – the jury did not deliver its reasoning, just a simple “no.” (p. 262)

The rest of the chapter Ihrig devotes to the observation of media coverage of Talât Pasha trial as it was a media event in and of early Weimar Germany. (pp. 263-269) The dossier of the trial shows that international papers such as the London *Daily Telegraph*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* etc, had asked for tickets long in advance, as had German papers such as the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *BZ am Mittag*, the *Berliner Morgenpost*, the *Freiheit*, and the *Vorwärts*. (p. 264)

As Ihrig notices many papers now realized the full extent of the events of 1915 and expressed this in such terms as “unparalleled horrors,” or “a distressing image of Armenian Horrors.” Most German newspapers had also printed Lepsius testimony’s conclusion that what happened to the Armenians “was not resettlement but the open intent to exterminate a whole people. Only with the most brutal methods could one million people have been exterminated in such a short amount of time.” (p. 266)

Ihrig states that it was the outcome of the trial, the non-guilty verdict, which left most of the papers in shock. Among others, the *Vorwärts*, one of German newspapers present at trial, commented the verdict in the following way: “[the jury] followed the same moral law based on which Friedrich Schiller acquits the murderer William Tell. Tehlirian, too, can justify himself with the Tell saying ‘avenged I the holy nature.’ ” (p. 267) The *Berliner Volkszeitung* also applauded the verdict and characterized the trial as not being about the death of Talât Pasha, but about “the murder of an entire people,” “condemned to annihilation” by Talât. (p. 268)

The Chapter 12, which bears the title “The Victory of Justificationalism,” focuses on the Armenian genocide debate in Germany aftermath of Talat Pasha trial till the coming of Hitler to power in 1933. The trend in these debates is characterized by the author as no longer one of a denial, but of a “justification”, thus the dynamics of this process is described as rise and victory of “justificationalism.”

The author argues that after Talât Pasha trial Germany saw the relative predominance in the press of a new and radicalized kind of anti-Armenian argumentation that had repercussions for far more than just Germany’s understanding of what happened in Anatolia. This was the justificationalist argumentation, which accepted all the horrors and, indeed, even the full intent of genocide, but at the same time strove to justify what had happened – thus *justifying genocide*.” (p. 272) To illustrate this thesis Ihrig again extensively quotes from the German press. (pp. 273-283)

The next step in the Armenian genocide discourse in Germany was in finding similarities between the Armenian question in the Ottoman Turkey with the Jewish question internally. The year 1922 marks the emergence of articles in the German press there Jews were identified as the internal “illness” as the Armenians in the Ottoman Turkey. Ihrig notes that the implications of this discourse were dangerously obvious: “the Armenian question was

solved by the Young Turk “ethnic surgeon” – now something similar had to be done to resolve the Jewish question.” (p. 288)

The fourth part of the Ihrig’s book is entitled “The Nazis and the Armenian Genocide” and is devoted to reconstruction of how the Armenian Genocide impacted the Nazis, the Armenian-Jewish conflation - that is how the Armenians were understood as quasi-and even uber-Jews in German discourse. Author states, that in the decade and a half before the Nazi takeover, the Armenian Genocide had not only been widely discussed in Germany, it also involved a group that was typically understood the prism of contemporary anti-Semitism. “The Armenian Genocide was understood through another group that lived in Germany and throughout Europe and that was also perceived as “problematic” by nationalists, indeed one that was understood by anti-Semites to pose another “question,” that is, the “Jewish question.” To illustrate this point the author extensively sites from anti-Semitic and racial texts, published from the late nineteenth century up to and during the Third Reich (Felix von Luschan, Hans F.R. Gunther, Houston Chamberlain and others). Special attention is made for Hitler’s use of Armenians as an example of a “lesser race” similar to the Jews in his speeches before 1933 (pp. 316-318).

As Ihrig summarizes “if the Armenians were often rather peripheral to the overall arguments of these texts, the way they featured in them placed them right at the heart of anti-Semitic discourse: First, the “Armenoid race,” used synonymously with the Armenians,” was seen as the major parent race of, and thus responsible for, the negative characteristics found in the Jews; second, the Armenians were perceived as the same as or worse than the Jews, as depicted in modern anti-Semitic discourse...; third, they played a central role in the debate about the “Aryan theory,” that is, the existence of an alleged “Aryan race” in opposition to the “Semitic race.” Thus not only had racial anthropology and (popular) racial handbooks put the Armenians on the mental map of anti-Semites and Nazis, these texts also reaffirmed the core ingredient of the justificationalist argument: the Armenians’ (alleged) racial characteristics. The Nazis further affirmed and reiterated the Jewish-Armenian conflation.” (p 319)

The chapter 14, entitled “The Nazis’ New Turkey” explores the role the New Turkey and its leader Atatürk played in Nazi discourse. As author points out, in the Nazi vision the New Turkey was a state that had, on a grand scale, “solved” its minority question in a “final” manner and emerged as a kind of “postgenocidal wonderland.” (p. 320)

The author states that for the Nazis the Armenian Genocide was in many respects the precondition for the successful Kemalist national revolution and resistance and as usual confirms this thesis by abundantly citing relevant articles from the Nazi press of 1920s. (pp. 321-326)

Chapter 15 is entitled “No Smoking Gun” and surveys some examples of how and where the Nazis have come across the Armenians and the Armenian Genocide. Here the author presents the gallery of prominent Nazi affiliated persons who had been also linked to the annihilation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire; these are Count Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg, the consul in Eastern Anatolia in 1916, Bronsart von Schellen-

dorff, the war-era Ottoman chief of staff and, last but not, least Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, former consul at Erzurum.

To introduce these persons Ihrig returns to the days of Tehlirian (Talât Pasha) trial in the summer of 1921 in Berlin, trial on which they all were involved as witnesses of either prosecutors' or defense side. Erwin von Scheubner-Richter traveled to Berlin with his friend, no other than Adolf Hitler. This fact gives Ihrig the opportunity to speculate that Hitler would have made his way to the courtroom as a spectator, if any tickets had been available. (p. 336)

Ihrig again states that the first four and a half years of the Weimar Republic were saturated with the Armenian Genocide. According to author while Hitler was not directly part of the "great German genocide debate" of those years, he has to be thought as always there, because in fact, he was there: he was in Germany; he was in audience and was an especially attentive member of the audience. (ibid)

In this part of the book the figure of Scheubner-Richter is again one of the central – at this time as a Hitler's closest advisor and friend, a "Nazi Martyr", killed in the Hitler Putsch of 1923 and by the fact of his death one of the most important blood heroes of Nazism. (p. 339) Ihrig portrays Scheubner as a paradoxical figure in Nazi history. Extensively citing from Paul Leverkuehn's book on Scheubner entitled "Guard on Eternal Watch" and published during Nazi era (1938), Ihrig shows that despite his antigenocidal past in 1923 Scheubner openly called for the "most ruthless struggle against everything foreign in the German national body" and also advocated the "ruthless cleansing of Germany" of all foreign and inimical elements. At the same time, Ihrig calls the German diplomat's story, as presented by his former adjutant, "a monument against genocide in the Third Reich," because of presence there of extensive depiction of the anti-Armenian policy of the Ottoman government in 1915. (ibid)

The most debated issue in Armenian genocide- Nazi connection is the authenticity of Hitler quote "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of Armenians." Ihrig dismisses the attempts of denialist historians to use the controversy surrounding the question whether Hitler pronounced these sentence or not, as an argument that the Armenian Genocide never occurred at all. (p. 348) Ihrig states that the burden of proof is actually not on showing that Hitler and the other Nazis did know of the Armenian Genocide; it is quite reverse: there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Germans had actually forgotten about the Armenian Genocide by 1939. There is every reason to believe that what Hitler meant in that part of the speech was that the Turks (as a whole) had never had to "pay" for the Armenian Genocide; they got away with it unscathed, without negative consequences. (p. 349)

Ihrig thus puts the Hitler's quote in context arguing that there is no doubt that the Nazis had incorporated the Armenian Genocide, its "lessons," tactics, and "benefits," into their own worldview and their view of the new racial order they were building. (ibid) Again according to Ihrig there cannot be the slightest doubt that the leading Nazis were well informed about the Armenian Genocide and they knew of it as what we would now call a

“genocide” – that is a deliberate attempt to exterminate an entire people. (p. 352) To substantiate this thesis Ihrig gives names of top political figures around Hitler before and during Third Reich which had served in the Ottoman Empire and had direct contact there with the Armenian topic: Scheubner, Humann, Schulenburg (Hitler’s ambassador to Moscow), Konstantin Neurath (foreign minister of the Third Reich in 1933-1938), Franz von Papen (Hitler’s first vice-chancellor and future ambassador to Vienna and Ankara), Rudolf Hoess (the commander of Auschwitz) and others. (p. 352)

Ihrig highlights aspects of inspiration and motivation for Nazis radiating from the Armenian Genocide. First, it must have taught them that such incredible crimes could go unpunished under the cover of war, even if one lost that war. (p. 353) A second major inspiration according to Ihrig was conveyed through the Nazis’ understanding and portrayal of the Ataturk’s New Turkey as a “postgenocidal paradise” of sorts. The role of the Nazis had assigned to the New Turkey in their beliefs, ideology, and propaganda – that of an “ethnic cleansing” success story, of a state that was now enjoying the benefits of past “cleansing” – must have constituted a perpetual reminder that Germany was not “cleansed,” and a strong motivation to think about “cleaning house.” (p. 354)

Another lesson from the Armenian Genocide according to author might have been the ability to find “willing executioners” among the population – from people organized in various civil and military formations to different kinds of civilians, from both the dominant and non-dominant ethnicities, including former neighbors and also, prominently, civilian women. (p. 355)

The author also shows the lessons from the genocide debate in Germany itself, these are: 1) no need to be afraid of such genocide debate, as it had no consequences, 2) it showed that it was incredibly hard to convince the public that genocide was indeed taking place or had happened. (ibid)

Author concludes the chapter by drawing parallels between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust, these are: killing under the cover of a major war; killing mainly away from major population centers and mainly after the target population had been physically removed from their former places of mixed residence; deportation itself as a part of extermination process; death by attrition; extermination as part of larger ethnic restructuring schemes, with “vacated properties” earmarked for and rapidly occupied by members of the dominant ethnic group; organized robbery of the group by structuring deportations so that most immovable and moveable goods stayed behind or were easily discoverable, all this in rather “orderly” fashion; the preparation for physical violence in form of an antiminority discourse, and so on.

In Epilogue Ihrig returns and takes to conclusion the destiny of four figures, the “passionate warriors against genocide” – these were Johannes Lepsius, Max Erwin Scheubner-Richter, Armin T. Wegner, and Franz Werfel. As in 1930s and afterwards only two of these “protagonists” were alive and continued their activity – Armin Wegner and Franz Werfel. Ihrig concentrates on the question of the contribution of the Armenian Genocide theme to Jewish life and identity by the examples of first’s “Open letter” to Hitler on de-

fense of the Jews and of reception of second's famous novel "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh" among Jews in Nazi ghettos, its impact as a source of inspiration for struggle and ideological fortification.

Yet Ihrig chooses to end his book by citation of the "another warrior against genocide" Raphael Lemkin, who also was influenced not only by the Armenian Genocide but also by Talât Pasha trial. In his memoirs, Lemkin wrote: "Tehlirian acted as the self-appointed legal officer for the conscience of mankind. But can a man appoint himself to mete out justice? Will not passion sway such a form of justice and make a travesty of it? At that moment, my worries about the murder of the innocent became more meaningful to me. I didn't know all the answers but I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be accepted by the world. ...Sovereignty, I argued, cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people." (p.371)

Thus Raphael Lemkin's "success" according to the author was much more visible and even more important as he fathered both the term "genocide" and the UN's 1948 Genocide Convention – the mechanisms aimed at deterring the states from butchering civilian populations and thus benefiting from genocides.

To conclude Ihrig's book is well researched; all his main theses and arguments, above all the continuity of presence of the Armenian question and the Armenian Genocide topics in German public discourse up to the beginning of WWII, are well grounded in sources and thus fully acceptable. Upon reading this book one fully understands that Hitler's famous words – "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of Armenians" – given on the eve of invasion to Poland in August 1939, were not made by chance but were the logical outcome of the long lasted Armenian genocide debate in Germany.

Special advantage of the book is the author's free and lively writing style which makes reader absorbed in narrative. Some minor observations on different occasions present in the book, which are not directly related to the main research topic, are also valuable. For example, while discussing the coverage of Talât Pasha trial in German press, the author ponders upon the power of media to set agenda of public discourse, summarizing that media and propaganda are never really successful in directing what the people think about a topic, but rather which topic the people should think about. (p. 264)

In summary, Ihrig's book is a very important contribution to the Armenian genocide studies, which provides researchers with huge amount of new data and insight and also paves the way for further similar studies on the impact of the Armenian topic in public discourse of other main actors in the Armenian question.

YETVART FICICIYAN, ED., *DER VÖLKERMORDAN DEN ARMENIERNIM SPIEGEL DERDEUTSCHSPRACHIGEN TAGESPRESSE, 1912–1922*, BREMEN: DONATVERLAG, 2015, 447 PAGES.

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The German dimension of the Armenian Genocide has seen important contributions over the last decade. One could mention for example Rolf Hosfeld's *Operation Nemesis*.¹ But of course, one must also mention the activities related to the publication of source materials, first and foremost the endeavors of Wolfgang Gust in editing materials available in the German Foreign Office. The documents collected in Gust's volume are invaluable to the study and understanding of the Armenian Genocide, and now are available in English and Turkish (and online) as well.² These materials are still very actively ignored by denialists as they are not easy to discard. The question remains and remains unanswered by denialists: why would Germany, an ally of the Ottomans and much worried by all the moral and political implications of the genocide in progress, falsify documents attesting to something that the German diplomats themselves (largely) wanted to stop or at the very least saw as damaging and misguided?

But the German connection still has much more to offer, also by way of new source materials still waiting to be fully explored. One such source material are newspapers and other forms of public and printed discourse. There have been similar publications in and on other countries already; now with Yetvart Ficiciyan's book we have something comparable for Germany as well.³ In his 447-page book Ficiciyan brings together many dozens of

1. Besides my own contribution, see also: Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller, eds., *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah* (Zurich: Chronos, 2002); Jürgen Gottschlich, *Beihilfe zum Völkermord: Deutschlands Rolle bei der Vernichtung der Armenier* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2015); Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "Who Still Talked about the Extermination of the Armenians? German Talk and German Silences," in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göcek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 199–217; Rolf Hosfeld, *Operation Nemesis: Die Türkei, Deutschland und der Völkermord an den Armeniern* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 2005); Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide – Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

2. Wolfgang Gust, ed., *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/1916: Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes* (Springe, Germany: Zu Klampen, 2005); Wolfgang Gust, ed., *The Armenian Genocide – Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915–1916* (New York: Berghahn, 2014); Wolfgang Gust (ed.), *Alman Belgeleri Ermeni Soykırımı 1915-16* (Istanbul: Belge, 2012) as well as online at www.armenocide.de.

3. Cf. for example: Richard D. Kioian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide – News Accounts from the American*

newspaper articles from the period immediately before the genocide, beginning in 1912, up to the post-war years, ending with 1922. Having worked myself on the German printed discourse and often the very same newspapers and articles for many years, it is hard not to greatly appreciate the work that has flown into this publication as well as the incredible service it provides for future researchers.

The volume combines newspapers from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. This makes the volume more diverse, but not necessarily more representative of the trends of the time. For example the Swiss *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* had been at the avant-garde of reporting on the Armenians and had regularly featured extensive articles for some time already before World War I. During the Armenian Genocide itself the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* was arguably the best source in the German language of what was actually going on. The German and Austrian papers, on the other hand, were acting under official censorship as well as self-imposed self-censorship; they viciously attacked the Armenians for the course of the war and were, in any way, not able to offer balanced views. Interestingly enough, Swiss papers were available at newspaper stands in Germany's larger cities throughout the war. Thus German newspaper readers could have informed themselves on the ongoing genocide at the time through papers such as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

The main contribution of this volume is perhaps something this reviewer has also attempted to do recently – to contradict two prevalent academic myths relating to the Armenian Genocide and the German dimension. The first, also grounded on previous, too narrowly focused analyses of the wartime press, was the idea that during the First World War censorship had prevented Germany's newspapers from discussing the Armenians.¹ The second dealt with the interwar period and the claim that Germany did not discuss the Armenian Genocide, even more that it did not come to terms with it and that this also contributed to the possibility of the Holocaust years later.² Ficiciyan's volume forcefully contradicts such legends by laying bare a series of articles from the war years and the early interwar period. It is true that censorship prohibited a balanced treatment of the Armenian Genocide and that de facto only anti-Armenian voices in the press were able to express themselves. But in the end and however skewed, there was a discussion of the Armenians. Often Ottoman propaganda was merely reproduced, sometimes German newspapers ventured farther and developed their own anti-Armenian discourse and logic. But it was an important topic in some phases of the war and any intelligent reader could have understood that the Germans and the Ottomans protested too much against allegations of wrongdoing for there not to have been something larger going on than atrocities and resettlement. Similarly Ficiciyan's collection shows that in the period after the war there was quite some debate on the Ar-

Press, 1915-1922 (Berkeley: Antioch Press, 1985).

1. Elizabeth Khorikyan, "Die Behandlung des Völkermordes an den Armeniern in der deutschen Presse und Literatur um 1915-1925," in Armenuhi Drost-Abgarjan, ed., *Armenologie in Deutschland* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005), 159-172.

2. Wolfgang Gust, "Die Verdrängung des Völkermordes an den Armeniern – Ein Signal für die Shoah," in Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik Schaller, *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah*, 463-480.

menian genocide – I go as far as to claim that there was a great German genocide debate in the years from 1919 until 1923. Ficiciyan republished here a selection of important articles from these years. The idea that Germany failed to come to terms with the Armenian Genocide is true, but only in so far as we would expect coming to terms to involve strong condemnations and some sort of moral learning. This was not the case. By the end of 1921, after a markedly pro-Armenian period directly following the trial of Talât Pasha's assassin, many German nationalist papers went on to even justify genocide outright.

Another fascinating contribution of this volume is the spotlight it throws on the period immediately before the genocide. In the first part of the book the years from 1912-1914 are covered for which the editor has found a wealth of articles and longer essays in the German-language press. The almost 150-pages of materials on this period convey a sense of heightened urgency of the Armenian Question before the First World War that contrasts sharply with how the years before are often portrayed in the main narratives of the Armenian Genocide. Perhaps this first chapter alone should serve as a call to further investigate these crucial years.

One could criticize Ficiciyan for missing some major articles and debates of the years that are covered in the volume. Especially blatant is the absence of Theodor Wolff's highly important editorial in the summer of 1919 when the so-called Lepsius documents were published – the documents from the German Foreign Office on the genocide.³ Similarly the volume missed some of the larger debates during World War I itself.⁴ However, given the absolute dearth of studies on the German newspapers and the Armenian Genocide, this would be an unfair criticism. But it should stand as a warning to the reader who might think that the volume is comprehensive and the last word on the German-language newspapers and the Armenian Genocide. Germany was highly attuned to the Armenian topic and highly entangled with Ottoman affairs in these years; it is an even broader and richer field than this book might suggest. But this should not deflect from the fact that this a highly important and welcome book. It should be but the beginning of more exploration, of more activities towards understanding how, in the era of the telegraph and modern mass (media) societies, a genocide could unfold, be discussed in the daily press, even to great extents, and yet lead to nothing more than often phony condemnations, or as I have shown and is documented also in this volume, to justifications for genocide.

3. Theodor Wolff, untitled daily commentary, *Berliner Tageblatt*, 28 July 1919.

4. Stefan Ihrig: "Lord Bryce and the Armenian Genocide in German wartime propaganda," in Stefan Ihrig, ed., *The Armenian Genocide and the World*, special issue of the *Journal of Levantine Studies* 2 (2015): 51-70.

DOCUMENTARY AND ARTISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN THE GOLDEN APRICOT FILM FESTIVAL

Reviewed by Serafim Seppälä
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Stony Paths. Dir. Arnaud Khayadjanian. France 2016, 60 min.

The Other Side of Home. Dir. Naré Mkrtchyan. USA/Armenia/Turkey 2016, 40 min

Journey in Anatolia. Dir. Bernard Mangiante. France 2016, 60 min.

Gavur Neighbourhood. Dir. Yusuf Kenan Beysülen. Turkey 2016, 95 min.

Geographies. Dir. Chaghig Arzoumanian. Lebanon 2015, 72 min.

Children of Vank. Dir. Nezahat Gündoğan. Turkey 2016, 70 min.

Who Killed the Armenians? Dir. Mohamed Hanafy Nasr. Egypt 2015, 73 min.

The famous Golden Apricot film festival in Yerevan has become, among its other aims, a remarkable forum for documentary and artistic films on the Armenian genocide and its cultural legacies. In recent years, the emphasis of the genocide-related documentary films has shifted from historical presentations of the actual events to the cases of lost Armenians and rediscoveries of Armenian identities inside Turkey, in addition to the stories of Western Armenians tracing the whereabouts of their forefathers.

The centennial output

In the centennial year of 2015, the genocide was a special theme in Golden Apricot, and a big number of old genocide-related films were shown in retrospective replays. As was to be expected, the centennial witnessed also a burst of new documentaries and a few more artistic enterprises. The new films included documentaries on Armenians looking for their roots in Western Armenia, such as Adrineh Gregorian's *Back to Gürün* (Armenia 2015, 64 min) and Eric Nazarian's *Bolis* (2011, 19 min), or Istanbul Armenians returning to their ancestral lands for the summer, as was the case in Armen Khachatryan's touching *Return or we exist 2* (52 min). There were also cases of Turkish Muslims discovering their Armenian roots, like in *Turkey, the Legacy of Silence* (2015, 52 min) by Guillaume Clere and Anna Benjamin from France.

Moreover, the lives of certain Scandinavian female missionaries and their roles in the aftermath of genocide were reflected in two dissimilar films. Aram Shahbazyan's *Map of Salvation* (Armenia 2015, 94 min), a big and expensive international project, was distinguished by its cheerful narrator Svante Lundgren. Aesthetically, however, the result was surpassed by Vrezh Petrosyan's simpler yet more poetical approach to a rather similar theme in *Other Homeland: Diaries of Maria Jacobsen* (Armenia 2014, 50 min). Pet-

rosyan's tranquil narrative manages to express something of the inner development of Jacobsen rather solemnly.

Unfortunately, the list of big films with potentiality for international success was much shorter. In addition to the well-known American enterprise called simply *1915* (USA, 82 min), the most interesting case was Robert Guédiguian's thought-provoking *Don't Tell Me the Boy Was Mad* (France, 134 min). Guédiguian's movie was well-directed, but in cultural and political sense his choice to approach the Armenian Genocide through the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism of 1970's was unfortunately the most difficult imaginable for promoting the Armenian cause, and probably an easy one to misunderstand. But at least for those who are familiar with the entire historical problematics, the film offers valuable insights for the legacy of genocide among the French Armenians.

Moreover, it must be admitted that truly artistic endeavours were also scarce. The most profound moments of 2015 were offered by the film portraying Diaspora Armenians' efforts to carry out West Armenian mystical chants first in Europe and then in west Armenian places: Nathalie Rossetti's and Turi Finocchiaro's *Singing in Exile* (Belgium/Poland/France 2015, 77 min) included some magical moments carried by the traditional Akn chants.

Fortunately, the bloom of genocide films did not end with the centennial year, but a considerable amount of interesting new films were presented also during the Golden Apricot festival of 2016. In fact, the number of new genocide-related documentary films remained approximately the same as the year before. Perchance some projects had slightly missed the centennial deadline, but nevertheless the output of 2016 was significant.

Regrettably, such films often fall into oblivion after the festival even though the production may have demanded considerable efforts, and at times the films display artistic qualities that might have some potentiality to popularise the genocide and its heritage.

In the following, the films related to genocide presented during the latest Golden apricot festival in Yerevan, July 10–17, 2016, are reviewed and discussed in order to pay attention to this remarkable phenomenon and to briefly estimate its qualities. In addition to the particular films and their characteristics, the purpose here is to provide some general outlines of the phenomenon in a wider perspective.

Stony paths, with an idea in hand

Documentaries on Armenians searching for their ancestral whereabouts in present-day Turkey typically suffer of two defects, or perhaps rather, obstacles. Firstly, the experience of being an outsider in Turkey is oftentimes delivered in so thorough manner that the result may not differ much from average tourists' attempts to film random people and places. Secondly, the films often make no serious efforts to reach artistic or philosophical depths but concentrate on documenting the phenomenological experience in Turkey. Sure, this may be effective, especially when showing the unwillingness and insecurity of the Turks to deal with the subject, but tourist perspectives are not enough to make outstanding documentaries, even though the films may be flavoured by a few deeper moments of personal

reflections. In other words, the problem is: how to get hold of insiders' views when coming from outside? And how to make the film surpass what is evident?

With some creativity, however, this outsider's complex may be overcome, and even rather easily, as proven by young French-Armenian director Arnaud Khayadjanian in his *Stony paths*. Firstly, his decision to concentrate to the righteous Muslims who tried to save some Armenians, like the governor of Konya, is probably the best method to engage in confidential and warm discussions without provoking immediate defence mechanisms in encounters with the locals.

Khayadjanian's bravest and most original idea, however, was to take with him a copy of Aimé Morot's (1850–1913) painting *The Good Samaritan* that happens to match with the survival story of his great-grandfather who was saved by a Kurd from the river somewhere around Erzinçan. Discussions on the painting easily open up views to the fate of his Armenian great-grandfather, and the artwork serves as a functional substitute to deal with the painful subject – not to mention its Christian contents – in a somewhat indirect way. Moreover, the silent sequences of the young Frenchman tramping in Anatolian mountains carrying a vast painting also manages to represent something of the surrealism of the genocidal experience and its abnormal legacy.

Having said that, Khayadjanian's imagery also shows how deeply the Turks are conscious of the subject, even though they seem to know nothing about it. When the discussion touches the fate of Armenians, the body-language and shivering hands of the interviewees silently show how the experience of destroying a people in one's own neighbourhood is transmitted, at least for a couple of generations.

Khayadjanian himself keeps on showing a friendly face with a sad



smile, and at the same time maintains certain distance to his interviewees, some of whom openly accuse of Armenians killing the Turks as the cause of their misfortune. Nevertheless, Khayadjanian's soft and constructive approach manages to bring some Muslims to acknowledge that a systematic destruction organised by the government may have been 'possible'. However, the use of the 'G-word' means an end to discussion, even with a young intellectual in Turkey.

Moreover, the film is concluded with a proper elevation. In the story of the grandfather, the turning point between life and death was the river. For Khayadjanian, river functions as a symbol that carries time into oblivion yet remains to show the original setting of the genocide. The film ends up with a spectacular scene with Morot's painting standing silently in the landscape in a place where it as if finally found its original setting.

As a result of his creative, personal and warm approach on the painful subject, Khayadjanian won the Golden Apricot prize for the best Armenian Documentary in 2016. One may hope that *Stony paths* is not his last word on his Armenian heritage, and Armenian culture in general.



The Other Side of Home

Naré Mkrtchyan's *The Other Side of Home* tells the story of a Turkish woman who has discovered her Armenian roots from the mother's side. The woman openly and honestly presents herself as a battle-field and conflict zone for whom the annihilated Armenianness has become a part of identity: "I am the conflict. [...] It is just what I am."

The Armenian grandmother of the woman represents a typical case of 13–14 year old girl who was forced to convert and to marry a Turkish officer. Consequently, the captured grandmother never laughed, was never happy, always dressed in black, and never spoke a word about Armenians or Armenian life, but took the secret with her to the grave instead.

Similar descriptions have been heard on many cases in the interviews of last years. In this case, however, the grandmother is remembered as having shown minor signs of happiness when singing Armenian songs that no-one understood.

In the family tradition, grandmother's story was told as a happy fairy tale of a girl who fell in love with a soldier who saved her life. The main character of Mkrtchyan's film refuses to believe the fairy-tale and examines the case critically.

The film, typically for documentaries on the Armenian genocide, also presents some basic information and historical photographs that are familiar from various books and films. This once again indirectly shows the power

of denialism: the basic facts are as if forced to be presented again and again, which in turn effectively hinders possibilities for artistic or discursive evolution.

The woman visited Armenia for the first time in April 2015. In manner of all Armenians, she had the authentic feeling of homecoming when viewing Mount Ararat. Remarkably, she was also deeply impressed by the presence of uprooted Armenians from all over the world – people who do not belong in the places in which they are located today, but who should rather be somewhere in Anatolian mountains.

In spite of her Armenian part and genuine sympathy, the woman does not want to use the word 'genocide' and speaks of massacres and deportations instead. A victory to the Turkish side in her inner conflict.



Journey in Anatolia: post-genocide tourism documented

Western Armenian cultural heritage tours from Yerevan to Turkey via Georgia have been active for several years, and thousands of Armenians from Armenia and Diaspora have seen Ani, Kars and Van, to say the least. Bernard Mangiante's *Journey in Anatolia* tells the story of one such group consisting of Armenians from France, German and Yerevan, joined by an Armenian from Istanbul. The places visited are the customary ones, and the film is a fine basic documentary, yet without any outstanding special dimensions or artistic ambitions.

The somewhat middle-of-the-road film is, in a way, saved from mediocrity by the character of charismatic French Armenian scholar sharing his own interpretations and backgrounds for the phenomena encountered in a charming manner. (However, I would like to challenge his remark that viewing Ararat as a national symbol is a 19th century nationalistic



invention, for the nationalists did not need to start from zero: they just continued and developed the roles Ararat had in medieval Armenian culture.)

Journey in Anatolia also manages to document a telling case of the ever-on-going Turkish mania for the hidden Armenian gold. Namely, a Turk completely seriously explains that the cusps of cross in an old *khachkar* are signs of hidden treasure's whereabouts! The phenomenon of treasure hunt reveals that the attitudes of legalised robbery of Armenian wealth are still alive and well in the Eastern Turkey.

Gavur Neighbourhood – charming recollections from the past

The post-genocide Armenian history of Diyarbakir has become better known in recent years, owing to the book published by Hrant Dink Vakfi,¹ in addition to the emergence of interviews in various media. The interest was intensified first by the restoration of Surb Kirakos church by the Armenian community, and then because of its seizure by Turkish authorities for obscure reasons.


Yusuf Kenan Beysülen's *Gavur Neighbourhood* tells the story of Margosyan family, the survivors of whom were forced to migrate from their village, the beloved Heredan in 1915. With the other remains of Armenians, they move to Diyarbakir's Gavur ('infidel') neighbourhood, yet keeping the Heredani traditions alive. 'Heredantsi' was one of the first three words taught to a newborn baby!

The central figure in the film is Mıgırdiç Margosyan, survivors' child, who in his youth lived and worked in Diyarbakir as an apprentice blacksmith until 1953. Later he became known in Turkey as a writer, "Master Margos from Diyarbakir".

1. Ferda Balancar (ed.), *Sounds of Silence II: Diyarbakir's Armenians Speak* (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2013). The Turkish original *Diyarbakırlı Ermeniler Konuşuyor* was published in Istanbul 2012.

In his writings Margosyan expressed the inherited yearning for Heredan, which had become like a lost Eden symbolising all precious that has been lost in both outer and inner reality:

Heredan, Heredan, Heredan, the father's hearth, the mother's lap... A whole generation, children and all, were separated from you, torn away, piece by piece, 'berdan, berdan (as the Kurds would say)'. But the never could or would forget you. You become a yearning in their hearts, grief on the smiles, and a kiss on the lips. You become a decoration, an adornment on the tombstones over the graves.²



The film *Gavur Neighbourhood* is built around Margosyan's charismatic personality. With his original and warm charm, Margosyan takes the viewer for a walk in the old streets of Diyarbakir and re-awakens Armenian characters that once lived and walked there. Exceptionally, he manages to do the reminiscing without any bitterness or gloominess. For Margosyan, life is like one big fairy-tale the course of which is not in individuals' hands. In a similar manner, Margosyan has in his writings depicted Diyarbakir and its forgotten social and cultural fabric with his colourful poetic language.

Interestingly, the film also documents insights to the Jewish quarter of Diyarbakir, emptied of its original inhabitants in late 1940's. Thus the film shows the fate of multiculturalism in a society on its way of becoming an utterly Islamic nation. Unfortunately, similar stories could be told of so many traditionally multicultural centres of Eastern Mediterranean, such as Antioch or Alexandria.

Finally, one cannot help wondering whether the film could have been improved by editing its ending a bit shorter; now it seems to have several potential endings in row. Having said that, the present solution serves to distance the viewer in phases, step by step: first from Diyarbakir to the school in Istanbul, and finally to the graveyard where Margosyan reminiscences courses of life in his poetic style. Be that as it may, *Gavur Neighbourhood*, due to its warmth and insights, stands out among the documentaries in a charming manner.

2. Translation from Fatma Müge Göçek: *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 210.

One could suppose that of all these documentaries, *Gavur Neighbourhood* might be the easiest one to sell to the European TV channels, because of its multicultural ethos.

Geographies – a sophisticated narrative

From an artistic point of view, the most aesthetic film of the seven is without doubt Chaghig Arzoumanian's family story entitled *Geographies*. The Lebanese-Armenian director nar-



rates a story that starts from Erzurum half a millennium ago and proceeds to Buruncisla, the village of Arzoumanian's ancestors for hundreds of years. The memory fragments of the village include a blue river, a church and forty donkeys of grandfather's grandfather.

Step by step, the story proceeds to Beirut, Cairo, and as far as Canada. In one of the key scenes, a descendant in America, after Pink Floyd's concert, realizes that he has as if ended up too far from his ancestors; he burns his books of western philosophy and decides to return to Lebanon. The circle is not closed, but at least it started to turn towards the beginning.

The film is distinguished by the quality of its verbal narrative – indeed, one of the most solemn Armenian genocide heritage narratives on the silver screen. The slow flow of imagery and the mental space created by moments of silence results in a film to be breathed rather than watched.

The director does not wail or speculate the lack of information after the annihilation, but proceeds solemnly and resolutely with those facts and contents that do exist, creating a hypnotic poetry of small gestures. In other words, she does not aim to portray the past as it was but rather shows the emptiness, what is no longer there.

The long sequences and silent moments are effects that usually demand exceptional visual imagery. In this respect the film is of rather uneven quality, however. Part of the

imagery stands out for its beauty, yet some other sequences are rather ordinary and even somewhat clichéd (camels of Cairo). Arzoumanian's narrative connected with visual imagery of Theo Angelopoulos would have made a perfect match! However, *Geographies* stands out among the genocide stories, due to its sublime narrative, even though the visual imagery is not always completely mature.

Perhaps the certain softness and sensitivity in the telling could be defined as a kind of feminine mode of narrative, in the sense that the outer actions are less important than their inner contents. In the final climax of the film, the narrator is left with the concepts of blue river, church and forty donkeys; the outer world has no trace of these to offer, but in her inner world they all are real and constantly present.

Regrettably, technique and style of *Geographies* will unavoidably be considered as too boring for big audiences, yet the long sequences and moments of silence serve those who are familiar with the genocide and are in need of some inner space for its reflection.

Children of Vank

Most of the documentaries filmed in Turkey show a good deal of random people who are



more or less unwilling to hear or talk about the annihilated presence of Armenians. Nezahat Gündoğan's *Children of Vank* shows a more rare case of the descendants of Armenians who are desperately keen on knowing about their past.

The film documents the exceptional case of Dersim, an area known of its Alevi majority, where some Armenians lived in a small monastery of Surb Karapet of Halvor (not the famous Karapet of Mush) until it was destroyed by the army in 1938. Consequently, the last Armenians were scattered to different directions. Some become Alevis, some Sunnis. Little by little some of them find out about their respected

great-grandfather who was an Armenian priest.

Gündoğan shows the heirs of these Armenians in search of information about their relatives, grandparents and the way of life they had. Each piece of information, even the smallest one, is valuable for them. However, the distorted traditions may include oddities; such has Herodes killing John the Baptist in Kayseri, before a mule brings his relics to the place where the monastery was built!

Children of Vank helps to understand the meaning of genocide as annihilation of national and family customs and beliefs, and even of their memory. The descendants struggle with detached Armenian names, some Armenian words such as *achig*, 'girl', and give an


overall impression of helplessness in dealing with the traumatic legacy of genocide and the cultural emptiness left by the disappearance of an ancient way of life.

A special mention must be made on Mikail Aslan's song *Surp Garabed'e Gitmişim*. The hypnotic song is used in the very end of the film to express something of what was left unsaid: the immeasurable depth of Armenian spiritual, aesthetic and cultural life that was lost forever. The song is from Aslan's album *Petag. Dersim Ermeni Halk Şarkıları* (2010), which is one of the best monuments of Western Armenian culture from Turkey of our times.



Who Killed the Armenians?

The only traditional documentary about the genocide itself among these films is *Who Killed the Armenians?* by Maryam Zaki and Mohamed Hanafy Nasr from Egypt. Nasr is the first Muslim Arab to make a full film on the Armenian genocide. It came out just for an important moment in history, when the parliament of Egypt was to discuss about the recognition of the genocide.



Given the fact that director Nasr is a Muslim, and so is most of his audience, it is no surprise that the role of Islam in the events is not highlighted as much as the cruelty of Ottoman history. However, the film is made with a good deal of effort, including shootings in Armenia, Egypt, and Lebanon, as well as interviews of remarkable characters such as Richard Hovannisian, Haik Demoyan, Taner Akçam, and the two Catholicos Aram I and Karekin II.

In brief, *Who Killed the Armenians?* deserves a full appraisal even by its mere existence. The same conclusion was made also by the leadership of Armenia, for Nasr and Zaki received the Republic of Armenia's Presidential Award for their significant contribution to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

* * *

After viewing more than a dozen new genocide-related non-fiction films in two years, I would like finally to draw attention to two important factors – not in the actual films produced but to what is lacking. Firstly, the beauty and colorfulness of the pre-genocide Armenian village life and its immeasurably rich traditions are not shown in any film. Such a film would need extremely much background work, not only in gathering the ethnographic information, but all the more in learning to grasp the ethos that was so dissimilar to modern way of life in the West, or even to the one in Post-Soviet Armenia, in which most of pre-1915 religious traditions of Western Armenia are already unknown.

Secondly, where are the art films and creative experiments? Most of the films discussed above are very basic by their technical and narrative solutions and, generally speaking, rather predictable. Could it be that the Turkish denialism has frozen the film makers to the level of the most basic documentary output, leaving everyone cautious of using imagination and creativity in order to avoid accusations of “inventing” things? Here again, the best way to show the true meaning of genocide would be to show the inner and outer character of the way of life, spirituality, culture and arts that disappeared. Just think of the beauty of Armenian medieval folk songs, to name one example, and the possibilities for their visualization. Sergei Parajanov did not say it all.

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